P.N.Bakshi, J. - (1.) A neat question of law arises for determination in this revision. In a summary trial the trial Judicial Magistrate Harriya convicted Ram Lakhan and Ram Chandra under Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced them to 6 months' R. I. and a fine of Rs. 50))/- each. In appeal Ram Lakhan was acquitted. The conviction of Ram Chandra was upheld, but the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him was set aside. The sentence of fine was, however, maintained. Hence this revision by Ram Chandra.
(2.) LEARNED counsel has submitted that the summary trial of the applicant for the offence under Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was illegal and his conviction is liable to be quashed The offence in the instant case is alleged to have been committed on 29th November, 1975, and the complaint was filed by the Food Inspector on 23rd March, 1976. The Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, No. 34 of 1976 was published in the Gazette Extraordinary on 17th February, 1976, and became operative from 1-4-1976. If the date of the commission of the offence is taken to be the relevant date which would guide the procedure to be followed for the trial of the accused, then there can be no doubt that the summary procedure of trial, which has been prescribed by Section 16 (A) of the Act, inserted or added by Act 34 of 1976, would not be applicable and the applicant would in law be entitled to stand his trial under the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing a summons case or warrants case depending upon the nature of the offence. Chapter 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relates to summary trial, Section 260 (1) runs as follows; Section 260 : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code- (a) any Chief Judicial Magistrate; (b) any Metropolitan Magistrate; (c) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court ; may, if he thinks fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences :- (i) offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years As has been mentioned in the judgment of the Sessions Judge, there can be no doubt that in the instant case Notification No. XIII ADM (B) dated 17th January, 1976 issued by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad empowered the Magistrate concerned to try a case summarily in the Section quoted above, such powers of a summary trial could only be exercised by the said Magistrate provided the offence was not punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been the target of several amendments ] from time to time. Prior to the date of offence, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Amendment Act No. 49 of 1964 has already come into force. Under Section 16 (1) (b) of this Act, as it stood then, the punishment which could be awarded to an accused for an offence committed under the Act could not be less than 6 months' R.I. but could extend to 6 years plus a fine not less than 1000/- rupees. Of course, for adequate special reasons a lesser sentence could be imposed but the maximum punishment that could be awarded was 6 years R.I. In these circumstances, the Magistrate who has been empowered by the High Court and invested with summary powers could not try an offence committed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as amended by Act No. 49 of 1964 in a summary way. In this view of the matter, the judicial Magistrate Harriya, even though empowered by the High Court, had no jurisdiction to try the accused summarily.
(3.) ASSUMING for purposes of argument that the Act as amended in 1976 was applicable, we have to consider the effect of Section 16 (A) which has been newly introduced and which runs as follows :- 16-A : Power of court to try cases summarily-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal. Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as fan as may be, apply to such trial. Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year ; Provided further that when at the: commencement of, or in the course of a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that ,a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code." This section, no doubt, empowers the Judicial Magistrate to try an offence summarily under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, subject to the restriction of sentences directed therein, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but it is to be noticed that in order to exercise the summary powers, a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, must be specially empowered in this respect by the State Government. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the Judicial Magistrate concerned in the instant case was empowered by the State Government to exercise summary powers. The authorization by the High Court, which I have referred to above, can not be taken as an authorization by the State Government by any stretch of imagination. In this view of the matter, the Judicial Magistrate Harriya concerned had no jurisdiction to try the applicant in a summary manner. The whole proceedings before him are therefore, without jurisdiction and void ab initio.;