- (1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The facts of the case leading to this petition may briefly be summarised as below. Amar Nath Misra husband of opposite party No. 1 and father of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 met with an accident on llth September, 1966 at about 8.30 P.M. on Unnao-Kanpur Road while he was on a scooter. One Kartar Singh was also seated on the scooter. He escaped with injuries but Amar Nath Misra died as a result of the injuries soon after. The accident occurred as a truck collided with his scooter. A report of the occur rence was lodged by one Ram Gopal same day at 9.05 p.m. at Gangaghat police station. It was stated in the re port that the number of the truck could not be noted and it was not known who drove the truck and who was the owner thereof. By a Notification published in the U.P. Gazette dated 18th March, 1967 the State Government constituted a Tri bunal (Motor Accidents claim Tribunal) under sub-Section (1) of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Opposite party No. 2 filed another report on 22nd April, 1967 stating therein that such and such truck owned by petitioner No. 2 driven by petitioner No. 3 and insured with petitioner No. 1 had caused the aforesaid accident dated llth September, 1966 re sulting in the death of the informant's father, Amar Nath Misra. Thereafter on 8th July, 1967 claim was filed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 claiming a sum of Rs. 80, 000/- as compensation but it was not on a prescribed form. Subse quently on 17th April, 1969 a similar claim was filed on a prescribed form. The petitioners appeared before the Tri bunal and took an objection that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of an accident which took place earlier than the date of its constitution. The tribunal opposite party No. 4 reject ed that objection by an order dated 12th September, 1968 a certified copy of which is filed as annexure 4 to the petition. The present petition is directed against the aforesaid order annexure 4 and the prayer is that the same be quashed for the reason that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim In res pect of an accident which took place prior to its constitution. It is also pray ed that mandamus may issue to opposite party No. 4 not to proceed with the claim of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 a true copy of which is annexure 1 to the peti tion.
(2.) THE petition is opposed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 on whose behalf a counter-affidavit sworn by opposite party No. 2 has been filed. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 at some length. As already stated the only point that requires determina tion in the case is if or not the Motor Accidents claim Tribunal is competent to entertain claim in respect of an acci dent taking place prior to its constitu tion. There is no gain-saying the fact that unless expressed otherwise a proce dural law is retrospective in the sense that it governs all the actions to be ini tiated since after its enactment regard less of the dates of the causes of action on which such actions are founded. In this connection I may refer to the follow ing observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 con tained in paragraph 4 of the report:- "There is no controversy on the gene ral principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to thealtered mode ......... In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relat ing to vested right is not only prospec tive." So, it is unnecessary to refer to other decided cases of different High Courts cited at the Bar for the proposition that there is no vested right in the matter of choice of forum. The difficulty, however, arises because of a different period of Limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter to be called the Act). Ac cording to that sub-Section an application for compensation is to be made within sixty days of the occurrence of the acci dent. Under Section 110 power is con ferred on the State Government to con stitute one or more Motor Accidents claim Tribunals. Reading Sections 110, 110-A and 110-F together it is obvious that there arises no occasion to resort to the remedy provided by these provi sions of the Act till a Tribunal has been constituted as envisaged by sub-sec. (1) of Section 110 and once that has been done, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit for damages preferred under Section 110-A is barred. It is to be borne in mind that Section 110-F bars jurisdiction of the civil Court "to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be ad judicated upon by the claim Tribunal." The words "which may be adjudicated upon by the claim Tribunal" are significant. These clearly indicate that the bar provided by Section 110-F is only in respect of such matters as can be enter tained by the claim Tribunal. That being so, it cannot ' readily be inferred that as soon as a claim Tribunal has been constituted under Section 110(1) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted in respect of claim for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 110, without the claim being one which can be entertained by the claim Tribunal, What I mean to emphasise here is that the provision contained in Section 110-F does not by itself furnish any ground to hold that the claim Tribunal as soon as it is constituted gets jurisdiction to entertain claim for compensation arising put of accidents of the nature specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 110 regard less of the fact whether such accident occurred prior or subsequent to the con stitution of the Tribunal. In other words that controversy has to be resolved on the basis of what is provided in Section 110-F. If on consideration of rele vant matters it is found that the claim Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain only such claim as relate to accidents occurring subsequent to its constitution then It would necessarily follow that Section 110-F bars jurisdiction of Civil Court only in respect of such claim or as arise out of accidents subsequent to the con stitution of the Tribunal and not in res pect of such claim as arise out of 'acci dents occurring prior to the constitution of the Tribunal. Thus what is to be seen is if notwithstanding the period of Limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act it is possible to give these provisions a retrospective effect. It is not in controversy that the period of Limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 for a suit to claim compensation arising out of such an acci dent is two years. The Limitation pro vided in sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act is only sixty days. If these provisions contained in Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act are given retrospective effect on the score that they relate to matter procedural in nature then obvi ously the effect would be that claim in respect of accidents which took place more than sixty days prior to the consti tution of the Tribunal would be barred even though suit in respect of them could be filed at any tune within two years of the dates of the accidents. There Is ample Authority to hold that in such cir cumstances the new statute providing a new period of Limitation unless it is so stated expressly in the statute itself can not be given retrospective effect. In the case of District School Board of Belgaum v. Mohammad Mulla, AIR 1945 Bom 377, Chagla, J., as he then was observed on page 380:- "Considering these authorities It Is clear that as a rule statutes of Limitation being procedural laws must be given a retrospective effect in the sense that they must be applied to all suits filed after they came into force. This general rule has got to be read with one important qualification and that is that If the sta tute of Limitation, if given a retrospective effect destroys a cause of action which was vested hi a party or makes it Impos sible for that party for the exercise of his vested right of action, then the Courts would not give retrospective effect to the statute of Limitation. The reason for this qualification is that it would inflict such hardship and such injustice on parties that the Courts would hesitate to attribute to the Legislature an intention to do something which was obviously wrong."
(3.) IN the Full Bench case of Govt. of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh, AIR 1962 Eaj 43 the headnote runs as below:- "It is not always true to say that the law of Limitation is only a law of proce dure and does not bar the remedy alto gether so as to destroy the right. It is a well-settled proposition of law that the new law of Limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of Limitation cannot be constru ed retrospectively so as to destroy alto gether the remedy of litigant to enforce his right in a Court of Law. In case the remedy to enforce a vested right is alto gether barred on the date when the new law comes into force without providing any breathing time to a litigant, that remedy must continue to be governed by the old law of Limitation. The Legislature has full power to make a law retrospective so as to destroy a right or a remedy altogether but this must be expressly Laid down or this result must flow by necessary impli cation. A Court of law is not justified in drawing such inference merely from the fact that the new enactment deals mainly with procedure." Similar view has been expressed in the case of Sarkar Dutt Roy and Co. v. Shri Bank Ltd., AIR 1960 Cal 243. ;