- (1.) ALL these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution can conveni ently be disposed of by a single judgment in so far as all of them are directed against the resolution dated 15th December, 1967 passed by the Regional Transport Autho rity, Lucknow Region, revoking strength on all the routes in Lucknow region with effect from the date of the resolution,
(2.) ALL the petitions except that of Writ Petition No. 314 of 1968 are operators on some or the other route in the Lucknow Region. The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 314 of 1968 is an association of operators providing motor passenger trans port on the routes In this State. These petitioners challenge the validity of the aforesaid resolution for a number of rea sons to appear from discussion to follow hereafter. The main relief in each case is that the Impugned resolution dated 15th December, 1967 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow Region, Lucknow be quashed though in some peti tions some other reliefs have also been claimed, such as in Petition No. 65 it Is further prayed that the Regional Trans port Authority impleaded as opposite party No. 2 In it be restrained from issuing permits more than one on Unnao Sandila route to which it relates since applications had been invited for the grant of only one permit on that route and further that the Regional Transport Authority be restrain ed from issuing any temporary permit on that route during the pendency of the ap plications for tiie grant of permanent permit Regional Transport Authority has contested each of these petitions. A counter affidavit has been filed in Writ Petition No. 195 of 1968 and another in Writ Petition No, 233 of 1968. No counter-affidavit appears to have been filed in any other petition.
(3.) I have heard learned counsel ap pearing for these petitioners and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the op posite party at some length. Three points have been urged in support of the peti tion. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that it is incumbent on the authority to give notice to the ex isting operators whenever it chooses to revise under Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act strength on any route. A similar contention was raised before a Division Bench of. this Court of which I happened to be a member In the case of Lakshmi Narain Agarwala v. State Trans port Authority II. P. Lucknow, 1967 All LJ 657 -(AIR 1967 All 573). In that case the contention was rejected. Material observations which occur on page 660 (of All LJ) - (at p. 576 of AIR) may be re produced below:- "...............We are unable to see as to how a person placed in the position of the petitioner can claim as a matter of right to be heard by a Regional Transport Authority whenever it decides to under take redetermination of the strength on a route under sub-section (3), Obviously, If no such right has been conferred on him by the statute, he can have none unless It be possible to say that by such deter mination any of his rights fe affected. It may be that if a larger number of opera tors is put on the route with the result that the profits so far earned by the ex isting operators become divisible among a larger number of persons and as such, an increase in the strength of the route may In ultimate analysis, mean some diminu tion in the income of existing operators. But that fact by Itself does not-furnish the existing operators with any cause of ac tion in so far as by getting permits they Ret no monopoly and, as such, whatever be the ultimate effect of an increase in the strength on the route it does not entitle them to claim notice. It thus follows that neither there is any provision in the Act or hi the rules requiring a notice being given to an existing operator in regard to a proposal to increase the number of operators on a route, nor the determina tion of such a matter affects prejudicially an existing operator so as to entitle him to be heard before the proposed action, is taken. In that view ? the matter we are unable to countenance the contention of the learned counsel that an existing operator must have his say in the matter of determination of the strength on a route under sub-section (3) of S. 47 before a final decision is taken thereunder." Learned counsel urges that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Charan Dass Sharma v. Re gional Transport Authority, 1968 All LJ 279 = (AIR 1969 All 269) (FB) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the ap peal from the aforesaid case from which I have reproduced above certain material observations, AIR 1968 SC 410, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal v. State Transport Autho rity, U. P., the view expressed by the Divi sion Bench must be taken to have been fmpliedly overruled. I am unable to agree with this contention. My attention has been drawn to the following observa tions in the Full Bench case occurring on page 286 (of All LJ) = (at p. 276 of AIR): "Once a valid permit is granted to an operator he has a right to carry on Ms business of plying his vehicle on the route concerned and the right thus given to him is a proprietary right." I fail to see as to how these observations affect the decision in Lakshmi Narain's case, 1967 All LJ 657 = (AIR 1967 All 573) (Supra). These observations at the most mean that a permit holder has a light to ply his vehicle thereunder In ac cordance with the terms thereof and has also a right to see that none is inducted on the particular route otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. These observations do not in my opinion go any further. They cannot be construed to confer any right on an existing operator to resist revision of strength by the authority concerned under Section 47 (3) of the Act. With regard to the contention that an existing operator has no right to prefer a revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act from an order revising strength on a route the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narain's case, AIR 1968 SC 410 observes In paragraph 7 on page 413:- "We are unable to say that no existing operator can be aggrieved by an order made under Section 47 (3), Increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages; It would depend on the facts and circum- etances of each case." From these observations it is sought to argue that according to the decision of the Supreme Court an existing operator has a right of revision under Section 64-A from an order determining strength on a route and as such it must be inferred that he is entitled to have his say in the matter even before Regional Transport Authority while a strength on a route is being re-determined. I fail to see as to how that can be inferred from the abovecited ob servations of the Supreme Court In my view these observations are based on the language of Section 64-A pure and simple. In fact Section 64-A is not designed to confer any right on any one but only to define revisional powers of the State Transport Authority though no doubt in its first proviso it says that the State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of Regional Transport Autho rity unless the same is made within 30 days from the date of the order. It is because of this provision in the proviso that it is possible to infer that a person aggrieved by an order of a Regional Trans port Authority can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority provided he conforms to the rule of limitation laid down therein. It cannot in my opinion be construed to con fer a right of revision on a person who feels aggrieved by an order of a Regional Transport Authority. Moreover, having regard to the language of the first proviso to Section 64-A, at the most it can be said that a person aggrieved by an order of Regional Transport Authority can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the State Trans port Authority. That would be so by virtue of a specific provision in the Act. That there is no specific provision requir ing notice to an existing operator at the stage of Section 47 (3) Is not Sn con troversy. The argument that in view of what is provided In subsequent Cl. (f) to sub-s. (1) of S. 47 (it be taken that an existing operator has a right to make re presentations at the stage of Section 47 (3)) was repelled by a Division Bench of this Court In Lakshmi Narain's case, 1967 AU LJ 657 - (AIR 1967 All 573) and that view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 410. Material ob servations occur in paragraph 5 on page 412. These are:- "The learned counsel contends that the expression "matters mentioned in sub section (1)" occurring in sub-section (3) refers back not only to matters mentioned In sub-clauses (a) to (f) to sub-section (1) In Section 47 but also the right of re presentation mentioned in sub-section (1)We are unable to accept this line of rea soning as being sound." So it is now settled that there 5s no provi sion in the Act requiring a notice to an existing operator at the stage of Section 47 (3). Such being the position, an existing operator cannot claim notice or right of hearing at the said stage unless it be pos sible for him to establish that by a re-determination of strength under Sec. 47 any of his rights is affected. A person may be aggrieved by an order even with out his right being affected. The Motor Vehicles Act is a regulatory Act. Its main purpose is to regulate vehicular traffic with a view to achieve maximum public convenience having due regard to relevant factors, such as the condition of road, demand of vehicular service in a parti cular region, number and nature of trans port services available in a particular region and so on. Thus if a permit is granted under the provisions of the _ Act to a particular person to ply his vehicle on a particular route, it is obvious that it does not confer on him any right to exclude any person who is likewise granted a per mit in accordance with the provisions of the Act. By introduction of another per son on the route he may feel aggrieved in so far as such other person is likely to divide the income derived so far by him alone. That way he may be said to be aggrieved. But it cannot by any means be said that by such introduction of another person any of his rights has been affected. So even if an existing operator is a person who can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority under Sec tion 64-A on feeling aggrieved by an order of a Regional Transport Authority under Section 47 (3), it does not follow there from that any of his rights is affected by such an order so as to entitle him to claim a hearing from the authority concerned before it passes an order under Section 47 (3). Here, I may refer to the following ob servations of the Supreme Court in para graph 7 of the report in AIR 1968 SC 410: "The High Court, as stated above, was of the view that at the stage of Section 47 (3) existing operators would not be en titled to be heard by the Regional Trans port Authority. But assuming that it is so, this does not affect the right of revi sion conferred by Section 64-A." If right of revision under Section 64-A is not dependant on right of hearing by the Regional Transport Authority, I fail to see as to how the right of hearing at the stage of Section 47 (3) follows from the right of revision under S. 64-A.;