J.S. Trivedi, J. - (1.) THIS is a Defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Saharanpur.
(2.) THE Appellant is admittedly the tenant and the Respondent the landlord of the premises in dispute. The suit was filed by the Plaintiff Respondent for arrears of rent, damages and ejectment. The accommodation in suit admittedly was of post -1951 construction and the UP Act No. 3 of 1947 did not apply to it. A notice Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act determining the tenancy on the expiry of thirty days was given to the Appellant and after the expiry of the period the suit out of which this appeal arises was filed. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit. An appeal against the decree for ejectment alone was filed by the Appellant and the lower appellate court confirmed the decree of the trial court. Hence this appeal. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the notice determining the tenancy was illegal and invalid because it terminated the tenancy forthwith. The notice Ext. 1 is on record. The relevant recital is as under: Mera muwaqqil apko ainda kiray -adar rakhna nahin chahta ha. Apki kirayedari bazariye notice haza khatm ki jati hai. Lihaza bazariye notice haza apko muttal kiya jata hai ki notice haza wasul hone ke tees yomke akhtetan par jaidad...mere muwaqqil ko de do, warna inkazai miad notice haza apke khilaf karwai zabta yani bedakhli wagaira adalat mayaz main dayar ki javegi. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant the notice terminated the tenancy forthwith whereas according to the learned Counsel for the Respondent the tenancy was determined on the expiry of thirty days. A bare reading of the relevant contents given above would disclose that the landlord only expressed his intention to determine the tenancy through the notice. The tenancy under the notice stood determined only after the expiry of thirty days when the tenant was directed to deliver possession of the accommodation to the landlord Respondent. I am therefore not prepared to accept that the notice contemplated the determination of the tenancy forthwith and was invalid on that account.
(3.) THE next contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the suit against the Appellant which is a cooperative marketing society and governed by the UP Cooperative Societies Act, 1966, was not competent in the absence of a notice Under Section 117 of the said Act. The said section reads as under: No suit shall be instituted against a cooperative society or any of its officers in respect of any act relating to the constitution, management or the business of the society until the expiration of two months next after the notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the Plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. A notice in respect of a suit against a cooperative society is essential only where the suit is in respect of any act relating to the constitution, management or business of the society. A suit for ejectment would not be a suit in respect of the business of the society. "Business" referred to in Section 117 is the business for which the society is registered and in relation to the objects of the society. Taking the house on rent cannot be deemed to be one of the objects of the society. The prohibition of a suit Under Section 117 therefore cannot apply in the present case.;