Lakshmi Prasad Nigam, J. - (1.) This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The facts of the case leading to this petition may briefly be summarised as below. Amar Nath Misra husband of opposite party Ho. 1 and father of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 met with an accident on 11th September, 1966 at about 8.30 P.M. on Unnao -Kanpur Road while he was on a scooter. One Kartar Singh was also seated on the scooter. He escaped with injuries but Amar Nath Misra died as a result of the injuries soon after. The accident occurred as a truck collided with his scooter. A report of the occurrence was lodged by one Ram Gopal same day at 9.05 p.m. at Gangaghat police station. It was stated in the report that the number of the truck could not be noted and it was not known who drove the truck and who was the owner thereof. By a Notification published in the U.P. Gazette dated 18th March, 1967 the State Government constituted a Tribunal (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal) under Sub -section (1) of Sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Opposite party No. 2 filed another report on 22nd April, 1967 stating therein that such and such truck owned by petitioner No. 2 driven by petitioner No. 3 and insured with petitioner No. 1 had caused the aforesaid accident dated 11th September, 1966 resulting in the death of the informant's father, Amar Nath Misra. Thereafter on 8th July, 1967 a claim was filed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 claiming a sum of Rs. 80,000/ - as compensation but it was not on a prescribed form. Subsequently on 17th April, 1969 a similar claim was filed on a prescribed form. The petitioners appeared before the Tribunal and took an objection that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of an accident which took place earlier than the date of its constitution. The tribunal opposite party No. 4 rejected that objection by an order dated 12th September, 1968 a certified copy of which is filed as annexure 4 to the petition. The present petition is directed against the aforesaid order annexure 4 and the prayer is that the same be quashed for the reason that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of an accident which took place prior to its constitution. It is also prayed that mandamus may issue to opposite party No. 4 not to proceed with the claim of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 a true copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition.
(2.) The petition is opposed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 on whose behalf a counter -affidavit sworn by opposite party No. 2 has been filed.
(3.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 at some length. As already stated the only point that requires determination in the case is if or not the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is competent to entertain a claim in respect of an accident taking place prior to its constitution. There is no gain -saying the fact that unless expressed otherwise a procedural law is retrospective in the sense that it governs all the actions to be initiated since after its enactment regardless of the dates of the causes of action on which such actions are founded. In this connection I may refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Anant Gopal Sheorey v/s. : 1958CriLJ1429 contained in paragraph 4 of the report: - - "There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode ..... In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective." So, it is unnecessary to refer to other decided cases of different High Courts cited at the Bar for the proposition that there is no vested right in the matter of choice of forum. The difficulty, however, arises because of a different period of limitation provided in Sub -section (3) of Sec. 110 -A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter to be called the Act). According to that sub -section an application for compensation is to be made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident. Under Sec. 110 power is conferred on the State Government to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals. Reading Ss. 110, 110 -A and 110 -F together it is obvious that there arises no occasion to resort to the remedy provided by these provisions of the Act till a Tribunal has been constituted as envisaged by Sub -section (1) of Sec. 110 and once that has been done, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit for damages preferred under Sec. 110 -A is barred. It is to be borne in mind that Sec. 110 -F bars jurisdiction of the civil Court "to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal." The words "which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal" are significant. These clearly indicate that the bar provided by Sec. 110 -F is only in respect of such matters as can be entertained by the Claims Tribunal. That being so, it cannot readily be inferred that as soon as a Claims Tribunal has been constituted under Sec. 110(1) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted in respect of claims for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub -section (1) of Sec. 110, without the claim being one which can be entertained by the Claims Tribunal What I mean to emphasise here is that the provision contained in Sec. 110 -F does not by itself furnish any ground to hold that the Claims Tribunal as soon as it is constituted gets jurisdiction to entertain claims for compensation arising out of accidents of the nature specified in Sub -section (1) of Sec. 110 regardless of the fact whether such accident occurred prior or subsequent to the constitution of the Tribunal. In other words that controversy has to be resolved on the basis of what is provided in Sec. 110 -F, If on consideration of relevant matters it is found that the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain only such claims as relate to accidents occurring subsequent to its constitution then it would necessarily follow that Sec. 110 -F bars jurisdiction of Civil Court only in respect of such claims or as arise out of accidents subsequent to the constitution of the Tribunal and not in respect of such claims as arise out of accidents occurring prior to the constitution of the Tribunal. Thus what is to be seen is if not withstanding the period of limitation provided in Sub -section (3) of Sec. 110 -A of the Act it is possible to give these provisions a retrospective effect. It is not in controversy that the period of limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 for a suit to claim compensation arising out of such an accident is two years. The limitation provided in Sub -section (3) of Sec. 110 -A of the Act is only sixty days. If these provisions contained in Ss. 110 to 110 -F of the Act are given retrospective effect on the score that they relate to matter procedural in nature then obviously the effect would be that claims in respect of accidents which took place more than sixty days prior to the constitution of the Tribunal would be barred even though suit in respect of them could be filed at any time within two years of the dates of the accidents. There is ample authority to hold that in such circumstances the new statute providing a new period of limitation unless it is so stated expressly in the statute itself cannot be given retrospective effect. In the case of District School Board of Belgaum v/s. Mohammad Mulla : AIR 1945 Bom 377, Chagla. J., as he then was observed on page 380: - - "Considering these authorities it is clear that as a rule statutes of limitation being procedural laws must be given a retrospective effect in the sense that they must be applied to all suits filed after they came into force. This general rule has got to be read with one important qualification, and that is that if the statute of limitation, if given a retrospective effect destroys a cause of action which was vested in a party or makes it impossible for that party for the exercise of his vested right of action, then the Courts would not give retrospective effect to the statute of limitation. The reason for this qualification is that it would inflict such hardship and such injustice on parties that the Courts would hesitate to attribute to the Legislature an intention to do something which was obviously wrong.";