G.C.MATHUR, J. - (1.) THE main question for determination in these cases is whether the two suits, out of which the special appeals and the civil revision arise, are covered by sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, as amended in U. P. In both the suits, reliefs for declaration and injunction have been prayed for. The contention of the Chief Inspector of Stamps is that both the suits are to obtain declaratory decrees where the consequential relief of injunction has been prayed for and are, therefore, governed by sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7 of the Act. According to him, since the consequential relief in both the suits is with reference to immovable property, court-fee has to be paid on the full value of the immovable property. The plaintiffs in the two suits, on the other hand, say that the injunction prayed for is not a consequential relief to the declaratory relief and the suits are not governed by sub-section (iv) (a). According to them they are liable to pay a fixed court-fee under Art. 17(iii) of Schedule II on the relief of declaration and a separate court-fee under sub-section (iv-B) (b) of the Section 7 on the relief of injunction on one-tenth of the value of the immovable property in the first suit filed in 1953, and on one-fifth of the value of the immovable property in the second suit filed in 1960. The plaintiffs have further contended that, even if the suits are covered by sub-section (iv) (a), the relief of injunction should be valued in accordance with the provision of sub-section (iv-B) (b) which lays down how a relief for injunction has to be valued for purposes of payment of the court-fee. The question can conveniently be split up into the following two questions :- 1. Whether the relief of injunction prayed for in the two suits is a consequential relief to the relief of declaration? and 2. how is the relief in the two suits to be valued if they are governed by sub-section (iv) (a)?
(2.) SO far as the first question is concerned, the controversy is as to what is the meaning of the expression "consequential relief" used in sub-s. (iv) (a). In Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, AIR 1932 All 485 (FB), a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court has laid down certain conditions or tests which should all be satisfied before a relief can be called a consequential relief. This decision was given in respect of Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act before its amendment in the U. P. Legislature. The revision and the special appeals have been referred to this Bench to consider whether the conditions and tests laid down by the Full Bench for determining whether a relief is a consequential relief or not still hold good. The questions arise in the circumstances set out below :- Suit No. 83 of 1953, out of which the special appeals arise, was filed by Sri N. A. Guzdar and 16 other Parsis against Sri S. T. Shapoorji and 24 other Parsis on the allegation that "The Barame Jashane Roze Bahram Mandali" of Allahabad was a socio-religious association of the Parsis, that it had constructed a hall known as Bazam Gandhi Hall, that a meeting was convened on February 14, 1952, for winding up the Mandali and for transferring the hall and that the meeting and the resolutions passed thereat were illegal and not binding. The relief prayed for were : "1. That it may be declared that the entire proceedings of meeting of 14-2-1952, including the resolutions passed thereat are illegal, ultra vires and null and void as regards the Mandali which is neither bound by them nor can be wound up for any reasons whatsoever. 2. That the defendants be restrained from interfering with or obstructing in any manner whatsoever the plaintiffs in the use and enjoyment of the Bazam Gandhi Hall property belonging to the Mandali, as members thereof." The first relief of declaration was valued at Rs. 5,000/- and the fixed court-fee of Rs. 18/12/- was paid thereon. The relief of injunction was valued at Rs. 200/-and a court-fee of Rs. 50/- was paid thereon. The defendants raised an objection that the suit was one for a declaration of this consequential relief of injunction and court-fee was payable ad valorem on the value of the immovable property under sub-section (iv) (a). The Civil Judge held that the suit was for a declaration with a consequential relief of injunction, that the consequential relief was in respect of immovable property, that the relief was incapable of valuation and, therefore, the court-fee was payable on the market value of the immovable property which was Rs. 12,000/-. He accordingly directed the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency which amounted to Rs. 986/2/-. Against this order, the plaintiffs filed F.A.F.O. No. 299 of 1959. J. D. Sharma, J., who heard the appeal, affirmed the decision of the Civil. Judge that the suit was for a declaration with a consequential relief but he was of the view that the relief claimed was not in respect of immovable property, and, therefore, court-fee was payable on the amount at which the two reliefs were valued in the plaint, i.e., Rs. 5,200/-. Against his judgment, three special appeals were filed, No. 27 of 1961 by the plaintiffs, No. 33 of 1961 by the defendants and No. 34 of 1961 by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. These appeals came up for hearing before a Bench which referred them to a Full Bench.
(3.) THE civil revision arises out of suit No. 12 of 1960 which was filed by Mahant Lakshmi Narain and two others for the following reliefs :- 1. That it be declared that plaintiff No. 1 was the Mahant of Math Khedra and Sarbarakar of Shiv Ji and of properties of the Math; and 2. That an injunction be issued restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of plaintiff No. 1 as the Mahant and Sarbarakar over the properties, plots, crops and well in suit," The properties in suit were valued at Rs. 7,343/11/- and the plaintiffs paid court-fee of Rs. 100/- on the first relief and a court-fee of Rs. 237/8/- on the second relief, treating the reliefs as two distinct and independent reliefs. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge and an appeal was filed by the plaintiffs. At that stage, the Inspector of Stamps, reported that the court-fee paid by the plaintiffs was insufficient as the suit was governed by sub-section (iv) (a) and court-fee was liable to be paid on the full value of the property and not on one-fifth of its value. The District Judge rejected the report, holding that the second relief was not a consequential relief and the court-fee paid separately on the two reliefs was sufficient. Against his order, the Chief Inspector of Stamps filed Civil Revision No. 526 of 1963. A learned Single Judge, before whom the revision came up for hearing, referred it to a larger Bench. The Division Bench, before which it then came up, referred it to a Full Bench.;