M.C.Desai, J. - (1.) The applicant challenges his conviction under Section 19 (f), Arms Act. He is a blacksmith and is a member of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his brother Ram Charan and his father Mahendra, living in one house. It has been found by the Courts below that the house was searched by a sub-inspector of police when the applicant and his father were present but Ram Charan was absent, having gone to another village two days previously, and a sword, a kanta, a pistol, a barrel of a pistol and triggers were recovered from a room and that the applicant and his father had no licence. The trial Court convicted all the three members of the joint family under Section 19 (f), Arms Act, but the Additional Sessions Judge, on appeal, maintained the applicant's conviction and quashed that of Ram Charan and the father on the ground that they had no knowledge of the presence of the the arms because of being away from the house for two days Or of being too old and weak. The applicant raises the usual plea that he has not been proved to be in possession of the arms and that they might have been in possession of his brother or father. In the trial Court a suggestion was made that the arms might have been planted by some enemy through a hole in the roof of the room but the suggestion was rightly rejected by the Courts below.
(2.) A person is guilty under Section 19 (f), Arms Act, if he has in his possession or under his control any arms without licence. It is not disputed that the applicant had no licence to possess the pistol and the parts of a pistol and the only question is whether he was in possession of them. The evidence to prove his possession consists of the facts that they were recovered from a room of a house occupied by himself and (his father and brother as member of a joint Hindu family and that his brother and father might not be aware of their being inside the house because the former was away from it for two days and the latter is old, weak and short-sighted, is hardly able to do any work and seems to be spending his time lying down.
(3.) In legal terminology no term is more ambiguous than the word "possession". Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say at p. 308 that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorizing it is that of possession, at page 317 that the idea of possession is no longer tied to fact and has become "a concept of the utmost technicality" and at page 329 that it is "no more than a device of convenience, and policy". According to Stephen, a chattel is said to be in possession of a person "when he is so situate with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need." According to Pollock and Wright ("Possession in the Common Law", p. 1) in common parlance a man is said to possess anything of which he has the apparent control or from the use of which he has the apparent power of excluding others. "Possession" is explained as follows in 72 CJS 233. It expresses the closest relation of fact which can exist between a corporeal thing and the person who possesses it implying an actual physical contact (as by sitting or standing upon it) or denoting custody coupled with a right or interest or proprietorship. It implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real detention. It also implies a right to deal with property at pleasure and to exclude others from meddling with it. It involves power of control and intent to control. In law the word is defined as meaning an act, fact or condition of a person having such control of the thing that he may legally enjoy it to the exclusion of others having no better right than himself. Salmond's theory that corporeal possession involves two ingredients, corpus possessionis and animus possidendi, is adversely criticised by Dias and Hughes at page 330. With reference to corpus possessionis, they point out that an expectation of non-interference is not necessary either for commencement of possession or for continuation of possession. They state that corpus and animus are only conditions of acquisition of possession and are not possession itself and that possession once acquired may continue even though either or both disappear. The conclusion reached by them at page 334 is that no single theory will explain possession, that corpus, and animus have no fixed meaning but are facts which the law generally requires for the commencement of possession and that possession carries with it the right to possess.;