V.Bhargava, J. - (1.) By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the validity of a number of notices issued to him under Section 34(1A) of Income-tax Act in respect of a number of assessment orders. Under the rules of this Court, the petitioner was required to file copies of those notices which the petitioner wanted to be quashed. The petition is supported by an affidavit in which there is a mention that certain exhibits are true copies of the notices received by the petitioner but the actual exhibits, which have been attached to the affidavit, do not bear the signatures of the deponent who swore the affidavit or any other authorised agent of the petitioner. Further, none of those exhibits bears the signature or the initials of the Oath Commissioner before whom the affidavit was sworn. The result is that these exhibits do not actually form part of the affidavit. In the absence of signatures or Initials of the Oath Commissioner, these documents could be replaced at any time after the affidavit had been sworn and before the filing of the affidavit and these documents in this Court, so that these documents serve no purpose at all. The result is that, for purposes of deciding the petition, these copies have to be ignored, If they are ignored, it is clear that the petition is not maintainable as it does not comply with the rules of Court and, in any case, it is not possible for this Court to issue writs quashing notices without haying before it those notices either in original or in the form of copies which in some way or the other are proved to be true copies o the notices. The petition fails on this preliminary ground alone. It may, however, be mentioned that this defect was discovered by us after the hearing of the petition on merits was practically over. In the circumstances, we consider that, in passing our order of dismissal, we may also take notice of the points that were raised before us.
(2.) Several of the points, that have been raised in this petition to challenge the validity of the notices under Section 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act arc identical with those which came up for decision before a Full Bench of this Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava v. Income-tax Officer, Civil Misc. Writ No. 397 of 1945, decided by this Court on the 15th of May, 1959: (AIR 1960 All 19). On those points, the decision of the Full Bench governs this case and, consequently, it is not necessary for us to go into these points at all in this judgment. The decision of the Full Bench is clear that none of those grounds urged by the petitioner has any force and all those grounds must be rejected.
(3.) Besides those points, learned counsel for the petitioner in this case urged before us two other points: One point urged was that, as the notices themselves indicated, the petitioner's income for these years had already been assessed once and these notices were issued for assessment of those parts of the income which had not been assessed in the original assessment orders of these years. Learned counsel drew our attention to the language of Section 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act to point out that, in that provision of law, all that is permitted is that the Income-tax Officer may proceed to assess or reassess income in cases where he has reason to believe that income, profits or gains have escaped assessment. There is no provision similar to that contained in Section 34(1)(a) and Section 34(1)(b) permitting such proceedings for assessment or reassessment to be taken in cases where the income profits or gains have been under-assessed. According to learned counsel since, the income, profits or gains of the assessee for these years have already once been assessed, notices could have been issued only on the ground that the income, profits or gains had been under-assessed and not on the ground that the income, profits or gains had escaped assessment, and there being no provision in Section 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act for taking proceedings where income, profits or gains have been under-assessed, no notices could have been issued under that provision of law. This argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner actually raises the question of interpretation of the expression "income, profits or gains have escaped assessment." The point, that arises, is whether this expression only covers cases where the income, profits or gains have totally escaped assessment or also includes cases where part of the income, profits or gains have been assessed and only another part has escaped assessment. On this point, however, we think that it is not necessary for us to enter into any discussion as the Supreme Court, in a recent decision of theirs, have explained the scope of the expression "income has escaped assessment", as used in Section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act. This case is Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, B. and O., 35 ITR 1: (AIR 1959 SC 257). The conclusion arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case on this point has been expressed in the following language: "In our opinion, even in a case where a return has been submitted, if the Income-tax Officer erroneously fails to tax a part of assessable income, it is a case where the said part of the income has escaped assessment. The appellant's attempt to put a very narrow and artificial limitation on the meaning of the word 'escape' in Section 34(1)(b) cannot therefore succeed." In this decision, the Supreme Court has thus clearly kid down that, in a case where the Income-tax Officer erroneously fails to assess a part of the income and does in fact assess another part of the income, it will still be a case where the said part of the income must be held to have escaped assessment. This interpretation put by the Supreme Court is binding on this Court, so that it is not at all necessary for us to enter into any discussion for purposes of interpreting this expression. Learned counsel tried to distinguish the case of the Supreme Court on the ground that that decision relates to Section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, whereas the point raised in this petition relates to Section 34(1A) of the Act. We do not consider that there is any distinction between these provisions of law for purposes of interpreting the expression "income, profits or gains have escaped assessment". In Section 34(1)(b), this expression is followed by an alternative relating to cases where "income, profits or gains have been under-assessed". In Section 34(1A) of the Act, no such alternative is mentioned by the -Legislature but it seems to us that this can make no difference at all so far as the interpretation of the expression actually used is concerned. If in Section 34(1)(b), where the alternative situation of income, profits, or gains being under-assessed is specifically mentioned, the expression "income, profits or gains have escaped assessment" is interpreted as including cases where part of the income has escaped assessment, that very interpretation must necessarily be put on that expression where no such alternative is specifically mentioned by the Legislature. Consequently, the decision of the Supreme Court is fully applicable and, on its basis, this point urged by learned counsel fails.;