Wali Ullah, Ag. C.J. - (1.) I agree that this application should be dismissed. The full facts of the case are set out in the Orders of my learned brothers, Sapru and Bhargava J J , and I gene, rally agree with the reasons given by them.
(2.) The applicant was removed from practice by an Order of the Special Bench of three Judges in miscellaneous Case No. 243 of 1946 dated 20th December 1946. On 29th July 1947, the present application for re-instatement and permission to practise was made by the applicant. It purports to be an application under Section 12 (6), Bar Councils Act. 2a. We have heard Mr. S. N. Verma, the learned Counsel for the applicant, at length. We have also heard Mr. Kunzru on behalf of the Bar Council and Dr. Faruqi, Government Advocate, on behalf of the Advocate-General, who have both opposed the application. Some argument has been addressed to us on the question whether the High Court acting under Section 12 (6), Bar Councils Act can admit fresh evidence and, on the strength of the same, "review" its previous Order passed under Sub-section (4) i, e., the Order removing the applicant from practice . I have no doubt in my mind that the Word "review" in Section 12 (6) of the Act has been used in a generio sense meaning "reconsider" Cr "re-examine," I do not think it can be reasonably held that the powers of this Court under Section 12 (6) of the Act are hedged in by any such restrictions as are contained in C. 47, Civil P. C. Under Sub-section (6) of Section 12, it is left entirely to the discretion of a High Court to pass such suitable Orders in each case as it considers necessary. The conduct and general behaviour of the applicant subsequent to the removal of his name from the rolls by the Order of this Court dated 20th December 1946, to my mind, is the crucial point to be considered in this case. As mentioned already, the interval of time which has elapsed between the applicant's removal from practice. on 20th December 1946 and the presentation of the present application for reinstatement on 29th July 1947, is, on the face of it, very short. In the course of his arguments, learned Counsel invited our attention to a number of cases in which advocates Cr pleaders have been re-admitted after their names had been struck off the rolls, but it is not necessary to refer to any of them beyond observing that the general principle underlying the decision in each one of the cases has always been that the subsequent conduct of the applicant is to be carefully considered and the Court must be satisfied that the Order of expulsion has had the salutary effect of awakening in the petitioner a higher sense of honour and duty than he evinced when disciplinary action was taken. Courts have always taken care to see that in the interval between removal from practice and fresh application for re-ad mission, the conduct of the petitioner has been such that notwithstanding big prior delinquency, he might be safetly entrusted with the affairs of clients and be received once again as a member of an honourable profession without detriment to the profession Cr the disparagement of the colleagues with whom be must work and without impairing the dignity of the Courts. In Order to ensure all this, Courts have always insisted that sufficient time must elapse before re-admission. A number of cases are referred to in In re Abiruddin Ahmad, S8 Cal. 309 : S I. C. 1108). In one case the comparatively short period of two years was deemed sufficient. In two cases 3 years were considered enough, but in the Majority of cases the lapse of five, seven, ten and even twelve years was insisted upon. Obviously, the period must naturally depend upon the nature of the offence and the evidence regarding the petitioner's conduct and activities after his name was struck off the rolls. Reference may be made here to the cases of,(l) In the matter of an advocate reported in A. i. R. (24) 1937 Bom. 48 : I. L. B. (1937) Bom 99, (2) In re Sri Ram Gautama, a. i. e. (86) 1949 b. p. 83 (P.B.), (8) In the matter of U, an advocate A. I. R. (26) 1939 Bang. 142 : 1939 Bang. L. E. 213 SB, (4) In the matter of N, an advocate, A. I R (23) 1936 Cal. 158 : 37 Cr. L. J. 534 B.B.), (5) In re U, ex-Lower Grade Pleader, Kama, A. I.R. (27) 1940 Rang. 32 : 41 Cr. L. J. 272) and (6) In the matter of K. J., a Vakil, Madras, A.I.R. (26) 1939 Mad. 906; (41 Cr, L. J. 163 S.B.). It should, however, be made clear that striking the name of a practitioner off the rolls does not mean perpetual disability. The decision of the Court in each case must depend upon its own particular facts and circumstances. In the present case, the applicant exhibited undue haste in rush, ing to the Court with an application for reinstate, ment. During the course of the hearing of the application, he appears to have secured a number of certificates from advocates practising at Meerut, but there are no affidavits to prove the truth of those certificates, There is no certificate from any judicial officer supporting the application for re-instatement.
(3.) After an anxious consideration of the whole matter, I have reached the conclusion that the present application is thoroughly misconceived and has no merits and that it must be dismissed. Sapru, J. 3a. The applicant in this case is one Mr. Raghubir Saran. He was enrolled as a vajdl of this Court in August 1917 and, after practising at Boorkee for a year, shifted to Meerut. He was selected for the Provincial Judicial Service and appointed Munsif in the Agra Province in 1923. In 1926 the Indian Bar Council Act (Act xxxvill [38] of 1926) which raised the status of Vakils to that of Advocates came into existence. He took advantage, as he was indeed entitled to, of the provisions of that Act and while still in service got himself enrolled as an advocate under it in 1928. Between 1928 and 1938 nothing particular happened. In September 1938, Mr. Raghubir Saran found himself posted as an Additional Civil Judge at Banaras for the purpose of disposing of certain arrears. He attracted the attention of the Anti-corruption Department as some suspicion fell upon him of taking bribes. In pursuance of their information that he was a corrupt officer, the officials of the Anti-corruption Department arranged a trap for him and a bribe was offered to him in connection with three cases, of which one was actually being heard in his Court. The trap proved successful. He was suspended the day following the acceptance of the bribe in one of the cases in which it had been arranged to offer him one and prosecution was Ordered under Section 161, Penal Code. This case ultimately came to be tried by the District Magistrate of Mirzapur and resulted in his conviction. He was sentenced to a period of 2 years' E. I. and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. On the very date, i. e., 23rd June 1941, on which the judgment was pronounced, he was dismissed from the Provincial Judicial Service by a notification of the Provincial Government.;