- (1.) Heard Sri Lihazur R.Khan, learned counsel for applicant and perused the record.
(2.) Applicant has invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") with a prayer to quash charge sheet dated 14.03.2000 and the cognizance thereof dated 29.03.2000 taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad as well as further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 129-A of 2000 arising out of Crime No.263 of 1999 (State vs. Bhikam Singh and another), under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Police Station Narkhi, District Firozabad pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad to the extent of applicant only.
(3.) Counsel for applicant contended that applicant is only a 'friend' of husband of deceased, therefore, Section 498-A IPC cannot be applied since 'friend' is not "relative" within the definition prescribed in Section 498-A IPC. This aspect has been considered by Supreme Court in Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010) 11 SCC 618 and it has been held that word "relative" would not include a paramour or concubine etc. and therefore, Court in paras 11, 12, 13 and 14 of judgment said : "11. Shri U.U. Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that in U. Suvetha v. State (2009) 6 SCC 757, it was specifically held that in order to be covered under Section 498A, IPC one has to be a 'relative' of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption. He pointed out that the present appellant was not in any manner a 'relative' as referred to in Section 498A, IPC and, therefore, there is no question of any allegation against her in respect of the ill-treatment of the complainant. The Court in this case examined the ingredients of Section 498A, IPC and noting the specific language of the Section and the Explanation thereof came to the conclusion that the word 'relative' would not include a paramour or concubine or so. 12. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word 'relative' and further relying on R. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advance Law Lexicon, Volume 4, 3rd Edition, the Court went on to hold that Section 498A, IPC being a penal provision would deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT (2007) 7 SCC 162. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr. v. State of M.P. (2007) 15 SCC 369. After quoting from various decisions of this Court, it was held that reference to the word 'relative' in Section 498A, IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage. 13. Relying heavily on this, Shri Lalit contended that there is no question of any trial of the appellant for the offence under Section 498A, IPC. The argument is undoubtedly correct, though opposed by the Learned Counsel appearing for the State. We are of the opinion that there will be no question of her prosecution under Section 498A, IPC. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, also did not seriously dispute this proposition. Therefore, we hold that the FIR insofar as it concerned Section 498A, IPC, would be of no consequence and the appellant shall not be tried for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 14. That leaves us with the allegation under Section 406, IPC for the offence of criminal breach of trust as there are allegations in respect of the jewellery. We desist from saying anything at this juncture. We also desist from going into the correctness or otherwise of these allegations as they will have to be proved by evidence. Shri Lalit pointed out that on the face of it the allegations are wild and baseless as the appellant herself comes from a wealthy background and is a married lady having settled down in Indore and is also mother of a child. He pointed that the FIR is calculated to destroy her marital life with the wildest possible allegations and, therefore, we should quash the entire FIR as not being bona fide and actuated by malice. ";