- (1.) This second appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellant against the judgement and decree dated 1.8.2006, passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Bareilly in Civil Appeal No. 222 of 1998 arising out of O.S. No. 203 of 1988 from the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bareilly.
(2.) In this appeal the following substantial questions of law were framed: "A. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the trial court was justified in striking off the defence of the defendant under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC B. Whether by a composite order the court could have struck off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and simultaneously decree the suit either under Order 15 Rule 1 or Order 12 Rule 6 CPC C. Whether after framing as many as 13 contentious issues including the availability of the protection of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 to the defendant, as well as the jurisdiction of the court, the courts were justified in law by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 15 Rule 1 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC for decreeing the suit without recording of evidence D. Whether it is permissible for the court to rely on an alleged admission made in the written statement for the purpose of decreeing the suit under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC particularly when the defence has already been struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC E. Whether from the own case of the plaintiff coupled with the registered lease deed, the provisions of Section 29-A of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were attracted thereby protecting the tenancy from termination of efflux of time F. Whether for purpose of determining the applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in view of Section 29-A, the lower appellate court was justified in holding that the constructions on the suit property were temporary, only on the basis of the clause in the lease deed that provides that the lessee shall remove the constructions made by him on determination of the lease, without recording a categorical finding that the constructions actually existing on the suit property were temporary or permanent in nature" BACKGROUND OF THE CASE.
(3.) The plaint case is that by means of a lease deed dated 20.8.1969 between the plaintiffs and Smt. Darshan Devi Jain (the lessors of the one part) and Caltex India Limited,(the lessee of the other part), lease was granted in respect of suit property to Caltex India Limited on the terms and conditions mentioned in the lease deed. A few years after execution of the lease deed, the Caltex India Limited was merged and vested in the defendant, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited1 and the identity of the Caltex India Limited got extinct. It is alleged that after the aforesaid merger, the tenancy came to an end but to avoid any conflict the plaintiffs accepted the defendant-appellant as month to month tenant and the tenancy period of ten years granted to M/s Caltex India Limited expired at the end of February, 1978 and the defendant-appellant continued to be a month to month tenant.;