Dilip Gupta, J. - (1.) THE petitioner who had sought appointment on compassionate grounds in the Banaras Hindu University (hereinafter referred to as the ''University') has sought the quashing of the order dated 9th June, 2006 by which his claim was rejected. THE petitioner has also sought the quashing of the order dated 28/29th September, 2006 whereby the petitioner was informed that this request cannot be accepted as his claim had been rejected earlier.
(2.) THE petitioner claims to be the adopted son of Aditya Narain Pandey who was working as a Group ''D' employee in the University and who had died in harness on 9th May, 1983 while serving as a peon. THE petitioner whose date of birth is 10th June, 1980 was, therefore, only three years old when Aditya Narain Pandey died. THE petitioner submitted an application seeking appointment on compassionate ground after he attained majority. This application was received in the office of the Registrar of the University on 20th August, 2003. THE University by the communication dated 10/16th November, 2004 informed the petitioner that the request for compassionate appointment was considered by the Appointments Committee of the University in its meeting held on 2nd September, 2004 but the aforesaid Committee did not accept his request because the application was barred by time. THE petitioner again submitted an application dated 17th May, 2005 before the University mentioning therein that he had earlier submitted an application before the University when he was a minor but that application was rejected on the ground that appointment could not be given to a minor. He, therefore, prayed that compassionate appointment may now be given to him. This application was also rejected by the University by the order dated 9th June, 2006. Not being satisfied, the petitioner submitted yet another application dated 7th August, 2006 seeking compassionate appointment. This application was also rejected by the University by the communication dated 28/29th September, 2006 mentioning therein that his case was placed before the Compassionate Appointment Committee of the University which in its meeting held on 29th August, 2006 observed that his case had already been considered and rejected on 30th September, 2005 as being barred by time. THE petitioner was also informed that any request made by him in future for this purpose will not be entertained. Sri Lal Babu Lal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even though the petitioner was a minor when Aditya Nath Pandey died in harness on 9th May, 1983 but after attaining majority, the petitioner filed an application in the University on 20th August, 2003 seeking compassionate appointment but the said application was wrongly rejected on the ground that it was filed beyond the period prescribed under the Rules. He further submitted that the University has failed to take into consideration the fact that as a minor the petitioner could not have been granted appointment earlier. Sri Pankaj Naqvi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-University has contended that the Executive Council in its meeting on 18/19th January, 1986 had clearly resolved that request for consideration on compassionate grounds must be made within five years of the death of the employee and subsequent requests cannot be acceded to. He further submitted that the petitioner is seeking appointment on compassionate ground as an adopted son but the affidavit in support of the writ petition has been filed by his father Om Prakash Pandey.
(3.) IN order to appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties it would first be appropriate to ascertain why compassionate appointment is provided to a member of the deceased employee. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Public Instructions and Ors. Vs. K.R. Vishwanath, 2005 AIR SCW 4102, dealt at length with the object regarding compassionate ground and observed:- "As was observed in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr. (AIR 1996 SC 2445), it need not be pointed out that the claim of person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependant on the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in-harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased-employee. In Rani Devi's case (supra) it was held that scheme regarding appointment on compassionate ground if extended to all types of casual or ad hoc employees including those who worked as apprentices cannot be justified on constitutional grounds. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar (Mrs.) and Anr. (1994 (2) SCC 718), it was pointed out that High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplates such appointments. It was noted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. (1994 (4) SCC 138), that as a rule in public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of application and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased." In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1989 (4) SCC 468, it was observed that in all claims of appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father is no ground, unless the scheme itself envisage specifically otherwise, to state that as and when such minor becomes a major he can be appointed without any time consciousness or limit. The above view was reiterated in Phoolwati (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 689, and Union of India and Ors. v. Bhagwan Singh 1995 (6) SCC 476. In Director of Education (Secondary) and Anr. v. Pushpendra Kumar and Ors. 1998 (5) SCC 192, it was observed that in matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for ground of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of the deceased-employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision."(emphasis supplied);