Prakash Krishna, J. - (1.) IT is unfortunate that a suit for ejectment of tenant and recovery of arrears of rent and damages has not yet attained finality, though it was instituted about 30 years back by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 herein, against the petitioner Ram Swaroop Saxena in respect of a house and a shop in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court by the judgment and decree dated 24-4-1984 on the finding that a notice dated 14-2-1979 determining the tenancy was not validly served, the tenant is entitled to deduct the amount incurred by him towards the construction and there is no default in payment of rent. The said judgment has been set aside by the impugned judgment and order dated 7-5-1985 on the finding that the trial court was not correct in holding that the notice was not served on the defendant. In the absence of any such pleadings in the written statement on the question of validity of service of notice, it was held that the trial court wrongly placed burden on the plaintiffs. The defendant carried out material alterations in the building in question, without permission of the landlords and as such, the defendant could not claim adjustment of any amount incurred by him towards the construction. Challenging the aforesaid judgment and order, the present writ petition has been filed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings recorded by the trial court were findings of fact and the same could not have been set aside by the revisional court, who could, at the most, have remanded the matter to the trial court. Elaborating the arguments, it was submitted that the revisional court was not justified in holding that the service of notice on the defendant petitioner is valid. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submits that the findings recorded by the trial court, being against the pleadings and material on the record, has been rightly reversed by the revisional court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The first question urged is with regard to the validity of service of notice on the defendant petitioner. The court was taken through the written statement. On a careful reading of the written statement, it is evident that there is no plea therein that the notice was not served on the defendant. The defendant took no such plea that the notice determining the tenancy was not served on him. On the contrary, it has been stated in paragraph-10 of the written statement that the notice dated 14-2-1979 is illegal, contrary to law and against the fact and as such, the tenancy has not been determined. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not refer anything from the written statement to show that the plea that the notice has not been validly served on the tenant was raised therein. This being so, the revisional court is right in making the observation that in the absence of any plea regarding the defects in the service of notice, if any, the said plea could not be considered by the trial court and as such the judgment of the trial court is vitiated.. In Dharm Pal Vs. Harbans Singh, 2006(9) SCC 216, it has been held by the Apex Court that law is well settled that an objection as to invalidity or insufficiency of notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act should be specifically raised in the written statement, failing which it will be deemed to have been waived. Then, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the notice in question is not a valid notice within the meaning of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. A copy of the said notice was produced during the course of the argument. On its bare perusal, I find no illegality therein. IT has been stated that the noticee has not paid the rent after June, 1976. A clear demand of rent w.e.f. 1-7-1976 was made and the tenant was asked to pay the same within a period of one month with stipulation that he is given time of 30 days. By the notice, it has also been provided that the tenant may remain in shop in dispute upto the period as provided in the notice and thereafter the tenancy shall stand determined. In my considered view, the notice fulfills the requirements, as provided for by Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Jalil Vs. Hazi Abdul Jalil 1974 Allahabad Law Journal 381. In this case, the Division Bench has examined some of usual types of notice that come before the Court so often. IT has classified all the notices, though not exhaustive, in categories A to G. Notices falling in categories A, B and C have been held to be valid notices, while other notices falling in the remaining categories have been held to be invalid. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present case, according to him, the notice in question falls in category 'D'. In the said category, the following kind of notice was under consideration:- "Your tenancy terminated w.e.f. today and your are required to vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of notice on you." Such kind of notice has been held to be 'invalid' on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end at once and the tenant is given right to remain in possession for 30 days either as a licensee or as a tenant of sufferance. IT has been held that when the lessor terminates the lease w.e.f. the date of notice, grace allowed to lessee to stay for 30 days before vacating the premises reduces him to the status of licensee or a tenant of sufferance, which is in contravention of law. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the first question which arises is whether the notice under consideration actually falls in category 'D' as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner or in any other category. As noticed hereinabove, under category 'D', such notice terminating the tenancy w.e.f. 'today' were under consideration. IT is not so with regard to the notice under consideration herein. On a plain reading of the notice in question, it has been provided that the tenant may remain in occupation of the tenanted portion for a period of 30 days and the tenancy would come to an end after expiry of the notice period. In my considered view, such notice falls in category 'C' which deals following kind of notice:- "I do not want to keep you as my tenant. You are, therefore, given this notice and required to vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of this notice on you." Such a notice has been held to be a notice which terminates the tenancy and ask the tenant to vacate the premises at a point of time which is in consonance with the provisions as contained under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. Then, it was urged that the revisional court was not justified in setting aside the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of default. The respondents landlords claimed arrears of rent since July, 1976. Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that he has paid any rent towards the arrears of rent. On the contrary, his case was that he has spent certain amount in making alterations in the building in question. IT is also no longer in dispute that the petitioner tenant has carried out additions and alterations in the building in question without written permission of the landlords. IT may be noted that under Section 20(2)(c) of the Act if a tenant who has without permission in writing of the landlord made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it, is liable for eviction. Emphasis is that before carrying out any construction etc., there should be a permission in writing of the landlord. In the present case, there is no written permission by the landlords. IT was not disputed by the trial court even. The trial court proceeded to decide the case against the plaintiffs respondents on the ground that permission of the landlords shall be assumed on the basis of acquiescence. The said approach of the trial court is faulty and contrary to law. When the requirement of law is that permission should be in writing, even if, the landlord had the knowledge, it will not in any manner legalize the construction/alteration. Before the trial court, it was pleaded by the tenant petitioner that earlier an agreement was arrived at in between the parties that the tenant will lay down a lintal and a room on the first floor, a stair case, kitchen and a bath room. IT was agreed that there would be an enhancement of monthly rent by Rs. 5/-. The date of the said agreement could not be disclosed by the defendant in his oral deposition. The parties were already litigating. The trial court then placed the entire burden on the plaintiffs to show that they did not accept the adjustment of Rs. 225/- towards rent. The alleged agreement was set up by the defendant and it was upon him to prove the said agreement by cogent and reliable evidence which he failed to discharge. On the basis of certain receipts of purchase of building materials, the trial court invoking the principles of acquiescence, has held that the defendant is entitled to get the expenditure incurred by him adjusted towards the arrears of rent. The said finding of the trial court is based on no evidence and has been arrived at by wrong application of law. The trial court has, by misapplication of principle of law, drawn an inference of the said agreement which it could not do. The requirement of law is that there should be a permission in writing by the landlord in favour of the tenant permitting him to carry out structural changes. Even, assuming for the sake of argument that the landlords had knowledge of such construction, it will not make such structural alteration valid. In such case, the principle of acquiescence is not attracted. The law requires that consent should be in writing i.e. in the form of document. The document itself should prove that a consent has been given. No evidence, either by way of affidavit or oral sworn statement in the court can be given under Section 91, Evidence Act to prove that such consent was given. This being so, the finding recorded by the trial court, being contrary to law, has been rightly reversed by the revisional court. The argument that the revisional court has entered into question of fact, as indicated hereinabove, has got no substance, as it has not reappreciated the evidence but has invoked correct principle of law and has rightly reversed the findings of the trial court being perverse and contrary to law. The tenant has admitted in his cross examination that the landlords used to issue the receipts. The receipts were issued only upto July, 1976 but no receipt was issued thereafter. This itself shows that the petitioner on his own showing has failed to discharge the burden of payment of rent in the absence of requisite receipts. The finding, on the question of default in payment of the arrears of rent as recorded by the revisional court, is perfectly justified. No other point was pressed. I find no force in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- Time to vacate the disputed premises is granted upto 31-8-2009, provided the petitioner files an undertaking on affidavit before the trial court that he will vacate the disputed accommodation and hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the landlords on or before 31-8-2009. The petitioner will deposit/pay the arrears of rent for the period upto 31-3-2009 at the decreed rate and thereafter from April to 31-8-2009 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month within one month after adjusting the amount, if any, already paid/deposited. In case of default in compliance of any of the conditions stipulated above, the time granted under this order shall stand discharged and it will be open to the landlords to put the decree for execution.;