B.K.Narayana, J. - (1.) HEARD Sri V.B. Upadhyaya, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri D.K. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite parties No.1 to 4, Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite party No.5, Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel appearing for the proposed opposite parties-M/s Belwal Spinning Mills Ltd. and Mahesh Chand Belwal and Sri Manish Singh, learned counsel appearing for the proposed opposite party-Helios Confectionery Private Limited seeking impleadment as opposite parties in this writ petition. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 26.03.2009 (Annexure No.1 to the writ petition) passed by the opposite party No.4 in Case No.638/Stamp/06 under Section 33/40(B) of the Stamp Act by which it has been held that the petitioner is liable to make good deficiency in stamp duty to the tune of Rs.4,74,10,160/- and to pay penalty of Rs.4,74,10,160/-, total Rs.9,48,20,320/-, on the deed of assignment dated 16.01.2006 by which the opposite party No.1 has transferred the mortgaged property to the petitioner. The impugned order has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the following grounds:- 1.The impugned order is totally without jurisdiction for the reason that the proceedings giving rise to the impugned order were instituted on the basis of an application filed by one Sanjeev Singh, who is totally stranger to the deed under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, totally ignoring the scope of Section 31 of the Act under which the Collector, who is the authority competent to pass an order under the said Section, is only required to give his opinion that the instrument requires stamp duty which has not been paid or has only partly been paid, after he gives the opinion, the Collector becomes functus officio and the provisions of Section 33 have no application. The provisions of Section 33 come into play at subsequent stage when something more than mere asking of the opinion of the Collector is to be done. Further in the instant case, the order under Section 31 was passed by the opposite party No.2 upon reference being made by the opposite party No.4 to him although there is no provision under the Act authorizing the authority competent to consider an application moved under Section 31 of the Stamp Act to delegate his authority or to refer the matter to some other authority and both the authorities were totally incompetent to entertain the application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act.
(2.) THE impugned order has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice without giving any notice to the petitioner or without affording him any opportunity of hearing. The decision to institute the proceedings resulting in the passing of the impugned order was not an independent exercise of the opposite party No.4 but the same was done at the behest of the opposite party No.2, who had no jurisdiction to direct the opposite party No.4 to impound the assignment deed or to initiate proceedings for recovery. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions:- I.1956 Allahabad 453 (F.B.) [ (S) AIR V.43 C. 158 Aug.], Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others. II.AIR 1961 Supreme Court 787 (V 48 C 124), Government of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan. Sri H. P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite parties No.1 to 4 has submitted that against the order impugned in the instant writ petition, the petitioner has statutory alternative remedy of appeal under Section 56 (1) (A) of the Stamp Act which also contains a provision for stay and as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Sri Srivastava further submitted that the grounds on which the impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant writ petition can very well be raised before the appellate authority. Sri Srivastava further submitted that remedy of appeal provided under this Act is an efficacious alternative remedy. In support of his contention, Sri Srivastava relied upon the Apex Court decisions reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others and (1983) 2 SCC 433, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa. Refuting the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties, Sri V.B. Upadhyaya submitted that since the impugned order is without jurisdiction and the same has been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice, the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC (22), Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar Trade Marks Mumbai and others. Sri Manish Singh and Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel for the proposed opposite parties, have submitted that they are necessary parties to the instant writ petition as they were vitally interested in the subject matter of the deed which has been held to be insufficiently stamped and liable to be impounded. I have examined the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has got a remedy of preferring a statutory appeal under Section 56(1)(A) of the Stamp Act against the order impugned in the writ petition. It is also not in dispute that the appellate authority has got power to grant interim stay of the order against which an appeal is preferred. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. (Supra) has held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. Paragraph-3 of the judgment of the Apex Court given in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise (Supra) relied upon by the leaned Additional Chief Standing Counsel reads as under:- "Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely the matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show that the alternative remedy of statutory appeal available to the petitioner against the impugned order is either inadequate or inefficacious. Thus, keeping in view the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the opposite parties, without going into the merits of the grounds on which the petitioner has assailed the impugned order, this Court is of the view that since the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of statutory appeal against the order impugned in the present writ petition in which he can raise all the grounds on which the impugned order has been challenged in the instant writ petition, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. For the reasons given hereinabove, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.;