Shishir Kumar, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition has been filed for quashing the order passed by respondent No.1 dated 3.9.2008 by which the amendment application filed by petitioner has been rejected. The petitioner's husband was an employee of respondent No.3 as a driver. In an accident, he was injured. Subsequently, he expired on 1.1.2005. A claim petition under Workman Compensation Act as Case No.71 of 2006 was filed before the Labour Court i.e. respondent No.1 for awarding compensation. During pendency of claim petition, it was revealed that by mistake of the counsel, the date of death instead of 1.1.2005, 30.12.2004 has been mentioned. Then an application for amendment has been filed only amending the date in the application was moved but the respondent No.1 has rejected the same without assigning any reason and without mentioning the fact that why this application filed by petitioner is being rejected. I have heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. As the limited question that whether the Commissioner under Workman Compensation Act has applied his mind while rejecting the application and has passed a non-speaking order, as such, in the opinion of the Court, it will be a futile effort to invite counter affidavit or to issue notice to opposite party. If this order is set aside, the opposite party is not going to be affected by the order which is going to be passed by this Court, as such, at this stage, the writ petition is being disposed of finally with the consent of the parties. From the perusal of the order dated 3.9.2008, it is apparent that respondent No.1 has not applied his mind and has not recorded any reason as why the application filed by petitioner for amendment of correction of the date of death of the petitioner's husband is liable to be dismissed. As no reasons have been recorded, therefore, it will be presumed that the order passed by respondent No.1 is an order of non-application of mind without assigning any reason. Learned Standing Counsel is also not in a position to assail that order passed by respondents is an order in accordance with law. It is well settled that an order having civil consequences, even though passed by administrative authority, must contain reasons so as to enable the aggrieved party to challenge the reasoning of the administrative authority or judicial authority because in the writ jurisdiction it is the reasoning, which has to be decided. In the absence of reasons, no foundation can be laid by petitioner based upon non-application of mind. In case of S.N.Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1984, the Apex has already held as follows:- "In view of the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reason an be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on an administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can be also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest under lying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. Therefore, except in cases where the requirement has been disposed of with expressly or by necessary implications, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. The recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. Therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It is however not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicitly so as to indicate that the authority has been due consideration the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K.S. Gandhi and others reported in 1991 (2) SCC, 716, the Apex Court has held as under:- "The reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. They also exclude the chances to reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The reasons assure an Inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached. When an order affects the right of a citizen or a person, irrespective of the fact whether it is a quasi-judicial or administrative order, and unless the rule expressly or by necessary implication excludes recording of reasons, it is implicit that the principles of natural justice or fair play require recording of germane and precise relevant reasons as a part of fair procedure. In an administrative decision, its order/decision itself may not contain reasons. It may not be the requirement of the rules, but the least, the record should disclose reasons. It may not be like a judgement. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicitly so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons. If the appellate or revisional authority disagrees, the reasons must be contained in the order under challenge. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to the facts on record. It also aids the appellate or revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 to see whether the authority concerned acted fairly and justly to mete out justice to the aggrieved person. In the case of M/s Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1970, SC, 1302, the Apex Court has held as under:- "The High Court in rejecting the petition filed by the appellants has observed that the District Magistrate in considering the explanation of the appellants had "considered all the materials" and also that "the State Government in considering the appeal had considered all the materials". We have, however, nothing on the record to show that materials if any were considered by the District Magistrate and the State Government. The High Court has also observed that Clause 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order does not require "the State Government to pass a reasoned order. All that is required is to give an aggrieved person an opportunity of being heard." We are of the view that the High Court erred in so holding. The appellants have a right not only to have an opportunity to make a representation, but they are entitled to have their representation considered by an Authority unconcerned with the dispute and to be given information which would show the decision was reached on the merits and not on considerations of policy or expency. THIS is a clear implication of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the appellate authority; it is not required to be expressly mentioned in the statute. There is nothing on the record which shows that the representation made by the appellants was even considered. The fact that Clause 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order to which the High Court has referred does not "require the State Government to pass a reasoned order" is wholly irrelevant. The nature of the proceeding requires that the State Government must given adequate reasons which disclose that an attempt was made to reach a conclusion according to law and justice." In view of the aforesaid facts, I am of the view that the Appellate Order dated 3.9.2008 (Annexure 4 to writ petition) deserves to be quashed. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 3.9.2008 (Annexure 4 to writ petition) is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to respondent No.1 to pass an appropriate and detailed order according to law within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before respondent No.1. No order as to costs.;