Amitava Lala, J. - (1.) THIS appeal has been preferred by the insurance company on the ground of quantum in spite of rejection of application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which, according to us, is not maintainable in view of the judgment of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Manju and others, 2007 (4) ADJ 101 : 2007 (2) ACCD 732 (All) : 2007 (2) AWC 1927, following three Judges' Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolleta Rohatgi and others, AIR 2002 SC 3350 : 2003 (1) AWC 23 (SC). Ratio of such judgment is also followed in two other three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, 2003 (3) SCC 524.
(2.) IT has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that by a subsequent order of a two Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 17301-17302/ 2007 converted to Civil Appeal Nos. 6026 and 6027 of 2007, United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Dutta and others, the principle laid down in Nicolleta Rohtagi (supra) has been referred to a larger Bench. Therefore, an interim order is required to be passed keeping the appeal pending as in the F.A.F.O. No. 2730/2008, National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shashikala Maskara and others. Without going into the controversy whether a Bench, when not agreeing with the earlier judgment and order of the parallel Bench, refers the matter to a larger Bench or even such Bench can refer the matter to a larger Bench without accepting the binding effect of judgment and order of the larger Bench, we are of the view that mere reference of a matter to a larger Bench does not declare laying down law by the three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court as nullity. That apart in date of the order of reference is 3.12.2001 and as per the case status of the internet till this date, the matter is pending before three Judges' Bench. Propriety demands while such type of issue is in the seisin of the larger Bench for active consideration, the High Court refrains from passing any order but not otherwise. We are governed by our own judgment in the case of M/s. MAK Plastics (P) Ltd. and others v. U. P. Financial Corporation and others, 2008 (7) ADJ 546 (DB), to understand difference between laying down law and a mere reference. Moreover, we cannot pass any order on apprehension keeping the appeal pending only at the stage of reference to mount the arrears of pendency on the High Court to have criticism of the people. Moreover, law will bind only when it has laid down by the Parliament or Legislature or by the declaration of the Supreme Court or parallel Bench of the High Court. Situation is not such in this case. Hence mere reference by the Supreme Court to a larger Bench or passing an interim order by a Division Bench of this Court or a referendum by any legislative body for the necessary amendment cannot lead us to deviate from our own judgment and order apart from having binding effect. Thus, the appeal cannot be admitted, hence dismissed, however, without imposing costs.
(3.) INCIDENTALLY, the appellant-insurance company prayed that the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000 made before this Court for preferring this appeal be remitted back to the concerned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as expeditiously as possible in order to adjust the same with the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants, however, such prayer is allowed.;