A.P.SAHI,J. - (1.) HEARD Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Manish Goel for respondent-Corporation.
(2.) THIS review application has been preferred primarily on the ground that the decision in the case of Mukesh Tripathiv. Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C. and another, (2004) 8 SCC 387, is no longer the correct law for the proposition that a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation is not a workman. For this, reliance has been placed in the case of L. I. C. of India v. R. Suresh, a decision of the Apex Court, reported in 2008 (2) AWC 1806, wherein, after considering the aforesaid decision in Mukesh Kumar Tripathis case, it has been held that the Development Officer is a workman. This petition had been allowed in favour of the petitioner Life Insurance Corporation on the ground that in view of Mukesh Tripathi's case, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The Development Officer namely B.D. Singh had also questioned the award to an extent and later on by an amendment application had also challenged his termination order in Writ Petition No. 35618 of 1996. The said writ petition was heard on merits and it has been dismissed by this Court today itself.
(3.) SRI Manish Goel, learned counsel for the peMf&ner, contends that this review application would not be maintainable on this ground in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal and others v. Kamalsen Gupta and another, JT 2008 (8) SC 317. The ratio of the said decision as contained in paragraph 28 is quoted herein below: "28. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22 (3) (f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22 (3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier." ;