Amitava Lata, J. - (1.) This writ petition has been filed by the Committee of Management of one Gajraula Singh Sabha, Gurudwara through its Secretary Sri Swaran Singh to establish before us that the order impugned passed by the concerned Asstt, Registrar, Bareilly under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter called as the Act) dated 29.6.2007 is bad in Saw and liable to be quashed.
(2.) We have heard the petitioner as well as the contesting respondent on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition as well as merit of the case only to the extent whether the writ Court can interfere with the matter in such type of disputes and passing of an order mechanically, or not.
(3.) Factually, one other society by the name of Sri Guru Singh Sabha, Gajraula Kala is also registered to discharge certain functions with regard to concerned Gurudwara at district Pilibhit, U.P. The petitioner is inclined to get registration of his Society to administer the same Gurudwara by the name of Gajraula Singh Sabha, the aforesaid Society. The petitioner has taken a plea before us that under the U.P. Amendment of Section 3 of the U.P. Registration Act, 1860, as applicable in the State of U.P., is to be carefully gone into to accept the position in this respect. Mr. A.K. Sachan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn our attention to Section 3(2) (a) of the Act to establish that under such Section the Registrar shall refuse to register a society if name of the society is "identical" with that of Society previously registered. Factually atone point of time existing Society failed to renew its registration but subsequently it has been renewed. Mr. Sachan has cited before us a Single Judge judgment of this High Court in Mahendra Pratap Shiksha Parishad, Firozabad v. Commissioner Agra Division, Agra and another, (1993) 3 UPLBEC 2081, to establish that there is a difference between the words "identical" and "similar" and in such circumstances the Court was pleased to direct both the Societies to function. He has also cited another judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Raghubar Dayal v. Commissioner Kanpur, Division, Kanpur and others, 2005(1) ESC 204 (All), to establish that it is true that apart from certain special statutes which entitle companies or persons to the exclusive use of a name or a mark, such as the Companies Act or the Trade Marks Act, a man has no exclusive proprietary rights in a fancy name or title, normally and principally. It is in relation to the user of a name associated with a certain business or trading concern or some profession that the Court affords protection and grants an injunction restraining the adoption and use of such a name by another when the Court is satisfied that damage has been caused or there is tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in the public mind or, in other words, by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name. He further relied upon U. Sriniwas Mattiah and another v. Krishna Kumar Chatterjee and others, AIR 1952 Cal 804, to establish that the name can be used by any company as trade mark when such type of right normally and principally can not be interfered with but later part of such judgment itself says that if there is tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in the public mind or in other words by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name, then the Court can interfere with the matter.;