Arun Tandon, J. - (1.) HEARD learned Counsel for the petitioner. 2. Petitioner before this Court is owner of the tanker (motor vehicle) which was involved in the accident resulting in proceedings under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, being Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 706 of 2000 (Smt. Juveda Khatoon and others v. Surinder Kaur and others). The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Special Judge, Bareilly after hearing the parties made an award dated 14.12.2005. The operative portion thereof reads as fol lows : "The petition of the petitioners is partly allowed and an award of Rs. 3, 35, 900/- (Rupees Three Lacs Thirty Five Thousands Nine Hundred Only) is passed in favour of the petitioner and against O.Ps. No. 2, 3 and 4. The petitioners are also entitled to get interest on the above amount @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till actual payment to them. 30% of the above amount which comes to Rs. 1, 00, 770/- shall be paid to the petitioners by O.Ps. No. 3 and 4 and the remaining 70% of the amount which comes to Rs. 2, 35, 130/- shall be paid by O.P. No. 2, National Insurance Co. Ltd., who shall be entitled to recover this amount from O.P. No. 1-the owner of the Tanker in question. O.Ps to file the cheque of their respective amount in the Court within 30 days. Out of the said amount, 10% of the amount shall be paid to the petitioner No. 6 Gunar, 10% of the amount shall be paid to petitioner No. 5 Km. Gulfam, 10% of the amount shall be paid to the petitioner No. 4 Km. Gulzar, 10% of the amount shall be paid to the petitioner No. 3 Km. Nanno, 10% of the amount shall be paid to the Petitioner No. 2 Nooran and the remain amount shall be paid to petitioner No. 1 Smt. Juveda Khatoon who is the widow of deceased, Badruddin. As the petitioner No. 4 Gulzar, petitioner No. 5 Gulfam and petitioner No. 6 Gunnar are minors, the amount of their shares shall be invested in some nationalized Bank in the form of FDRs which shall continue till they attain the majority." 3. In terms of the award so made, the Insurance Company deposited the amount so awarded, and thereafter proceeded to make an application under section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the said money being recovered form the owner of the vehicle in terms of the award. The application is stated to have been decided on 23.9.2008. The petitioner, however, made an applica tion for recall of the order on the ground that he could not correctly note the date. The application was entertained by the Tribunal and on the asking of the petitioner 16.10.2008 was fixed for case law being produced before the Tribunal in support of the application. On the interim stay application moved by the petitioner, an interim order was granted and the case was adjourned to the date fixed. The petitioner thereafter made another application for further time to produce the case law. This application was rejected on 16.10.2008. The Tribunal thereafter proceeded to reject the application made by the petitioner for recall also on the ground that proceedings under section 174 of Act, 1988 have been ini tiated by the Insurance Company in terms of the award made by the Tribunal referred to above and the application as filed by the petitioner virtually seeks modification of the award made in the claim proceedings, which was beyond the scope of the proceedings initiated under section 174 of the Act, 1988, which were in the nature of execution proceedings. The Tribunal directed that the amount as per the original award be paid by the owner of the vehicle to the in surance company. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner challenging the order so passed by the Tribunal alleges that section 174 confers a right upon the claimant to re cover the money from the Insurance Company as per the award and no other person can initiate proceedings under section 174 for the purpose. The heading of the section had been relied upon. Learned Counsel for the petitioner clarifies that Insurance Company is not entitled to make an application under section 174 of Act, 1988 and therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in granting the prayer made by the Insurance Company in its application for recovery of the amount from the owner of the vehicle. 5. In support of his case, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and others, 2004 (54) ALR 549 (SC)=2004 (15) AIC 436. 6. I have considered the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the records of the present writ petition. 7. For appreciating the controversy raised in the present writ petition, it is necessary to refer to section 174 of Act, 1988, which reads as follows : "174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue. - Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as arrear of land rev enue." 8. From the simple reading of the language of section 174, it is apparently clear that it confers a right upon the person (named under the award by the Tribunal) to recover the amount in terms of the award from a person against whom such an order has been passed. The word 'any person' so used in the sec tion would include the owner of the vehicle provided in the award a direction against the owner has been made. Similarly the words 'the person entitled' would include the insurance company provided a direction in its favour has been made in the award. 9. In the facts of the present case, the Tribunal while making an award had provided that the Insurance Company may recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, requirements of section 174 of Act, 1988 are fully satisfied in the facts of the present case. 10. It is settled law that heading of the section will not control the ambit of the provision of the section. The Supreme Court has expressed itself as follows : "It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries (of a Tariff Schedule) cannot control the plain words of the provision; they can not also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision. (Reference Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 689, p. 693= (1990) 1 SCC 400 and Forage & Co. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, JT 1999 (9) SC 57, p. 61=AIR 2000 SC 378 p. 380=(1999) 8 SCC 577). 11. After referring to the conflicting of opinions relating to the use of head ings or titles prefixed to sections or group of sections, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again expressed as follows : "It is permissible to assign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject-mater dealt with there under. The heading or title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment underneath; though the name would always be brief hav ing its own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language of the provision and the meaning of the heading or title, the heading or title would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the provision thereunder". (Reference Raichurmatham Prabhakar Rawatmal Dugar, (2004) 4 SCC 766, p. 775=AIR 2004 SC 3625, p. 3631 (9th Edn. pp. 153-155 of this book is referred)=2004 (56) ALR 105 (SC)=2004 (18) AIC 98 (SC). 12. In view of the aforesaid, the Tribunal is justified in recording a finding that since the petitioner has not challenged the main award, he cannot be per mitted to question of the order passed on the application of the Insurance Company under section 174 of Act, 1988 qua recovery of the amount in terms of the award made by the Tribunal earlier. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has no application in the facts of the present case nor the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has considered the scope of section 174 of Act, 1988 therein. 13. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Petition Dismissed.;