Tarun Agarwala,J. - (1.) THIS group of writ petitions arises between the petitioners and the workmen against an award and the consequential proceedings initiated pursuant to the said award. The facts leading to the filing of these petitions is necessarily required to be narrated for effective adjudication and final disposal of the controversy which is pending between the parties for the last more than two decades. For facility, Writ Petition No.13026 of 2006 is being taken as the leading case. It transpires that on 1.11.1986 the workman was appointed on a temporary basis and his services was terminated on 1.4.1987. The workman, being aggrieved, raised a dispute which was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court issued an exparte order dated 1.9.1994 directing reinstatement with back wages. It transpires that the petitioners had appeared before the Labour Court and had filed the written statement but, at some stage of the adjudication proceedings, the representative of the petitioners made a statement that he had no instruction from the employers and, on that basis, the Labour Court proceeded and passed an exparte award. When the petitioners came to know about the exparte award, a writ petition was filed which was dismissed by a judgment dated 17.5.1995 on the ground of laches as well as on the ground of alternative remedy, namely, that the petitioners had a remedy of filing an application for the recall of the exparte award. The petitioners, being aggrieved, preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and also filed an application dated 25.6.1995 before the Labour Court for setting aside the award. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of by a judgment dated 27.11.1995 directing the Labour Court to decide the application of the petitioners for the recall of the exparte award in accordance with law on merits, without being prejudiced by the order of the High Court, whereby, the writ petition of the petitioners against the award was dismissed. It may be stated here, that at the time when the petitioners had moved an application dated 5.6.1995 for setting aside the exparte award, an application was filed for staying the recovery proceedings which had been initiated pursuant to the award. The Labour Court, by an order dated 4.7.1995, stayed the recovery proceedings. Subsequently the Labour Court, by an order dated 14.12.1995, rejected the application for the recall of the award, against which, the petitioner preferred writ petition No.18265 of 1995, which was allowed by a judgment dated 29.11.2004, and the matter was remanded again to the Labour Court to decide the matter in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court. The Writ Court found that the Labour Court had not considered the directions of the Supreme Court and that no reasons had been assigned while rejecting the application for the recall of the award. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Labour Court again considered the matter and, by its order dated 25.10.2005, rejected the application again holding that the Labour Court had become functus officio and had no power to decide the application for the recall of the exparte order since the said application had been moved after the expiry of one month from the date of the publication of the award. The petitioners, being aggrieved by this order, has filed the present writ petition No.13026 of 2006. The workman has filed Writ Petition No.18670 of 1995 for the quashing of the application filed by the employer for the recall of the exparte order as well as against the order dated 4.7.1995 whereby the Labour Court had stayed the recovery proceedings. The workman also filed Writ Petition No.19560 of 1999 praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the Additional Labour Commissioner to implement the award and to issue the recovery certificate pursuant to the award passed by the Labour Court. In this writ petition, an interim order dated 12.5.1999 was passed by the Court directing that the enforcement of the award shall remain stayed provided the employers pays wages at the rate admissible under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, w.e.f. 1.12.1997 onwards. THIS direction was issued since it was alleged that the workman had received the wages till 30.11.1997. In this writ petition, a counter affidavit along with a stay vacating application has been filed by the petitioners alleging that the workman never offered himself nor presented for work pursuant to the order of reinstatement under the award and, therefore no wages was payable on the principle of "no work no pay" nor any amount could be recovered under Section 6-H(1) of the Act. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it transpires that the Deputy Labour Commissioner/Additional Labour Commissioner issued various orders from time to time under Section 6-H(1) for the recovery of wages pursuant to the award passed by the Labour Court. One such order dated 21.8.2008 was issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner under Section 6-H(1) for the recovery of Rs.95,060/- towards arrears of wages. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No.49379 of 2000, praying for the quashing of this order and further praying for a writ of mandamus directing the Labour authorities to recover the excess amount paid to the workman. It was alleged by the petitioners that through various recovery certificates, a sum of Rs.3,90,228/- was recovered from the petitioners towards arrears of wages, whereas only a sum of Rs.57,131/- was payable. In the light of the aforesaid factual controversy, the Court has heard Sri A.P.Srivastava, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.P.Agarwal, the learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, the learned counsel for the workman, at length. It is quite unfortunate, that the workman, having worked from 1.11.1986 till 1.4.1987, i.e, for about five months, which comes to 150 days, has an award of reinstatement with back wages, in his favour. There is also an interim order of the Court, dated 12.5.1999, directing the petitioners to pay wages to the workman, in terms of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has also been alleged that a sum of Rs.3.90 lacs had already been received by the workman without doing a single day's work. The petitioners is an instrumentality of the State and public money has been lost on account of this litigation for reasons best known to the parties, probably, based on wrong advice. The petitioners have filed the present Writ Petition No.13026 of 2006 for the quashing of the order of the Labour Court whereby their application for the recall of the exparte order has been rejected. THIS Court finds that the petitioners have not attacked the award on merits, namely, as to whether the order of reinstatement was justified or not since the workman admittedly had only worked for five months. Since these questions have not been raised in the writ petition, this Court is not inclined to dwell on these matters and, can only say, that it is unfortunate that, through an interim order of the Court, the workman had succeeded in getting wages through the process of filing an application under Section 6- H(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. In so far as the merit of the case is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Labour Court has committed an error in rejecting the application on the ground that it had become functus officio when, in fact, the Labour Court ought to have been decided the matter on merits, as directed by the Supreme Court, by its order dated 27.11.1995. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, that the Labour Court could not have rejected the application on the ground of limitation and that it should have decided the matter on merits. In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived. The Supreme Court, in its order dated 27.11.1995 directed as under: "We direct the Labour Court to dispose of the said petition for setting aside the exparte award in accordance with law on merits without being prejudiced by the order made by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of." In my opinion, the Labour Court has complied with the order of the Supreme Court and has decided the application on merits. The Labour Court found that the application for the recall of the exparte award was filed by the petitioners on 5.6.1995, much after the expiry of one month from the date of the publication of the award, and consequently held, that the Labour Court had become functus officio after the expiry of one month and had no jurisdiction to decide the application. In my opinion, the order of the Labour Court does not suffer from any error of law, in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606 and in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Badri Prasad Hari Dass vs. Bartan Nirmata Mazdoor Sabha, Mirzapur and others,.1984(10)ALR 49, holding that the Labour Court becomes functus officio after the expiry of one month from the date of the publication of the award and that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide any application filed by any party including an application for setting aside an exparte award. Consequently, the order of the Labour Court dated 25.10.2005 does not suffer from any error of law. Since no other grounds were raised to attack the award on merits, the writ petition No.13026 of 2006 fails and is dismissed. The dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition now leads to the question of recovery of wages in terms of the award. According to the petitioners a sum of Rs.3.90 lacs was already recovered from them towards alleged wages till 31.8.1998 and as per the order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner dated 24.10.2007 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition in writ petition No.61081 of 2007), a sum of Rs.7.84 lacs was paid through various recovery orders upto March, 2006. One such recovery certificate for Rs.95,060/- has been challenged by the petitioners. On the other hand, the workman had filed a Writ Petition praying that a mandamus should be issued to the labour authorities to recover the arrears of wages in terms of the award. The contention of the petitioners is, that the workman at no point of time offered employment pursuant to his reinstatement in terms of the award and only moved an application under Section 6-H(1) for the computation of the wages in terms of the award. The learned counsel submitted that the proceedings initiated under Section 6H(1) were without jurisdiction and that wages could not be recovered when there was a dispute with regard to the reinstatement in terms of the award. Further, assuming that wages could be recovered, the learned counsel submitted that only last drawn wages, in terms of the order of the Writ Court dated 12.5.1999, could be recovered. The learned counsel submitted that as per the order dated 12.5.1999, the enforcement of the award namely, reinstatement was stayed with a further direction that the wages last drawn by the workman was to be paid by the employers and therefore, the Deputy Labour Commissioner could only calculate the arrears on the basis of wages that was last drawn by the workman and could not calculate the wages on the basis of the current wages that was payable to the workman concerned. The learned counsel consequently submitted that the excess amount paid should be recovered . On the other hand, Sri K.P.Agarwal, the learned senior counsel submitted, that the arrears of wages could be recovered in execution proceedings under Section 6-H(1) of the Act and such arithmetical calculation could be done by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, and that the proceedings under Section 6-H(1) was maintainable. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Kays Construction Co. (P).Ltd. vs. The State of U.P. and others, AIR 1965 SC 1488 and another decision of the Supreme Court in The Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. , Akola vs. Baliram Ukandaji and another, AIR.1966 SC 616. The learned counsel for the workman further submitted that, in the event, the award is affirmed, the workman would be entitled to receive full wages without having worked for a single day since the employers refused to take work from the workman and therefore, the question of refunding the excess amount did not arise. Even otherwise, the recovery was made as per the wages payable to the workman and that no excess amount had been recovered from the employers. The learned counsel submitted that the writ filed by the petitioners should be dismissed and the writs filed by the workman should be allowed and a direction should be issued to the labour authorities to enforce the award and recover the balance amount of arrears of back wages. Apparently the enforcement of the award was stayed by an interim order dated 12.5.1999 which is still continuing till date. Consequently, the workman could not be reinstated. The Court, by the said order, directed the petitioner to pay last drawn wages. If the petitioners did not pay this amount nor complied with the order of the Writ Court, it would not entitle the workman to take recourse to initiate proceedings under section 6-H(1) of the Act. The interim order had not attained finality and, non- compliance of the interim order could invite punishment by the Court in contempt proceedings against the employers but, non-compliance of the interim order of the Court could not entitle the workman to file an application under Section 6-H(1) of the Act for the recovery of the wages. The interim order does not partake the nature of the award. The interim order does not merge with the award nor can it be enforced in a proceeding under Section 6H(1) of the Act. The interim order has not attained its finality. In view of the aforesaid, the recovery proceedings initiated by the workman under Section 6H(1) for non-compliance of the interim order cannot be maintained. Since various orders issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner under Section 6-H(1) of the Act are not before the Court, this Court cannot issue any writ for its quashing nor can it issue any direction for the recovery of the excess amount already paid to the workman. Only one order dated 21.8.2000 has been challenged by the petitioner for the quashing of recovery order of Rs.95,060/- which, in my opinion, cannot be sustained on the aforesaid short ground and, to that extent, the said order deserves to be quashed and is quashed. The Writ Petition No.49379 of 2000 is allowed. There is another aspect of the matter. The Supreme Court in Kays Construction Co. (P).Ltd.(supra) has clearly drawn the distinction between the words "money due" as specified under Section 6-H(1) of the Act and the word "any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of the money" contemplated under Section 6-H(2) and held that the back wages, as per the award, amounts to "money due" which can be recovered under Section 6-H(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court held that the amount of back wages can be determined by arithmetical calculation which is permissible under Section 6-H(1) of the Act. Similar view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in The Sawtram Ramprasad Mills Committee of Management . Ltd., Akola vs. Baliram Ukandaji and another, A.I.R. 1966 SC 616, wherein a claim of a lay off was found to be maintainable under Section 6H(1) of the Act, since only a mere calculation was required to be made. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, the provisions of Section 6-H(1) of the Act applies to a case where money is due to a workman under an award or a settlement or under the provisions of Section 6- J to 6-R which has already been concluded and ascertained and where there is no dispute with regard to its calculation or computation. Section 6H(2) of the Act applies to monetary and non-monetary benefits. In case of monetary benefits, it applies where such benefits, though due, is not calculated, and there is a dispute with regard to its calculation. Section 6-H(2) takes within its purview such benefits to be computed in terms of money, even though, the right on which the claim is based, is disputed by the employer. It would be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right exists as held by the Supreme Court in Chief Mining Engineer, M/s East India Coal Committee of Management Ltd. Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad vs. Rameshwar and others, A.IR. 1968 SC 218, while interpreting the analogous provision of Section 33C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court, in the case of Kays Construction Co. (P).Ltd. (supra) made it clear that back wages as per the award is "money due" which could be recovered under Section 6H(1) of the Act even if the amount is not determined and only a mere arithmetical calculation was required to be made, but whether post award wages could be recovered under Section 6-H(1) is a moot question which is required to be decided. The question whether post award wages amounts to "money due" as contemplated under Section 6-H(1) of the Act is also required to be considered and whether the post award wages amounts to "a benefit" that can be computed in terms of the money under Section 6-H(2) needs consideration. It is settled law that the proceedings under Section 6H(1) of the Act are execution proceedings and disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings. Where question of employment as per the award is seriously disputed by one party or where rate of wages is seriously disputed by a party, such questions cannot be adjudicated by the authority under Section 6H(1) and such questions could only be decided by a Labour Court. In furtherance to the aforesaid, there is another aspect which requires consideration. Under Section 6-C of the Act, an award remains in operation for a period of one year. The Supreme Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. A.R.Chako, 1964(1)LLJ 90, held that even though the period of the operation of the award lapses, the obligation flowing from the award continues to govern the relation between the parties till it is altered by another contract. In the light of the aforesaid, even if the award has ceased to be operative,, it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties that had been made by an industrial adjudication in place of the old contract. There is yet another aspect. If a claim has been made under Section 6H(1) for the enforcement of the award, the said award attains finality when the amount payable thereunder is calculated and is recovered. Another application under Section 6H(1) of the Act, for the purpose of the enforcement of the award, namely, for post award wages, is, in my opijnion, not maintainable. The Supreme Court in Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner and others, 2007(5) SCC 281, held : "If a claim had been made under an award, the same attained finality when the amount payable thereunder had been calculated . Bonus was a subject-matter of claim in the first application filed under Section 6-H(1) of the Act. The amount payable thereunder had been determined. Another application under section 6-H(1) of the Act for the purpose of enforcement of award, therefore, was, in our opinion, not maintainable. When the second application was filed, the same was dehors the award. It was an independent claim. Such an independent claim, thus, on a plain reading of section 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act could have been raised as an industrial dispute in the light of the decision of this Court in Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand. The decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kohinoor Tobaccoo Products (P) Ltd., in our opinion, to that extent is not correct. When the statute provides for a remedy in a particular manner, the same cannot be achieved by filing an application which subserves a different purport and object. Such an application was, thus, not maintainable under Section 6-H(1) of the Act which corresponds to Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even the jurisdiction of a Labour Court in terms of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be limited. An application under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 must be for enforcement of a right. If existence of right, thus, is disputed, the provisions may not be held to have any application." At another place the Supreme Court held: "Section 6-H(1) of the Act provides for a proceeding which is in the nature of an execution proceeding. The said provision can be invoked inter alia in the event any money is due to a workman under an award. They cannot be invoked in a case where ordinarily an industrial dispute can be raised and can be referred for adjudication by the appropriate Government to an Industrial Court. The authorities to determine a matter arising under Section 6-H(1) of the Act and an industrial dispute raised by the workmen are different. Section 6-H(1) of the Act, it will bear repetition to state, is in the nature of an execution provision. The authority vested with the power thereunder cannot determine any complicated question of law. It cannot determine a dispute in regard to existence of a legal right. It cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 11-B of the Act." In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion, that an application under Section 6H(1) for the recovery of post award wages, is in fact an application for the enforcement of the contract, would not be maintainable. Such enforceability is possible under Section 6H(2) or under Section 4-K of the U.P. 0 Industrial Disputes Act, depending on the situation and the facts of that particular case. In my opinion, post award wages does not come under the category of "money due" and consequently, an application under Section 6-H(1) of the Act cannot be filed. Post award wages, at best, could be "a benefit" which becomes capable of being computed in terms of money and such an application could become maintainable under Section 6-H(2) of the Act, depending on the facts and the circumstances of that case. In Manik Chandra Srivastava vs. Regional Deputy Labour Commissioner and others, in Writ Petition No.3105 of 2004, decided on 5.2.2009, this Court had held that where employment of workman pursuant to reinstatement as per the award was seriously disputed, the application under Section 6H(1) of the Act was not maintainable. In view of the aforesaid, Writ Petition No.49379 of 2000, filed by the petitioners is partly allowed. The order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, dated 21.8.2000 and the consequential order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate for the recovery of Rs.95,060/-, are quashed. The Writ Petition No.61081 of 2007, filed by the workman, commanding the Deputy Labour Commissioner to verify the claims of the workman filed under Section 6H(1)of the Act fails, and is dismissed. Consequently, Writ Petition No.19560 of 1999 filed by the workman, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the labour authorities to issue the recovery certificate cannot be allowed in the facts and the circumstances of the case, as stated aforesaid and is dismissed. The interim order dated 12.5.1999 passed by the Writ Court is discharged. Writ Petition No.18670 of 1995 filed by the workman for the quashing of the application filed by the employer has become infructuous and is dismissed as such. In view of the partial success, the parties will bear their own cost. 1;