- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. The petitioners were alleged to have been appointed in Class IV post on ad hoc basis after they had been engaged as daily wage labours for some time by the respondent No. 1. But the respondent No. 2 did not allow the petitioners to join and resume their duties pursuant to the appointment letter issued by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that the area in respect whereof the appoint ments were being made, were outside the administrative jurisdiction of the respon dent No. 1 and that the power to appoint class IV employee has since been con ferred on respondent No. 2 by a Govern ment Order dated 30th July, 1986. This order has been challenged by Mr. R. K. Porwal, learned Counsel for the petitioners.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners contends that one Subhash Chandra was so appointed by the respon dent No. 1 and he had moved a writ peti tion, in which an order dated 17th January, 1992 was passed directing the respondents to comply with the order dated 20th June, 1991, contained in Annexure III to the said writ petition within a fortnight. Pursuant to the said order, the said Subhash Chandra has been given appointment. Therefore, the petitioners should be al lowed to join and the appointment given to them should be made effective. He fur ther contends that the petitioners having been so selected and appointed, there is no scope for refusing employment to the petitioners when Subhash Chandra was accommodated. He further contends that respondent No. 2 having admitted to have forwarded the applications of the petitioners to the respondent No. 1, he is estopped from disputing the validity of the appointment on the alleged ground. Therefore, the petitioners should be al lowed to join their services and continue in their posts. Mr. K. R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that respondent No. 1 did not have any authority to appoint Class IV staff in respect of the area on which the respon dent No. 2 had administrative control. That apart, the power to appoint Class IV staff in the project area having been delegated to the respondent No. 2 by the State Government, the respondent No. 1 cannot claim any right or jurisdiction and issue any appointment letters to the petitioners. Since there was no power con ferred on the respondent No. 1, the ap pointment made in violation of the Government Order dated 30th July, 1986, is void ab initio and cannot be sustained. The respondent No. 1 having not been empowered to appoint the petitioners, the same was rightly refused by the respondent No. 2. Therefore, he prays for dismissal of the writ petition. I have heard both Mr. R. K. Porwal and Mr. K. R. Singh at length.
(3.) COUNSEL for the petitioner had relied on the interim order dated 17th January, 1992 granted in favour of Sub-hash Chandra in his writ petition and claims that the petitioners may also be equitably considered. Admittedly, the interim orders are interlocutory orders and are not prece dents. Therefore, any order passed in another writ petition cannot be imported to the present one. The petitioner cannot claim similar orders in terms of the order dated 17th January, 1992. But then from Annexure CA-1, it appears that the respondent No. 1 cannot appoint the petitioners when he had no power to do so and Subhash Chandra having been ap pointed pursuant to the interim order, which is subject to the result of the writ petition, no similarity could be claim by the petitioner. Inasmuch as interim orders are not precedents and then again interim order did not lay down any ratio which could be followed.;