S.R. Singh, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been instituted for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 24.10.1997 and 24.2.1992 passed by the opposite parties No. 1 and 2 respectively. The respondent Ravindra Prakash Mathur applied for execution of a decree for possession of the house in question. Suit No. 88 of 1974 giving rise to the decree was instituted by Ravindra Prakash Mathur in the Court of Civil Judge, Saharanpur for possession of the suit property. The relief was based on the ground that the defendant was liable to hand over the possession of the house to the plaintiff in view of Clause 9 of the agreement due to the breach of contract by the petitioner. The trial court dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 30.9.1977. The plaintiff then preferred an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1977 which came to be allowed by the District Judge, Saharanpur vide judgment and order dated 28.7.1980. The Second Appeal No. 2506 of 1980 filed by the defendant -petitioner was allowed in part by this Court vide judgment order dated 4.12.1986. The decree passed by the High Court became final between the parties but when the decree -holder applied for execution of the decree the petitioner filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating therein that she was in possession of the house in question as tenant from before the execution of the agreement and the suit filed by the plaintiff -Respondent was barred by Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) and therefore, the decree in the suit was a nullity. The Execution Court by its order dated 24.2.1992 rejected the objection filed by the petitioner -judgment -debtor. Aggrieved by the order dated 24.2.1992 the petitioner preferred a Civil Revision No. 54 of 1992 which came to be dismissed by order dated 24.10.1997. These two orders are the subject -matter of impugnment in this writ petition. I have heard Sri V.K. Barman for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon for the respondent/decree -holder.
(2.) THE thrust of submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that suit for eviction of the petitioner from the house in question was barred by Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, and hence the decree passed in the suit was nullity. Learned Counsel urged that the petitioner was in occupation of the house in question as its tenant from before the agreement to sale dated 8.6.1962. Section 20(1) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, it may be recalled, visualises that save as provided in sub -section (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner, provided that nothing in this sub -section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy of a fixed term was entered into or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding which is either recorded in Court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. Sub -section (2) of Section 20 visualises the grounds on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted. Sri V.K. Barman placed reliance upon the statement of the plaintiff -respondent recorded during the trial of the suit in which it was admitted by him during the course of examination on 25.1.1977 that the defendant -petitioner herein had been residing in the house as a tenant from before agreement on breach of which the suit was filed. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted, in reply to the submissions made by Sri Barman, that the Court executing decree cannot go behind the decree, that in paragraph 6 of her written submission, the petitioner had admitted the allegations made in paragraph 6 of the plaint that physical possession of the house was delivered to her in pursuance of the agreement between the parties and therefore, Sri Rajesh Tandon submitted, the petitioner became liable to eviction in terms of Clause 9 of the agreement which reads as under: If the second party fails to pay for six months installments continuously to the Bank or fails to pay Rs. 400 (Rupees four hundred) in any year or does not pay off balance of the loan in the last year, then in that case the whole amount paid by the second party either to the first party as earnest money or to the Bank towards loan, will stand forfeited to the first party and this deed and agreement will immediately come to an end and will be deemed to have been cancelled and the second party will have absolutely no right against the first party under this deed. The second party will be liable to deliver back the possession of the said house to the first party and if he fails to do so then the first party will be entitled to get possession through Court. Having given my anxious consideration to the submissions made across the Bar, I am of the considered view that the Courts below have rightly rejected the objection filed by the petitioner under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others : AIR 1970 SC 1475, it was held that Executing Court cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representative, it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts, until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. It is true, a decree passed by a Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction to make it would be a nullity and its invalidity can be set up anywhere at any time including execution proceeding, but the ground on which the decree is sought to be declared a nullity in the present case is, in my opinion, not sustainable. The bar of Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 cannot be pressed into service in execution proceeding, particularly in view of the fact that admittedly the petitioner was put in possession of the house in question on the basis of the agreement to sale between the parties and the plea that she was in occupation of the house as tenant from before the agreement was not raised by the petitioner in her written statement. Mere fact that in course of cross -examination the respondent -plaintiff admitted that the defendant -petitioner herein was living in the house from before the agreement would not be sufficient to hold that the suit was not maintainable in view of the bar created by Section 20(1) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1977, Ravindra Prakash Mathur v. Smt. Kailashwati, arising out of judgment and decree dated 30.9.1997, the appellate Court recorded a categorical finding that as a consequence of breach committed by the defendant, the agreement of sale came to an end and being owner of the house, the plaintiff was entitled to resume possession over the house. The appellate Court categorically held that "the basis on which the defendant came in possession has disappeared in consequence of her failing to abide by the terms agreed for the payment being made to the Bank." It is not open to the petitioner now to say that she was not given possession of the house under the agreement for sale and was rather in occupation of the same as tenant from before the agreement for sale. 'Admission', it may be stated, is the best evidence but it cannot be explained or proved to be incorrect. In the instant case it was not pleaded by the petitioner in her written statement that she was in occupation of the house as a tenant. The admission of the respondent decree -holder on which reliance has been placed by Sri V.K. Barman is of no avail and in any case shall be presumed to have been not relied upon in view of the fact that the decree in question was based on the finding that the possession of the house in question was delivered to the defendant -petitioner pursuant to the agreement for sale executed between the parties. In my opinion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the writ petition fails and is dismissed with cost on parties. The interim order dated 30.7.1998 as extended from time to time is hereby discharged.;