- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. The petitioner had filed a suit for a declaration that his ter mination of service is illegal and invalid and that he is entitled to continue in ser vice as well as to the payment of salary. A preliminary issue was framed as to the maintainability of the suit. The trial Court had held that the suit is not maintainable. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal No. 13 of 1989 was preferred. The said appeal was allowed and it was held that the suit is maintainable as framed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. P. Vajpayee had argued that in view of the provisions con tained in Section 6 of the U. P. Public Ser vice Tribunal Act, the suit is not main tainable. He also contended that even if the suit is not barred by Section 6 of the said Act by reason of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the U. P. Inter mediate Education Act, 1921, the Civil Court can assume jurisdiction in respect of termination of service of an employee other than teacher.
(2.) SRI G. D. Misra, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 on the other hand contended that the civil suit is main tainable and he had referred to several judgments on this point. According to him, the petitioner not being a public ser vant within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (b), Section 6 of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976 cannot be at tracted. According to him by reason of this specific provision contained in Section 16g (4) of the U. P. Intermediate Educa tion Act, the bar of suit provided therein applies in relation to the persons covered by sub-section 3 thereof. Sub-section 3 covers only the teachers and not other employees of a recognized school. The petitioner being other employee of a recognised school, such bar cannot operate against him in respect of filling of the suit. After hearing heard both the learned Counsel, it appears that the petitioner cannot be said to be a public servant as defined in Section 2 (b) of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976 since he is neither in the service nor in the pay of State Govt. , nor of a local authority or any other corporation owned or con trolled by the State Govt. The said defini tion does not include an employee other than teachers in a recognized school. Therefore, Section 6 of the said Act cannot be attracted to bar the suit in respect of termination of service as rightly con tended by Mr. G. D. Misra, learned Coun sel for respondent that Section 16g (4) does not bar a suit in respect of termina tion of service of an employee other than teacher of a recognized school. Regulation 31 of Chapter III of the said Regulation framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, does not specify that a suit is barred while prescribing certain other remedies therein. When Section 16g (4) has deliberately omitted to include other employees while creating bar of suit in respect of conditions of service, the same embargo cannot be introduced through rules, which the Act had omitted to incorporate. There cannot be any rule framed contradicting the Act itself. Therefore, the bar provided in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act against filing of the suit, does not operate in respect of termination of service of an employee other than teacher, in a recognized school. Now such suit is subject to Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act in respect of the contract of employment which cannot be specifically enforced. But this provision does not preclude a person from seeking a declaration of some right arising out of his employment under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was so held in the case of Ashok Kumar Srivastava v. National Insurance Company Limited, reported in 1998 (33) ALR 386. In the said judgment, it was held as follows: "though Specific Relief Act widens the spheres of the Civil Court its preamble shows that the Act is not exhaustive of all kinds of specific reliefs. "an Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief. It is well to remember that the Act is not restricted to specific performance of contracts as the statute governs powers of the Court in granting specific reliefs in a variety of fields. Even so, the Act does not cover all specific reliefs conceiv able. Its preceding enactment (Specific Relief Act, 1877) was held by the Courts in India as not exhaustive. Vide Ramdas Khatavu v. Atlas Mills. In Hunger ford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra and Ors. , this Court observed that Specific Relief Act, 1963, is also not an exhaus tive enactment and it does not consolidate the whole law on the subject. "as the preamble would indicate, it is an Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief. It does not purport to lay down the law relating to specific relief in all its ramification. " Chapter II, contains a fasciculus of rules relating to specific performance of contracts. Section 14 falls within that Chapter and it points to contracts which are not specifically enforce able. Powers of the Court to grant declaratory reliefs are adumbrated in Section 34 of the Act which falls under Chapter VI of the Act. It is well to remember that even the wide language con tained in Section 34, did not exhaust the powers of the Court to grant declaratory reliefs. In Veruareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and Ors, v. Konduri Seshu Reddy and Ors. and in Mis. Suprepe General Films Exchange Ltd, v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. , this Court while interpreting the cor responding provision in the preceding enact ment of 1977 (Section 42) has observed that "section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognized type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in ap propriate cases falling outside Section 42. " the position remains the same under the present Act also. Hence the mere fact a suit which is not maintainable under Section 14 of the Act is not to persist with its disability of non-admission of Civil Courts even outside the contours of Chap ter II of the Act. Section 34 is enough to open the corridors of Civil Courts to admit suits filed for a variety of declaratory reliefs. "
(3.) THUS it seems that a suit is main tainable to the limited extent under Sec tion 34 relating to the declaratory decree declaring the right of the petitioner under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act sub ject to the restriction of Section 14 there of. Therefore, the order impugned does not suffer from any infirmity, for which it can be set aside. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that since in junction has been prayed for in the suit, the same is not maintainable in view of the Allahabad Amendment of Order XXXIX, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.;