- (1.) R. R. K. Trivedi, J. Central Ad ministrative Tribunal, Allahabad by order dated 4th November, 1996 accepted the claim of the applicants in O. A. No. 1642 of 1994 and ten other cases with direction to respondents to consider the claim of ap plicants and to give same benefit which is available to the other candidates under the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 27th July, 1995 in civil appeal arising out of S. L. P. (C) Nos. 14756-61 of 1993, 11631 of 1994 and 20114 of 1993. Hon'ble Supreme Court by its judgment in the aforesaid civil appeal set aside the order passed by bench of the Tribunal in O. A. No. 479 of 1992. The Tribunal in para graph No. 8 gave reasons for accepting the claim of the applicants which reads as under:- "o. A. No. 479 of 1993 is one of the cases which has been dismissed by a bench of this Tribunal wherein it has been held that the Mobile Booking Clerks and the Voluntary Tick et Collectors belong to two different categories and that the benefit of Railway Board's circular dated 6-2-1990 is available to Mobile Booking Clerks only and that Voluntary Ticket Collectors are not entitled to the benefit of the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reversed the above finding by setting aside the order of the Tribunal. As we have already noticed above in Usha Kumari Anand's case reliance has been placed on the decision of Sameer Kumar Mukherjee which pertain to Voluntary Ticket Collectors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the order whereby the judgment of this Tribunal in O. A. No. 479 of 1993 has been set aside has held that the appeals are disposed of with the direction given in the case of Usha Kumari Anand and the respondents were directed to examine the case of the appellants in accordance with the direc tions contained in paras 37 and 38 of the Tribunal's judgment in that matter. The case of the applicants in these O. As. is similar to that of the O. A. No. 479 of 1993. Hence the controver sy whether the Voluntary Ticket Collectors are entitled to the benefit of the instructions issued by the Railway Board in their letter dated 6-2-1990 is available to the Voluntary Ticket Collec tors or not, stands settled in the aforesaid case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, thus, by setting aside the judgment of this Tribunal in O. A. No. 479 of 1993 and by issuing a direction to the respondents to exemine the case of the ap plicants in accordance with the directions con tained in paras 37 and 38 of Usha Kumari Anand's case put a stamp of approval to the law laid down in Samir Kumari Mukherjee's case. Therefore, there is nothing more for this Tribunal to adjudicate in these applications. The applicants of all these original Ap plications are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above. These applications, there fore, will abide by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal referred to above. A copy of this order be placed in the records of all the cases. There will be no order as to costs. " Against the aforesaid order dated 4th November, 1996 present petitioners filed review applications which have been rejected by the Tribunal by order dated 22nd' April, 1997. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) IN this writ petition, notices were issued to the respondents by order dated 9-2-98 and the implementation of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal impugned in this writ petition was directed to be kept in abeyance till the next date of listing. Respondents have put in appearance and filed counter- affidavit alongwith an application for vacating stay order. Learned Counsel for the respon dents raised a preliminary objection ques tioning the maintainability of the writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that writ peti tions against the order of the Central Ad ministrative Tribunal have been held to be maintainable in respect of those orders which have been passed after the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, (1997)3 SCC 261. It is submitted that the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar case (supra) was given on 18th March, 1997. Thus as the main order impugned in this writ petition passed by Tribunal, was of 4th November, 1996, the writ petition is not legally maintainable. Reliance has been placed in paragraph 94 of the aforesaid judgment which reads are under:- "the directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respec tive High Courts will, however, come into effect prospectively i. e. will apply to decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings, we have invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to decisions already rendered. " Reliance has also been placed in Full Bench judgment of this Court is Sakal Singh and others v. Smt. Devi and another, AIR 1979 Alld. 274. It has been submitted that admission of a review application only means that the Court is satisfied about the merit of the applications but still after hearing both the parties the Court may reject the review application. It is only when the review application is allowed that the original proceeding is reopened then it could be said that the judgment is put to jeopardy. Learned Counsel has fur ther submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable against the main order dated 4th November, 1996 against which only an appeal can be filed before Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence it is not open to petitioners to challenge the same order on basis of order dated 27th April, 1997 rejecting the review application. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the controversy in this writ petition stands concluded by judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court which have been followed by the learned Tribunal, neither the review application was maintainable nor this writ petition is maintainable. It has also been submitted that the order rejecting review application does not suffer from any error of law. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, submitted that against the order of the Tribunal a review application is maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 22 (3) (f) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, here- in-after referred to as Act' read with Rule 17 of Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987. It has been sub mitted that as petitioners have statutory right to file a review application under the provisions of the Act and the Rules which has been decided after the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 18th March, 1997 in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), this writ petition is legally main tainable.
(3.) WE have thoroughly considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties about the maintainability of the writ petition. From perusal of the provisions contained in Cl. (f) of Section 22 (3) of the Act read with Rule 17 of the Rules, there is no doubt that the review application filed by petitioners was main tainable before the Tribunal. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sri Gopalbandhu Biswal etc. v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and others, etc. , J. T. 1998 (3) SC 279 after considering the provisions of Section 22 (3) (f) and Rule 17 has held that power of review which is granted to an Ad ministrative Tribunal is similar to power given to a civil court under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, any person (inter alia) who considers himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred can apply for review under Order XLVII, Rule l (1) (a ). An appeal lies to this Court from a decision of the Administrative Tribunal. If an appeal is preferred, the power to review cannot be exercised. In the case before Hon'ble Supreme Court special leave petition to file an appeal was preferred from the judgment of the Tribunal, which was rejected. As a result of the order of the Tribunal became final and binding. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is being reproduced below:- "the power of review which is granted to an Administrative Tribunal is similar to power given to Civil Court under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, any person (inter alia) who considers himself ag grieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred can apply for review under Order XLVII, Rule l (1) (a ). An appeal lies to this Court from a decision of the Administrative Tribunal. If an appeal is preferred, the power to review cannot be exercised. In the present case, a special leave petition to file an appeal was preferred from the judgment of the Tribunal in T. A. No. 1 of 1989 to this Court and the special leave petition was rejected. As a result the order of the Tribunal in TA No. 1 of 1989 became final and binding. The rejection of a petition for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. In effect, amounts to declining to entertain an appeal, thus making the judgment and order appealed against. final and binding. Once a spe cial leave petition is filed and rejected, the party cannot go back to the Tribunal to apply for review. In the case of State of Maharashtra and another v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, JT 1996 (3) SC 567 (1993)3 SCC 403, this Court held that when a special leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Thereafter the power of review cannot be exercised by the Tribunal. The Court said that the exercise of power of review by the Tribunal in such circumstances would be "deleterious to judicial discipline. " Once the Supreme Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. In Sree Narayana Dhannasanghom Trust v. Swami Prakasananda and others, JT 1997 (5) SC 100; (1997)6 SCC 78, the above decision was reaf firmed. This Court held that after an order of this Court dismissing the S. L. P. in limine from a judgment of the High Court, the High Court cannot review it. The Court followed the earlier judgment in State of Maharashtra and another v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle (supra ). " Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the controversy as to whether Voluntary Ticket Collectors and Mobile Booking Clerks were entitled for the benefit of the Circular of Railways dated 6-2-1990 stands settled under the judgment dated dated 27the July, 1995 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Against the order of the Tribunal deciding bunch of 73 cases (leading case of which was O. A. No. 83 of 1993), Special Leave Petitions were filed before Hon'ble Supreme Court which were numbered as 9606-9608, 16443-51, 17005-17017, 17148-17164, 17224-17230 and 18608 of 11995. All these Special Leave Petitions were decided by order dated 19th February, 1996 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. The order reads as under:- "special Leave granted. Learned Counsel state that the matters are covered by the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14756-61/93 and connected matters decided on 27-7-1995. The order of the Tribunal under appeal is, accordingly, set aside. The appeals are disposed of with the directions given in the case of Usha Kumarianand. The respondents are directed to examine the case of the appellant in accordance with the directions contained in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Tribunal's judgment in that matter. This should be done within Six weeks. There shall be no order as to costs. " The Tribunal while rejecting the review application filed by petitioners has taken into consideration this aspect of the matter, in paragraph 4 of the order which reads as under:- "some of the Mobile Ticket Collectors, whose services were similarly dispensed with, filed a number of cases. A bunch of 73 such cases, leading case of which was O. A. No. 83 of 1993 was heard and disposed of by a Bench of this Tribunal comprising Hon'ble Vice-Chair man and Hon'ble Mr. K. Muthu Kumar, Ad ministrative Member. The said Bench dismissed the O. As. and held that voluntary/mobile Ticket Collectors and Mobile Booking Clerks are two different cadres and the instructions issued by the Railway Board by letter dated 6-2-1990 are applicable to the category of Mobile Booking Clerks only. Shri Shiv Shanker, the applicant of O. A. No. 479 of 1993 challenged the decision in the aforesaid case by filing Special Leave Peti tion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reversed the above finding by setting aside the order of the Tribunal. The cases of the applicants in the O. As. , the judgment of which is being sought to be reviewed in this Misc. Application, are in pari-materia with the case of Shiv Shanker allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We, therefore, by order under review held that their cases will abide by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal of the said Shiv Shanker. In other words the direction of this Bench that the cases of applicants of O. A. No. 1642 of 1994 and other connected O. As. will be examined in the same manner as in the case of Shiv Shanker, the applicant in O. A. No. 479 of 1992. The direction in this O. As. , therefore, obligates the respondents to examine the cases of the ap plicants of O. A. No. 1642 of 1994 and other connected O. As. in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. " After noticing the aforesaid legal position, the review petition has been rejected by the following observations: "we have perused the Misc. Review Ap plications and the order sought to be reviewed and we find that neither any error apparent on the face of the record has been shown nor it has been brought to our notice that material facts having bearing on the merit of the case, could not be brought out with exercise of due diligence at the time, order was passed, have subsequently been discovered, warranting review of the order. We, therefore, find no merit in the review ap plication No. 37 of 1997 and the connected Review Applications. The petitioners, in fact, are seeking fresh judgment on merit which is not permissible within the scope of review. " The legal position in the present case is that the order dated 4th November, 1996 has been passed following the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and reliefs have been granted following the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court. In such cir cumstances, as the controversy stood con cluded by order of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the review petition was not legally maintainable though technically it can be said that as no S. L. P. was filed against order dated 4th November, 1996, the review is maintainable but the main tainability of the review petition has to be judged as to whether the Tribunal was in a position to review its order which was passed following the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In our opinion, it was a futile exercise to file a review application where the controversy had already been decided and settled by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court. In case of Shri Gopabandhu Biswal (supra) at the time of review application was filed, three fresh O. As. were also filed claiming benefit of the judgment of Tribunal which had be come final on rejecting of Special Leave Petition by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Tribunal dismissed these O. As. following its order passed on the review application. Order of tribunal rejecting the O. As. was also set aside by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Paragraph No. 15 of the judgment is reproduced below:- "the Tribunal also had before it, three other applications which were filed under Sec tion 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Tribunal had dismissed these applica tions in view of having allowed the review peti tions and set aside its earlier order in TA. No. 1 of 1989. In view of the fact that the Tribunal's judgment in review applications cannot be sus tained, the Tribunal will be required to examine these three applications filed before it on merit and dispose them of in accordance with law. " Petitioners, if were aggrieved by order dated 4th November, 1996, instead of filing review, they should have filed an appeal before Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, review petition was not legally main tainable.;