- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. It is alleged that the land of the petitioner's father was acquired by the respondents and pursuant to the Government order on compassionate ground he was offered traineeship. The traineeship was terminated by an order dated 9- 8-1984 without assigning any reason. This order has since been chal lenged in the present writ petition.
(2.) SRI Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that since the offer of traineeship contained in Clause-11 that he may be offered an employment in a suitable scale of pay depending upon successful completion of the training. He also contends that the termination is in valid on account of mala fide. He further contends that the appointment was on compassionate ground, it should have been made permanent appointment and could not have been dispensed with on the alleged ground and in that event the pur pose of appointing on compassionate ground will be completely frustrated. He further contends that by reason of Clause-11 of the conditions of offer of appointment/traineeship, the petitioner has a right to be absorbed in service. The other contention is that the termination not being simplicities and having been done in violation of principles of natural justice, the same cannot be sustained and the same should be quashed. Sri Chandrashekhar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, on the other hand contends that the petitioner's services has not been terminated on the basis of confidential report or otherwise. It was termination simpliciter and in terms of the offer of Traineeship the petitioner cannot claim any right. Clause-11 provides that he may be offered an employment in a suitable scale of pay depending upon his passing typing test and final assessment by the Selection Committee, subject to the availability of the post, which is a matter of chance and does not confer any legal right upon the petitioner. At the same time Clause-10 provides that training can be terminated at any time during the currency of training or at the conclusion of the training without any notice and without assigning any reason there for. The train ing shall continue for the period as the respondent may decide. Therefore ter mination of Traineeship after nine months cannot be said to be illegal and cannot be beyond the scope of said letter of offer. He further contends that compassionate ap pointment as a trainee does not mean that the respondents are precluded from ter minating his traineeship. His appoint ment was subject to the conditions of offer of appointment as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition dated 22-10-1993 addressed to the petitioner. Having ac cepted the said appointment the petitioner cannot contend otherwise. On these grounds, according to him, the writ petition should be dismissed. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length.
(3.) SO far as the point that termination was not termination simpliciter is con cerned. In paras 11 and 12 of the petition the petitioner has made out a case that his Traineeship has been terminated on the basis of confidential report. In para-11 of the counter-affidavit it has been pointed out by the respondents that termination was not on the basis of any confidential report or otherwise which was termination simpliciter. The alleged report, if any, is connected with project and its plants which are always subject to surveillance of different agencies which are purely con fidential and the same has no nexus with the present controversy. This proposition is being disputed in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner. Thus on the face of it it appears that a disputed questions of fact has been raised. This Court sitting in writ jurisdiction cannot enter into dis puted questions of fact. However, there is no material to substantiate the allegations made in paras 11 and 12 of the writ peti tion. There is no iota of material to sub stantiate the said allegations. In absence of any such material it is not possible to decide the question by this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction. Therefore the said point cannot be sustained. The second point that Traineeship cannot be terminated in view of Clause-11 of the condition of offer, is concerned, it appears that the condition of offer as provided in the said Clause-11 prescribes that, "you may be offered an employment in a suitable scale of pay of the Corporation depending upon the pass ing typing test and which should be con ducted during the period of training from time to time and fixed in the grade of L. D. C. after final assessment by the Selec tion Committee, subject to availability of post. " Thus, this contention is purely a chance which may come in the way of the trainee. Subject to the availability of post such offer may be made and depending upon passing of test and final assessment by the Selection Committee which are the conditions to be fulfilled. Simply because a person has been offered Traineeship does not mean that he has a right of considera tion under Clause-11 before completion of his training. In the present case the Traineeship was terminated, therefore, there was no completion of Traineeship and that right might be accrued to the petitioner only after completion of the training and not before that. The right can accrue only after the petitioner would have completed Traineeship. Clause-1 contains a condition that initially the period of training shall be of six months and would be further extended according to the discretion of the respon dents and the trainee will have no choice in the matter. In the present case admittedly the petitioner had been continuing till the date of termination of Traineeship. The petitioner cannot say that on completion of six months he has completed Traineeship since it was not within his choice.;