- (1.) R. K. GULATI, J. These are two connected trade tax revision, filed at the instance of the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U. P. , Lucknow and are directed against a common order dated June 9, 1997 passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, Agra Bench III, Camp at Saharanpur, As the controversy raised in both these revisions is identical and arises from common facts it is convenient to decide both the revisions together.
(2.) HAVING heard learned standing counsel in support of this revision, in my opinion, no case for interference has been made out. What had happened was that the respondent-assessee had filed appeals against the assessment orders for the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90 which were beyond time by 22 months of the prescribed period. The condonation of delay was sought on the ground that the respondent-assessee was unwell during all this period and in support of this plea a medical certificate was also furnished along with the applications for condonation of delay. The appeals were dismissed on the finding that the assessee was not able to explain the delay satisfactorily. However, on second appeal, the Tribunal has accepted the explanation of the assessee and accordingly, it has condoned the delay in filing the appeals. The question whether there was a sufficient cause or not which prevented the assessee in presenting the appeals within time is essentially one of fact. The Tribunal has chosen to believe the version of the assessee. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 66 STC 228 (SC); 1987 UPTC 2128 the Supreme Court has pointed out that in the matter of condoning delay liberal approach is called for. It was pointed out that ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence, or on, account of mala fides. The judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In the instant case, there is nothing to indicate that the respondent-assessee had deliberately failed to prefer the appeals within the prescribed period. The plea set up by the assessee was supported by a medical certificate. In absence of any material to the contrary which may justify the rejection of the medical certificate, the Tribunal, in my opinion, was fully justified, on facts, to condone the delay. The order under revision does not give rise to any questioin of law.
(3.) BOTH the revisions are devoid of merit and are accordingly, dismissed. .;