D.K. Seth, J. - (1.) In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 6.1.1992 which was held to be illegal by the Inspector, Arabic Madrasa, U. P. Allahabad in his order dated 31.3.1992. Therefore, in this writ petition the petitioner had prayed for revocation of the order of suspension in pursuance of the order dated 31.3.1992. Admittedly in the meantime, pursuant to the charge-sheet, which was mentioned in the order of suspension, an enquiry was held and the petitioner having been found guilty, his service was terminated by the Management by an order dated 1st November, 1992. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been alleged that in terms of Rule 34 of the U. P. Recognition of Non-Governmental Arabian and Persian School Rules, 1987, the proceedings of the enquiry have been forwarded to the Inspector and the Inspector has not given any suggestion as contemplated in Rule 34. Therefore, after the said order has been passed, the question of suspension becomes academic.
(2.) Mr. M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for respondents contends that in 1995, the order dated 31.3.1992 has since been recalled. Mr. B.D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contends that after the order of termination, the recalling of the order in 1995 is wholly immaterial and as such is nonest in the eye of law.
(3.) But the fact remains that the petitioner has not challenged the order of termination, though the said fact was disclosed in the counter-affidavit filed by respondents in 1995. At this stage, Mr. Mandhyan fairly submits that the entire question is dependent on the question of interpretation of Rule 34 of the said Rules. If the said Rule cannot be interpreted to mean that an order of termination or suspension requires approval of the Inspector, in that event, the order of suspension and the order of termination cannot be sustained. Mr. Qadeer contends that Rule 34 does not contemplate grant or refusal of approval either to the order of suspension or termination as such there is no further scope for decision in the writ petition which has become infructuous by reason of the termination of the petitioner's service which has not been challenged.;