- (1.) PALOK Basu, J. Two questions of paramount importance have arisen in these cases, First, whether on the fact and circumstances of the case, particularly keeping in view the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of the Apex Court dated 9-4-1997, it was incumbent upon the State of U. P. , for short State, to follow the provisions contained in Rule 72 of the U. P. Minor Mineral Conces sion Rules, 1963, for short M. M. C. Rules. Second, if in the meantime a lease-deed relating to a mining area has come to be executed between the State of U. P. and the Opposite Party No. 4, its effect.
(2.) AT the outset it may be pointed out that if what the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 34381 has alleged in this writ petition is true, the action of the State Government in passing the impugned order offering settlement of lease of a mining area with the opposite party No. 4 is not only ar bitrary, is indicative of an intentional ef fort to bye-pass the M. M. C. Rules and corner the petitioner even when he has obtained an order from the Supreme Court and local officials were to hear the matter of the petitioner applying lease for the mining area which has been settled with the opposite party No. 4. The petitioner has pleaded that he himself was engaged in granite business and had ob tained lease from the State of the said area for granite Industry. The petitioner has never challenged the right of the State to promulgate change in policy decision relating to lease of area where granite may be excavated but his grievance is that there is absolutely no ostensible reason why the opposite party No. 4 may have been chosen and why the petitioner's application may not have been considered. The allegations of the petitioner further are that while the District Magistrate, Mahoba and the Commissioner of the Division were hear ing the matter relating to the grant of lease to the petitioner and his application for further hearing, the settlement of lease with the opposite party No. 4 on the sup posed change in the granite policy was a complete negation of the principles of natural justice and totally flouting the M. M. C. Rules. It, therefore, is further but to quash the order of the State Govern ment settling the lease of the said area with the opposite party No. 4. Throwing challenge to the grant of lease, when the Writ Petition No. 34381 was filed on 16-10-1997 an interim order was passed and counter-affidavit was called directing the matter to come up on 2-11- 1997, on which date the interim order was extended till 12-11-1997. After taking note of the fact that the matter had travelled to the Apex Court and further that the petitioner Prem Nath Sharma was stated to have been a lease-holder of the area said to containing granite for excava tion and prima facie noting the argument of the petitioner that calendestine efforts was made to grant lease in favour of the O. P. No. 4, it was directed by that interim order that "in the meantime effect shall not be given to the order dated 2-4-1997 passed by the State Government nor any excavation mining operation shall be car ried out by any of the opposite party. . . . . . . The interim order will operate till 12-11-1997, until this order is vacated or modified earlier. " The matter then went to another Division Bench which extended the inter im order till 3-2-1998 by its order dated 23-1-1998. On 23-4-1998, yet another Division Bench admitted the writ petition but did not grant or extend the interim order. Sri Ashok Bhushan in the meantime appeared for opposite party No. 4. On 24-2-1998, the Bench had required the petitioner to file a copy of the application that he had made in the meantime for grant of or extention of lease as the case may be. This has been done by a Supplementary Affidavit. While admitting the aforesaid appeal, since no interim order was passed, the petitioner went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Special Leave petition was rejected on 4-5- 1998 by fol lowing orders: "the Special Leave Petitions are dis missed on merits. "
(3.) ON 12-5-1998, an application for extension of the interim order was moved by the petitioner. It directed to come up in the next cause list by the learned single judge on 20-5-1998. Fresh application for apparent that if the petitioner's allegation grant of stay order was moved before is found true, there may be no alternative Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by order dated 20-5-1998, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed the following orders: "the application be listed before the Division Bench presided over by P. B. U. on 22-5-1998. Sd/- D. P. Mohapatra, Cj 20-5-1998 6. ON 22-5-1998 when the matter came up before this Court Sri R. C. Srivastava, Senior Advocate appeared for op posite party No. 4 and Sri H. S. Nigam for the petitioner and stay order was prayed. After hearing learned Counsel for the par ties the following operative portion in the order was passed by this Court: "the parties are agreed that the matter be listed for disposal on 5-8-1998. List accordingly. " Opposite party No. 4 appears to have moved an application through Sri Dinesh Dwivedi Advocate before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for recall of his Lordship's orders directing listing of the matter. Hon'ble the/ Chief Justice, then directed that: "heard Sri Dinesh Dwivedi for applicant who is representing respondent No. 4 in the writ petition and Sri H. S. Nigarn for the writ petitioner. This application has been filed by the opposite party No. 4 seeking recall of my order dated 20-5-1998 in which I directed the stay extension application be listed before a Bench presided over by Mr. Justice P. Basu on 22-5-1998. It appears from the record that in pur suance of this order the case was listed before the Division Bench presided over by Mr. Justice P. Basu and it has been ordered on agreement of parties that the matter be listed for disposal on 5-8-1998. Since the petition has already been directed to be listed on 5-8-1998 on agreement between the parties, I am not inclined to review or recall my order dated 20-5-1998. This ap plication stand disposed of. Sd/ D. P. Mohapatra, Cj 20-8-97" 7. It was then that the matter came up before this Court on 5-8-1998 through the daily cause list and ultimately arguments began in this Court on 31-8-1998. 8. All this history of how the matter commenced for hearing was not necessary had Sri S. P. Gupta, appearing for opposite party No. 4 may not have said that the matter was, not jump or ripe for hearing. It is good that having said so Sri S. P. Gupta, Senior Advocate and other Counsel ap pearing for opposite party No. 4 have made detailed submissions on the merits of the matter. Sri S. N. Verma, Senior Ad vocate Sri H. S. Nigam assisted by Sri M. C. Chaturyedi have also argued in detail on behalf of the petitioner. It maybe respect fully added that the arguments advanced by the Senior members of the bar have enriched this Court to a great extent and the points canvassed, rulings cited have facilitated this Court in dictating this judg ment after conclusion of the hearing. 9. Before coming to the facts of the respective petitions a few legal questions shall have to be referred to because it is on them that the facts have to be set. The Mine and Mineral (Regulation (Develop ment) Act, 1957 came to be promulgated w. e. f. 1st June, 1958. Section 4 thereof says that prospective or mining operations shall have to be under licence or lease. Mining lease stands defined under Section 3 (c ). Minor Mineral has been explained in Section 3 (e ). Section 15 of the Act em powers the State Government to notify in official gazette rules for regulating grant of quarry-lease and mining lease or other minor concessions in respect of the minor minerals and for purpose connected there with. It is in exercise of the powers con ferred in Section 15 of the Act that the State of U. P. has issued the M. C. C. Rules. Relevant Entries dealing with the right of the Central Government and that of the State Government concerning any mineral and minor mineral has been dealt with under entry 54 of the Union List and 23 of the State List. It is not disputed that in the instant case the M. C. C. Rules are applicable but what is in dispute is, as noted above at the outset whether fresh notice under Rule (M. M. C. Rules) 72 was required or not. 10. The other legal proposition which has to be settled here is that so long as the minor mineral is continued to be treated as a minor mineral, the State Government will have the right to deal with it. It, there fore, follows that it will not be open to the State Government or any of the petitioners or the respondents who would like to be bestowed with the right to quarry any minor mineral under the licence or lease of the State Government, to sub sequently name it is major mineral. For, States powers must relate to a minor mineral. Therefore, even if it be assumed for the sake of the argument that Khanda, Gitti and Bolder of granite for use in the road-sites may be different from granite size dimensional stones both will come and fall within the category of minor mineral. For all practical purposes, there fore, the applicability of the M. C. C. Rules will control and regulate the lease or licence as the case may be for mining of granite in whatever form or by whatever name it may be called. The additional reason maybe pointed out here. If granite is held to be major mineral, that is some thing other than minor mineral, the State Government will, concerning that mineral have no right on the given provisions con tained in the Act and the M. C. C. Rules to deal with it. May be that only Union of India shall be then entitled to deal with the major minerals, that is, minerals other than the minor minerals. Therefore, the conclusion is that granite in whatever form is being dealt with in the State of U. P. by the State Government and so long as there is no other contrary notification of the relevant Government, M. M. C. Rules will apply to granite. 11. Coming now to the facts of the case, it may be pointed out that the petitioner Prem Narain Sharma was granted lease of a plot of land measuring about ten acres in Mahoba, District Hamirpur for ten years which was ex tended from time to time from 17-9-1977. ON final expiry, a public notice was issued on 31-3- 1995 by the District Magistrate Hamirpur for grant of fresh lease. This notice was issued under Rule 72 of the M. M. C. Rules. The Petitioner applied for the grant of lease of the said area on 2-5-1995 and the District Magistrate ordered lease in favour of the petitioner on 6-5-1995, for Khanda, Gitti and Bolder. 12. But this lease was cancelled on 29-5-1995. ON 30-5-1995 second notice has been issued by the District Magistrate under Rule 72 for the said area and for the said Khanda, Gitti and Bolder. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 15290 of 1995 to get the lease executed in pursuance of the District Magistrate's order dated 6-5-1995. However, because of the issuance of the second notice in the mean time, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 18686 of 1995 challenging the second notice dated 30- 5-1995 issued by the Dis trict Magistrate. Both the writ petitions came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 24-4-1996 and the petitioner's Special Leave Petition has also been dismissed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on 9-4-1997. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has made the following observations in its order dated 9-4-1997: "the opportunity granted by Rule 72 (II) to prospective applications to apply for a mining lease was denied when within four days of the receipt of the application the District Magistrate on 6th May, 1995 took decision whereby he decided to grant the lease in favour of the appel lant. This could not be done. From the aforesaid discussions it will follow that it is not the notice dated 31st March, 1995 which suffer from any legal infirmity but it is acceptance of the applica tions before 9th May, 1995 which was bad in law. The said order dated 6th May, 1995 being con trary to Rule 72 (II) was rightly not acted upon and, therefore, the only course which was open to the respondent was to issue afresh notice which he did on 30th May, 1995. The conclusion of the High Court that the writ petition filed by the appellant could not be allowed was correct, though for a different reason. For the aforesaid reason these appeals are dismissed. The respon dents will be at liberty to issue a fresh notice for the grant of lease in accordance with law and keeping in view the observations contained herein. There will be no order as to cost. " (emphasis supplied. ). 13. It transpires that the District Magistrate issued fresh notice on 20-8-1997 for Khanda, Gitti and Bolder. It how ever appears that since the petitioner's original application dated 4-7-1995 had not been decided, the Commissioner Jhansi Division, Jhansi disposed of the revision of the petitioner vide his order dated 11 -9-1997 directing the District Magistrate to decide the said application of the petitioner. It has been mentioned in the order of the Commissioner that if granite is found in the area then the petitioner should be given a hearing. ON 4-10-1997 the District Magistrate extended the hear ing to the petitioner and held that since State Government has already granted lease of granite on 24-9-1997, there was no power left to the District Magistrate to grant any lease to the petitioner for the said area nor can any hearing be done by him in pursuance of the directions of the Commissioner dated 11-9- 1997, The Dis trict Magistrate further held that the petitioner may if he is so advised, approach the State Government. 14. The time is ripe now for taking up the relevant events and dates concerning the opposite party No. 4. It is stated that the State Government has promulgated three specific policy decisions relating to granite and its excavation/mining. The first granite policy is dated 14-2-1994, the second is elated 23-5- 1995 and the third policy decision has been issued on 11th March, 1996. It is said that in view of the changed nature of the area depending upon the report of the local geologist and the decision of the State Government taken from time to time relating to granite and its excavation/mining, opposite party No. 4 obtained the order dated 24-9-1997 in his favour under which the State Government propose to grant lease to the opposite party No. 4 for the same area but the mining was described as mining for granite sized dimensional stones. ON 4-10-1997 the lease was executed in favour of the opposite party No. 4 which was registered on 6-10-1997 and it has been averred in the counter-affidavit filed by the opposite party No. 4 that he has entered into miningoperationfrom7-10-1997. 15. At this stage it may be clarified at once that since much arguments have been advanced on the execution of the lease deed, the stay order passed by this Court was operating till 3rd February, 1998 its effect on the alleged subsequent action relating to actual excavation after the grant, execution. and registration of the lease deed shall be considered at the relevant place. 16. Much arguments have been ad vanced by Sri S. N. Verma and Sri Nigam on behalf of the petitioner that there cannot be a better example of the calendestine action on the part of the respondents than the instant case where on the one hand Hon'ble the Supreme Court's direction about issuance of fresh notice was being pursued by the petitioner, without any notice, or publication of any order under Rule 72, Settlement was being entered into by the respondent State and its officials with opposite party No. 4, that is Avon Granite New Delhi. 17. In this connection it was pointed out that there are observations in the judg ment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as there is specific mention of the word granite in the application of the petitioner dated 4th July, 1997 and unless the citizens were made aware of some change in the mode of inviting applications or settling lease for granite excavation/mining, the petitioner should be held to be well within his rights to pursue the type of lease he has been obtaining from the year 1977. It was also argued on the fact of the present case while proceedings for grant of lease to petitioner were going on before the Dis trict Magistrate, before the Commissioner and again before the District Magistrate, it is only on the last date when the petitioner appeared before the District Magistrate that he came to know all of a sudden that an order has been passed in favour of the opposite party No. 4. 18. It may be pointed out here that learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 4 have vehemently argued that there was neither clandestine activity nor any il legality in the grant of the lease in his favour and it was pointed out that what is alleged in the impugned order of the State Government dated 4-10-1997 is neither an order nor a decision, it was only an offer and, therefore, cannot be challenged in the writ petition. It is further argued that even if the petitioner's application dated 4th July, 1995 was bonafide and genuine it only relate to a minor mineral viz. Kanda, Gitti and Bolder. It has nothing to do with granite sized dimensional stones for which it was opposite party No. 4 who had been offered lease for a period of fifteen years, which the opposite party No. 4 in its turn accepted and the lease deed has been ex ecuted. It was therefore, further con tended that once lease deed has been ex ecuted and it has not been challenged in the writ petition, it is not open to the petitioner to get any order in his favour with regard to the said lease and the right of the opposite party No. 4 to go on ex cavating and mining under the said lease deed. Reliance was placed on Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act as also other provisions contained in the Indian Contract Act and it was said that even if this Court comes to a conclusion that the petitioner's writ petition may be decided in his favour there is no power or jurisdiction, or atleast jurisdiction to interfere with the lease deed executed in favour of the op posite party No. 4. It was also vehemently argued that the M. M. C. Rules do not bind the State Government in as much as the Crown Grant Apt which was subsequently named as Government Grant Act may be looked into as amended by the State of U. P. and if the provisions are read together with M. M. C. Rules it will not be possible to hold that the State Government was bound to issue notice under Rule 72 on the fact and circumstances of the present case. 19. Sri R. P. Goel, learned Advocate General of the State of U. P. has said that so far as the State of U. P. is concerned it has tried to abide by the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules in executing the lease deed in favour of the opposite party No. 4, but the State will always abide by such directions as may be issued by this Court after hearing the parties and pronouncing its judgment on the con troversial questions raised in this writ peti tion. 20. Details counter-affidavits have been filed by the State of U. P. through its officials as well as opposite party No. 4. Basically the dispute is between the petitioner and the opposite party No. 4 and all that the Court has to examine is the procedure adopted by the State of U. P. in giving and executing the lease deed in favour of the opposite party No. 4 was valid or not. 21. Before entering into the discus sions a few words may be stated about the two other writ petitions because Sri S. P. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner the said petitioner viz. Achitya Kumar Tripathi. Sri Singh took the Court to the various provisions contained in Section 3 (e) of the Act, Section 15 of the Act, Sec tion 19, Mining Rules under M. M. C. Rules, Entry 23 in the State List and Entry 54 in the Union List. Sri Singh has relied upon three decisions reported in 1994 (1) J. TS. C. 376, AIR 1972 (Punjab) page 356 and AIR 1964, S. C. 1284. He also relied upon the declaration made by the Central Government quite some times ago to the effect that Marbel is major mineral and on the aforesaid strength he argued that the granite should be held to be major mineral and therefore this Court should conclude that the State of U. P. was not empowered to deal with granite. However, before going into these questions it maybe noted here that so far as Achitya Kumar Tripathi is concerned he did not even apply after the second notice was issued by the District Magistrate, Sri Dinesh Dwivedi appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 3 in these two writ petitions (that is Avon Granite who is opposite party No. 4 in the Writ Petition No. 20169 of 1998) has ob jected to the argument of Sri S. P. Singh and has said that both these writ petitions are not maintainable at all because the prayers contained therein cannot be granted in favour of Achitya Kumar Tripathi. 22. In order to lend support to the argument Sri S. N. Verma and Sri Nigam have placed implicit reliance on the ap plication that was moved by the petitioner before the State of U. P. A copy of the said application has been filed by the petitioner alongwith the supplementary affidavit. It is mentioned therein, that admittedly the petitioner wanted the "lease for granite stone mining (a type of material used for road)". It was strongly contended that the fact that the petitioner was already dealing mining with same type of granite is known to the petitioners, to the District Magistrate, to the Mining Officials as also to the State Government, therefore there was nothing to be discovered by anyone with regard to the mining area in posses sion of the petitioner through the earlier lease deed in his favour. The petitioner was already having the lease and its term had not ended when the new granite policy came to be promulgated. It maybe pointed out that the lease in favour of the petitioner was to continue till 30th March, 1995 and the first granite policy came to be pronounced by the State Government on 14-2-1994. Whatever may have been the policy of the Government it has come to the notice of the Court only through the counter-affidavit. It is not known in what manner the said policy was published be cause obviously the District Magistrate at Hamirpur was going on with the notice under Rule 72 of the M. M. C. Rules in spite of the alleged change in the granite policy at the Headquarter of the State Govern ment. 23. ONce the granite policy was changed all further actions should have been stopped at the site level i. e. area where the mining was being done. All per sons must have then automatically come to know of the decision of the State Govern ment. Nothing of the type appears to have been done. It is only the latest order of the District Magistrate through which the petitioner came to know that there is some change in the policy of the Government. The said order does not indicate any prior convening of the said change even to the officials of the district including the Dis trict Magistrate. The Commissioner in his order has referred to the fact that if the matter relates to granite the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity of hear ing. These three orders leave no manner of doubt that nobody in Hamirpur knew that there is any change in the granite policy of the State Government. These discussions here should not be interpreted as a chal lenge to the State Authorities to have a; policy decision regarding any minor mineral. It is fully empowered-to and al ways entitled to change its policies in ac cordance with the need and justification. But the point is that if and when a settle ment of area is going to be made by the State Government with any citizen, all citizens must be placed on equal level and equal footing. If this is not done, the action of the State Government would be not only arbitrary but also illegal in view of the provisions under Article 14 of the Con stitution of India. 24. Sri S. P. Gupta learned Senior Ad vocate for Opposite Party No. 4 has dealt with at length the various amendments beginning with 19th followed by 20th and 21st Amendment in the M. M. C. Rules and tried to argue that the present site was not covered by Rule 72 at all. Argument proceeded that since there was no re-grant to be made, the Government was not bound to identify the area in accordance with the provisions of the said Rule 72. Sri Gupta took the Court to the language used in various forms such as MM-1, MM-2 and MM-3 and strongly contended that since the petitioner had initially got lease only for Gitti, Khand and Bolder, he being not an applicant for granite sized dimentional stones, no notice was required to be pub lished or given for settlement of lease with opposite party No. 4. Sri Gupta further argued that on 4-9-1997 the Chief General Manager of U. P. State Mining Develop ment Corporation (who is the convenor of the Granite Committee) addressed a letter to the Director Geology and Mining stat ing him that the District Magistrate should be required not to grant lease for ballast, bolder etc. as "granite area" has been marked. The letter of the State Govern ment dated 6-9-1997 issued to the District Magistrate, Mahoba was also relied upon. These letters obviously indicate noticing of granite in the area: It may be noted here that the availability of granite is known to every one. There is no concealment by anyone much less the petitioner that granite is available in the area in question. Rule 72 may be usefully quoted here.- "availability of area for regrant on mining lease to be notified: (i) If any area, which was held under a mining lease under Chapter-II or on reserved under Section 17-A CF the Act becomes avail able for regrant on mining lease the District Officer shall notify the availability of the area through a notice inviting for applications for grant of mining lease specifying a date which shall not be earlier than 30 days from the date of notice and giving description of such a land and a copy of such notice shall be displayed on the notice board of his office and shall also be sent to the Tehsildar of such area and the Director. (ii) The applications for grant of mining lease under sub-rule (1) shall be received within 7 working days from the date specified in the notice referred to in the said sub-rule. If, how ever, the number of applications received for any area is less than three, the District Officer may further extend the period for 7 more work ing days and if even thereafter, the number of applications remains less than three, the District Officer shall notify the availability of the area afresh in accordance with the said sub- rule. (iii) An application for grant of mining lease for such area which is already held under a lease or notified under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 or reserved under Section 17-A of the Act and whose availability has not been notified under sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to be pre-matured and shall not be considered and the application fee thereon, if paid shall be refunded. " 25. Having noticed the aforesaid Rule 72 and the fact that the petitioner had gone up to Hon'ble the Supreme Court and directions were contained in the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court for issuance of fresh notice and further that it is nobody's case that either the petitioner or the op posite party No. 4 can claim to be the discoverer of the mineral which is to be found in the mining area concerned, the argument of Sri S. P. Gupta that Rule 72 is not attracted cannot be accepted. 26. It may also be mentioned here simultaneously that the 21st Amendment bringing about some changes in the then existing Rule 72 was published on 11-2-1995. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner's lease was valid till, 31-3-1995, from this point of view, the area can be said to be falling again for grant subject of course to the change which has been bought about by the State Government on a policy basis le. calling back all areas which were allotted for permit as ordered on 6-9-1990 by the State Government but applied in the year 1997 on these areas. Chapter-II of the Rules was applied by the order dated 23-12-1993 under which all that area in the State was made available for lease as system of permit was done away with. 27. In this view of the matter the reference to the various forms by Sri Gupta, or to the language of Rule 72 with effort to pursuade the Court to hold that no notice before settlement of lease of the area by State Government with a citizen was necessary is totally futile. 28. It may be useful to refer to the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Victorian Granite (P) Ltd. v. Versus P. Rama Rao and Ors. , 1996 (10) SCC 665, which lays down that where the publicity was avoided and the State Government resorted to a subterfuge to circumvent the constitution al philosophy and objective, such action of the State cannot be sustained. This case has gone even the extent of suggesting that refraining of certain rules may be neces sary in order to bring the said rule in con sonance with the constitutional philosophy and the attempt to avail unjust enrichment also has come up for criticism. 29. In Dharambir Singh v. Union of India, 1996 (6) SCC 702, though it was a matter dealing with the Act and not any M. M. C. Rules, yet the principle high lighted is that on the fact of the given case the petitioner D. V. Singh could not claim to be the sole lessee claiming preferential right being a discoverer. The circumstan-'ces when preference may be given to the discoverer has been gone into in this case. In may be stated here that from the rival contentions noted in the preceding para graphs it would not make either the petitioner or the opposite party No. 4 in this case to claim to be the discoverer. No preference, therefore, could be claimed by either of the said two parties or for that matter any other third party who may have been an applicant for grant of lease if there was a notice under Rule 72 of the M. M. C. Rules. 30. In Alankar Granite Industries v. P. G. R. Scindia and Ors. , 1996 (7), ACC 417, the question whether there could be a quarry lease contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 3 (A) of the M. M. C. Rules of Karnataka has been left open. It has been further held that the grant in mining matters should be governed by the M. M. C. Rules. However none of the gran tees could succeed in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court because the High Court view that Rule was not correctly applied was upheld. 31. In the case of Assam Silimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1417, it has been held that if a lease granted under the Act is to be prematurely terminated, opportunity of hearing must be given to the lessee. It is true that this case was not dealing with the matter governed by M. M. C. Rules but the principle of hearing has been well defined even in case where mining lease are concerned. 32. In the case of Indian Metal and Feno Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 818, the provisions of the Act were being examined and some Rules thereunder in the M. M. C. Rules. The prin ciple that mining lease could be settled by the State with an applicant who can ex plore mining most efficiently has been dealt with in the said ease. 33. In the case of M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1521, the principle followed by the State Government in granting the lease under the Act to a company which had applied at an earlier point of time than the grantee company was upheld. 34. In view of the aforesaid discus sions it cannot be any doubt any more than wide publicity or atleast publicity as is necessary within the meaning of Rule 72 of the M. M. C. Rules has to be strictly fol lowed and adhered to by the State Govern ment in settling the State largess. 35. Sri S. P. Gupta has however strongly relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Kastoori Lal v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1992, and also on Sachchidanand Pandey v. State of West Ben gal, 1987 (2) SCC 295. No exception can be taken to the right of the State Government to settle a particular lease in a particular case with a particular person. But on the fact of the present case as quoted above the State Government has for whatever reason intentionally shelved the require ment of publicity, the necessity of notice and need to propagate amongst citizens the proposed settlement of lease for the mining area and in a close door exercise has settled the lease with apposite party No. 4. 36. Coming now to the argument of Sri S. S. Bhatnagar on behalf of the op posite party No. 4 that the State Govern ment was and is not bound by the Rule of the Rules existing in the M. M. C. Rules, he placed reliance on 1934 Privy Council page 34, 1960 Supreme Court, 1355 and 1967 Supreme Court, 997. This is an important point raised by Sri Bhatnagar and has to be dealt with in a little more detail. It was pointed out by Sri Bhatnagar that: (I) The State can be bound only by those provisions of law which specifically enact that the State is bound by those provisions. (II) The Mines Act makes no such refer ence and therefore the State is not bound to follow the Rules laid-down under M. M. C. Rules which are primarily meant for the persons who are going to get benefit through the State lar gess. (III) Parallel legislation such as Oil Fields Regulation and Development Act, 1948, Oil Industry Development Act, 1974, Indian Com panies Act and the Contract Act etc. have provisions binding the State. (IV) Had the provisions contained in Ar ticle 300 not being there, it may not have been permitted to sue the Government in any Court's action. (v) The Crown Grant Act subsequently amended as Government Grant Act as amended by the State of U. P. does not make permissible for a challenge to the State action regarding the grant of mining lease to the op posite party No. 4. 37. Much, water has flown since 1947 Privy Council was decided. Likewise, in spite of the decision of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Director Rationings. Corporation of Calcutta, 1960, S. C. 1355 and Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Department, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, 1967 SC997 the distribution of State largess has been made subject-matter of a number of decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court mostly depending upon the verdict in the celebrated decision in Ramnna G. Shetty v. International Airport Authority, 1979 SC 1628. In the last, reference must be made to the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular and New Horizons 1994 (6) SCC 651 and 1995 (1) SCC 478 respectively. 38. It has to be noticed that perhaps, keeping in view the multi dimensional problems in this country and also different types of practical difficulties prevailing in the various provinces and yet the impera tive need to have an uniform base for the citizens' access to the State largess the ruling in Ramanna G. Shetty has not only been followed till date but holds the field rather strongly. State is the power centre of many economic activities also and as against the executives unfathomable powers, the individual citizen is just as a small fly trying to make its way in a cyclonic hurricane. 39. Political analyst have published comments that in the last few years our nation has been passing through a phase of political unstability and uncertainty, may be due to the failure of achieving absolute majority at the elections for Parliament or State assemblies by any political party. The major sufferer is executive ad ministration as there was no object of governing, there was no philosophy to govern and there was no purpose of governance. Thus the citizens have pinned ab solute faith in the judiciary and they have preferred to initiate open court proceed ings to challenge closed door operations in distribution of State largess. Therefore, the Constitution of India has established the Rule of Law and has made enough avenues for the citizens to challenge ar bitrary actions of the State Government passed in arbitrary fashion, with which he may be aggrieved. 40. As already mentioned above the State Government action in the instant case appears to be an activity behind the curtains. There was no access of citizens to the policy decisions even if the policy decision was really taken. From the record it is clear that the State has never per mitted the policy decision to percolate into the district sites so that desirous citizens were to get benefit of the orders under those policy decision. It is important that the decision should be taken in the manner so as to benefit all the citizens on equal footings. It is equality and equal opportunity which is the heart and soul of Article 14 and every action of the State must respond to the Constitution and there is no option left to the Court but to. hold that in the instant case the action of the respondent has been totally arbitrary if not calculatedly one sided. 41. Having held so, the last argument of Sri Bhatnagar has to be examined. It has already been noted above that there was an interim order passed by this Court. The State was fully aware of the said order. The petitioner has rushed up to this Court much earlier without knowing that the lease has been executed or may be that he came to know of the lease execution. But for him it was the order calling for the execution of the lease deed which had to be challenged. Therefore, in the writ peti tion he made the following prayer: (i) issue a writ quashing the Government order dated 24-9-1997. (Annexure 13 ). (ii) Issue a writ quashing the order dated 4-10-1997. (iii) Issue writ commanding District Magistrate Mahoba to decide the application dated 4-7-1995, filed in compliance with the notice dated 30-5-1995 and give effect to the Commissioner's order dated 11-9- 1997. 42. Let it be repeated here that this Court had granted an interim order on 16-10-1997, directing that effect shall not be given to the order dated 24-9-1997 passed by the State Government nor any excavation/mining operation shall be car ried on by any of the opposite parties. This interim order continued to operate till 3-2-1998. There could be no occasion for the respondent to either settled a lease with opposite party No. 4 or get lease deed executed on 4-10-1997 or get the same registered on 6-10-1997. In no case could any opposite party excavate or commence mining operation during the continuance of the stay Order. 43. If it be conceded that the lease deed was executed before the interim order was passed, there was no occasion for any of the opposite party to continue with the excavation to which there was a direct bar in the interim order. Therefore, the petitioner was within his right to chal lenge the order by which the lease was said to be executable in favour of the opposite party No. 4. 44. Before parting with the instant case another aspect has to be dealt with which may still permit passing of lawful orders by State for respective parties. From the affidavit and the material exist ing on record it appears that a large area in Mahoba has come to be covered by the granite policy of the State Government. Hon'ble the Supreme Court's direction and the notices issued by the District Magistrate under Rule 72 on the one hand being basis for the petitioner to apply for grant of lease, may not stand in conflict with the claim of the opposite party No. 4 on the other as it may be treated now for grant of lease of some area without jeop ardising petitioner's interest. From the ap plication of the petitioner the area falling for consideration of lease by the respon dent state is about 47. 5 acres. If this is so, even if the petitioner's application for 10 acres in independently decided, the Court does not see any reason why if a fresh application is moved by the opposite party No. 4 for another area of 10 acres, the same may not be independently considered by the State Government. If the opposite party No. 4 is so advised he may also make a fresh application for fresh area without overlapping the area of the petitioner's application and in that case State Govern ment is directed to dispose of the applica tion of opposite party No. 4 also in accord ance with law with a speaking order within a period of one month of the making of the application which may be moved within three weeks. 45. Since there cannot be any dispute now that the area in question will be covered by the aforesaid Rule 72 of the M. M. C. Rules, the State will proceed ac cording to law for considering applications for lease which may come in response to the said notice for the added areas over and above the area which was settled with the petitioner Prem Nath Sharma. 46. In view of the aforesaid discus sions the writ petition of Prem Nath Shar ma succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 21-9-1997 (Annexure 13) and 4-10-1997 (Annexure 12) are quashed. The respondent District Magistrate and the State of U. P. are directed to follow Rule 72 of the Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules in accordance with law and decide the petitioner's application dated 4-7-1995. If the opposite party No. 4 makes a fresh application as directed above it may also be independently decided according to law. 47. Coming now to the writ petitions of Achitya Kumar Tripathi, it has been held that petitioner Achitya Kumar Tripathi had not applied against the notice which was issued under Rule 72, therefore, he need not be heard in these writ petitions at all. These two writ petitions are dismissed. 48. All the, parties will bear their costs. Decided accordingly. .;