- (1.) S. R. Singh, J. Present petition has its advent to this Court begging answer to the question whether the Additional Dis trict Judge is a Court within the meaning of Section 2 (e) of the Arbitration and Con ciliation Act, 1996 and if not, can the Dis trict Judge-transfer the application moved for setting aside the Arbitration Award under Section 34 of the said Act.
(2.) THE minimal facts as bear on the controversy involved in this petition, are that the petitioner is a Government of India undertaking and company engaged, in the business of manufacture, sale and supply of telephones and transmission equipments, apparatus and other allied components and M/s. K. V. Electronics (respondent No. 3) was engaged in the venture of supplying various components and assemblies of telephones and trans mission equipments to the petitioner as per indents (purchase and supply orders) issued from time 10 lime by the petitioner. It transpires that a dispute between the petitioner and the third respondent arose in theyear 1995 regarding over-payment of about Rs. 12. 81 lacs by the petitioner to the third respondent as a consequence of few purchase orders of the years 1. 991, 1992 and 1993. THE dispute was referred to the arbitration for adjudication in pursuance of the Arbitration Clause encapsulated in the covenant on the respective purchase orders and Sri M. K. Sakeeja, Additional General Manager (C. N. S.) of the petitioner's company was appointed as sole Arbitrator vide order dated 9-2-1996. THE arbitrator gave award on 10-3-1997 to the effect that M/s. K. V. Electronics (the respondent No. 3) will pay Rs. 1281,500. 95 p. to the petitioner. Dissatisfied by the award dated 10-3-1997, the 3rd respon dent filed an application dated 19-5-97, under Section 34 read with Section 16 ( VI) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (In short the Act') in the Court of District Judge for setting aside the said award. THE Munsarim scribed a report on the said application that it should have been filed before the Civil Judge. THE Dis trict Judge, however, differed with the report and overruled the objection of the Munsarim and held vide order dated 25-5-97, that the application was rightly presented in the court of District Judge and directed the application/petition to be registered and transferred to the court of 3rd Additional District Judge, Allahabad for disposal On 28-8-1997, an objection having the complexion of preliminary objection, was raised before the 3rd Additional Dis trict Judge, Allahabad that the said Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the ap plication. The Additional District Judge by his order dated 28-8-1997 overruled the objection holding that the expression "but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes" used in Sec tion 2 (e) of the Act, implies that in addi tion to the District Judge there may be other principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction in a district and Additional District Judge not being inferior in grade to the District Judge, comes within the purview of the term "court" as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act. The petitioner then moved an application under Section 42 dated 16- 9-1997 praying therein that the case be remitted to the District Judge for disposal on the hypothesis that since the application for setting aside the award was moved under part I of the Act in the Court of District Judge and hence that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and "the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other court" as envisaged by Section 42 of the Act. In substance, the plea raised was that since M/s. K. V Electronic has moved the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award in question in the Court of District Judge, which is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, all sub sequent arbitral proceedings would be held in that court. The learned 3rd Addi tional District Judge, Allahabad clung to and expressed itself in concurring with the view in his order dated 28-8-1997 and rejected the application vide order dated 8-10-1997, which is the subject-matter of impugnment in this petition. I have heard Sri C. P. Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. K. Singh for opposite party No. 3. The question that surfaces for consideration is whether the court of Additional District Judge is a 'court' within the meaning of Section 2 (e) of the Arbitration and Con ciliation Act, 1996 ? If not, can the District Judge transfer to the Court of an Addition al District Judge, an application moved for setting aside the Arbitration award under Section 34ofthesaid Act?
(3.) UNLESS the context otherwise re quires, the terms "court", as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act, "means the prin cipal Civil Court of Originaljurisdictionin a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil juris diction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the sub ject-matter of a suit but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal civil court or any court of Small Causes. " The term "court" as elucidated in Section 2 (c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, meant" a Civil Court having jurisdic tion to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject- matter of a suit". A Small Causes Court was expressly ex cluded, except for the purpose of Section 21, from the purview of the term "court" as defined in the said Act. By using the words "means", "includes" and "does not include" in Section, 2 (e) of the new Ar bitration Act, the parliament has exhaus tively explained the meaning of the term "court" in that the word "means" is a term of restriction, while the word "includes" is a term of enlargement and when both the words "means" and "includes" are used together to define a thing, the intendment of the Legislature is to supply restricted meaning to the term. (See Lachcho v. Damon Mal, AIR 1986 All 303; M/s. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State ofa. P, AIR 1989 SC 335 ; P. Kasilingam v. P. S. G. College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395. The expression "but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal civil court, or any court of Small Causes" used in Section 2 (e) of the Act, further restricts the mean ing of the term "court" defined therein. The statement of objects and reasons as given in the Arbitration and Conciliation ill, 1995 would point to the fact that one of the main objects, sought to be achieved by the Bill was "to minimise the super visory role of Courts in arbitral process. " This object might be overreached by giving an amplified meaning to the term "court". Section 3 (17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the term "district Judge" as "the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. " The High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original juris diction is not included in the term "dis trict Judge" as defined in Section 3 (17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 albeit the term "court" used in the Act includes the High Court in exercise of its original juris diction. It admits of no manner of doubt and rather, it is abundantly clear from Sec tion 3 (17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well that the "court of District Judge" and the expression "the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district" are synonym. The Court of Civil Judge may also be a Civil Court of original jurisdiction but it would not be "the prin cipal Court of original jurisdiction in a district. " The Court of an Additional Dis trict Judge is no doubt, a class of Civil Court as visualised by Section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887 and it exercises the same power as the District Judge in relation to the functions assigned to it by the District Judge under Section 8 (2) of the aforesaid Act but that by itself, would not invest it with the trap ping of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a, district. Section 8 of the aforestated Act reads as below. "8. Additional Judges- (1) when the busi ness pending before any District Judge requires the aid of Additional Judges for its speedy dis posal, State Government may, having consulted High Court, appoint such Additional Judges as may be requisite. (2) Additional Judges so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them and in the discharge of those functions they shall exercise the same power as the District Judge. ";