- (1.) SRI Shiam Lal Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a very interesting question as to whether the Prescribed Authority under Section 12-C of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, is empowered to condone the delay in filing Election Petition beyond the period prescribed under Rule-3 of U. P. Panchayat Raj (Settlement of Election Dispute) Rules, 1994 or in other words whether the application of the Limitation Act is excluded by reason to Rule-3 of 1994 Rules. According to him the provision of the Limitation Act is not applicable in special Statute relating to the dispute regarding election and, therefore, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as by the Revisional authority, condoning the delay in filing Election Petition long after 21 months is wholly without jurisdiction and, as such the writ petition is liable to be set aside.
(2.) SRI Pankat Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, on the other hand contends that by reason of Clause- (vi) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of 1994 Rules having provided that the Sub Divisional Officer may at any time dismiss the application, presented beyond time, indicates that it has given discretion to the Sub Divisional Officer, which pre-supposes application of the Limitation Act in the said Statute and relies on two decisions in support of his contention namely in the case of Bhakti Mandal v. Khajendra Bandhu Upadhyaya, AIR 1968 Calcutta 69 and on the decision in the case of Bhoureylal v. Kuni Behari Lal, AIR 1969 Rajasthan 299. Relying on the Calcutta decision he submits that there it has been held that the prescribed authority has power to condone the delay. Similarly relying on the decision in Rajasthan's case he contends that Panchayat Raj Act being a local law by reason of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act the provisions of Section 4 to 24 becomes applicable. Sri Rahul Sripat, learned counsel appearing with Sri P. K. Singh, points out that the provisions relating to Election dispute provided in the Panchayat Raj Act and the Rules framed thereunder is quite different from the provisions relating to election dispute provided in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and therefore, according to him the decision with regard to application of Limitation Act in respect to Election dispute under Representation of the People Act, 1951, cannot be attracted. He also points out that in the present case election having been found void because of ineligibility of the elected candidates, this question cannot be gone into and as such the orders were rightly passed. On the request of the Court Sri Arun Tandon, learned counsel agreed to act as Amicus Curiae in order to assist the Court. The Court appreciates the assistance rendered by Sri Tandon. He has referred to the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 480 in support of his contention, that the provision of Section 29 (2) cannot be attracted in respect to Election petition under Representation of the People Act. According to him right to elect and right to be elected are statutory rights flowing from the Statute. Therefore unless it is provided from the Statute itself the provision of Limitation Act cannot be attracted. He further contends that the provision relating to election dispute provided in the Panchayat Raj Act are pari-materia similar to those under Representation of the People Act, 1951. He further relies on the decision in the case of Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Siddaramaiah, AIR 1994 SC 512 for the proposition. He also relies on the decision in the case of Ram Nandan v. District Judge, Sitamarhi, AIR 1980 Patna 180 where election was challenged under Bihar Panchayat Election Rules. There it has been held that the Limitation Act is also excluded in respect of Election petition under Panchayat Raj Act, on the anology that the provisions of Panchayat Raj Act and those of Representation of the People Act are pari-materia the same. He further relies on the decision in Shamsher Singh v. VII Additional Distt. Judge, 1991 Rev. Dec 434 both of this Court, relating to election dispute under Panchayat Raj Act, where it has been held that the provision relating to settlement of dispute of election being statutory right it has to be decided as provided under the Statute itself.
(3.) I have heard Sri Shiam Lal Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rahul Sripat and Sri B. K. Singh learned counsel for the respondent as well as Sri Arun Tandon acting as amicus-curiae at some length. Section 12-C of Panchayat Raj Act provides for disputing election only in accordance with the provisions contained in the said Section according to the prescribed manner. Section 12-C provides that no election under the said Act can be "called in question except by application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner, as may be prescribed on the ground mentioned therein, which has been explained in various sub-sections of the said Section. Thus it shows that the scope of the disputed election has been subject to the limitation provided in Section 12-C of the Act. It clearly indicates that the manner and time as prescribed are mandatory. The same cannot be decided otherwise than what is prescribed with regard to the time and manner of presenting the election petition. When section itself clearly indicates expressly that such a dispute is to be presented in such a manner and within such time as may be prescribed there is no scope to attract anything foreign to what has been prescribed. Unless it is specifically prescribed we cannot take to aid of any other provision, as it appears from the clear intention expressed in the section itself. The prescription as provided in Section 12-C is prescribed through enactment of U. P. Panchayat Raj (Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994. The said rule is Rule-3 which provides that Election petition under Section 12-C has to be "presented before the Sub Divisional Officer within whose jurisdiction concerned Gram Panchayat lies within 90 days after the date of which the result of election questioned, is announced. . . " Rule-3 limits time of presentation of the election dispute to 90 days from the commencement of result of the election. Thus we see that authority has been prescribed and time within which it has to be presented has also been prescribed. The manner has also been prescribed with which I am not concerned. Manner of presentation as provided in Rule 3 does not provide for any relaxation or extension of time.;