Aloke Chakrabarti, J. - (1.) -Two tube-well operators filed an application under Section 15(2) of the PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT, 1936 through the present petitioner contendirig that respondent-employers illegally made deductions from their wages for the period between 1.10.1988 and 31,7.1989 and prayed for refund of the said amount together with compensation. The application was allowed by order dated 21.12.1989 directing refund of deductions and compensation. After the recovery was in progress under Section 15(3) of the said Act and recovery warrants had been issued, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 preferred an appeal under Section 17 of the said Act on 21.3.1990. As there was delay of about two months, an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act supported by an affidavit was filed. Employees filed objection to the application for condonation of delay. The respondent No. 5 by his order dated 12.7.1990 allowed the said application upon condoning the delay and the appeal was admitted. Challenging the said order this writ petition was filed.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner on behalf of the employees contended that in respect of such an appeal under Section 17 of the said Act the provision of Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963.is not available. Law has been. referred to on behalf of the petitioner. Workmen as decided in the case of Shri Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Sri Siddaramaiah, Union of India v. Aftab Hussain, and U.P. Electricity Board & Ors. v. 7th Addl. District Judge, Faizabad & Ors.. Reference was also made to the cases of Hukum Narain Yadau v. Lalit Narayan Misra, Mukri Gopalan v. C.P. Aboobacker and Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubachand Beghel.
(3.) It has been contended that law has been decided in the case of Shri Anwari Basauaraj Patil (supra) wherein question of applicability of provisions of LIMITATION ACT, 1963 in respect of a proceeding under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 was being considered. It has been held therein that the period for notice under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the said Act does not permit condonation of delay under the LIMITATION ACT, 1963. Considering the provisions of the said Act as also the effect of Section 29(2) of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 and also the law as explained in the case of H.N. Yadau (supra), it has been held that if on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Special Act, it is clear that the provisions of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 are necessarily excluded then the benefits conffered by the Limitation Act cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Special Act. It has been fur-ther contended that the specific provision for condonation of delay has been made in the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the said Act although no such provision is there in Section 17 and, therefore, the aforesaid interpretation of law becomes applicable.;