K. P. Singh, J. - (1.) -
(2.) THIS writ petition has been directed against the judgment of Shri G. S. Lal, I.A.S. Member, Board of Revenue, dated 30-8-1975 in Second Appeal No. 105 (z) of 1971-72. On 16-7-1971 the trial court ordered the sale of the disputed land in favour of the plaintiff opposite party as is evident from Annexure VI attached with the writ petition. Against the judgment of the trial court the defendant petitioner preferred an appeal which was allowed by the lower appellate court through its judgment dated 10-1-1972 contained in Annexure VII attached with the writ petition. Thereafter the plaintiff opposite party preferred a second appeal which was allowed by the learned Member through the impugned judgment dated 30-8-1975. Aggrieved by the judgment of the second appellate court the defendant petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the defendant petitioner was not a co-tenure holder in the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the respondent no. 1 has patently erred in restoring the judgment of the trial court. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress that the defendant petitioner was absolute owner of the disputed land being purchaser from the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
(3.) SECOND contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner is purchaser of the area and share in the disputed land but he would not be a co-tenure holder, therefore, Rule 159 of the UP ZA and LR Act would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The second appellate court has patently erred in applying the provisions of Rule 159 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that that half of the area was purchased by the plaintiff respondent for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- whereas equal area is being acquired by the plaintiff opposite party for a paltry sum of Rs. 1483/- and odd. Therefore, the order passed by the trial court and maintained by the second appellate court is wholly inequitable and deserves to be quashed.;