Misra, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's revision against the judgment dated 26th February 1988 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Saharanpur in Small Cause Court Suit No. 4 of 1984 valued at Rs.9000/-.
(2.) THE plaintiff-respondent had filed a suit against the defendant-applicant for arrears of rent, recovery of possession and damages for use and occupation in respect of a shop situate at Court Road in the town of Saharanpur. THE trial court has decreed the suit for ejectment of the defendant from the shop in suit as well as for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.250/- per month from 1st April 1980 to 22nd August, 1983 amounting to Rs.9000/- as prayed by the plaintiff and thereafter for damages at the rate of Rs.250/- per month from the date of the suit till the plaintiff-respondent gets possession over the shop in dispute. THE defendant in his written statement has disputed the rate of rent and has alleged that he had taken the shop in dispute from Baisakha Singh, father of the plaintiff, on a rent of Rs.50/-. Subsequently, the written statement was amended and a plea was taken that the contract of tenancy was void since the shop was let out on 16th September, 1977. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff was that the shop was let out on 1st January, 1976. From a perusal of the trial court record which was produced before me, I find that only the following two issues were raised in this case vide order-sheet entry dated 7th January 1987 : "(1) When was the building in suit let out and what is the rate of rent ? Its effect ? (2) Relief ?" It has also been stated in the order-sheet that no other issue arises nor was pressed before the trial court. THE parties, therefore, went to trial and produced evidence in regard to the said issues. After the close of evidence and on hearing learned counsel for the parties, the trial court framed points for determination. With regard to Issue no. 1 the trial court, on appraisal of evidence, came to the conclusion that the rate of rent settled was Rs. 250/- per month and not Rs.50/- as alleged by the defendant. This finding recorded by the trial court has not been challeged before me. As regards the date of commencement of tenancy, the trial court, in appraisal of evidence, came to the conclusion that the tenancy commenced with effect from 1st January 1976 as alleged by the plaintiff and not with effect from 16th September, 1977 as alleged by the defendant. THE other findings recorded by the trial court that the defendant committed default in the payment of rent and was in arrears of rent and hence was liable to be ejected have also not been challenged before me. The grievance raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-applicant before me is that in the impugned judgment, the trial court has not dealt with the controversy as to when the building was let out to the defendant, although learned counsel admits that on appraisal of evidence a finding in this connection has undoubtedly been recorded by the trial court in it's judgment. The argument of the learned counsel proceeds to say that no speaking order has been passed by the court in this behalf and that being so the said order is liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional power. I, therefore, proceed to examine this contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant. At page 4 of the judgment the trial court has noticed the case of the plaintiff that after negotiations with the defendant, rent was settled at Rs.250/- and in pursuance of the aforesaid settlement the defendant occupied the premises with effect from January 1976. He continued paying rent right upto 31st March 1980 and thereafter defaulted in the matter of payment of rent. In support of his aforesaid plea, both with regard to the rate of rent as well as commencement of the tenancy, the plaintiff examined himself and the said evidence was also corroborated by the evidence of his witness Sri Jogender Singh. It has been stated by the trial court in the judgment that the said two witnesses were cross- examined at length by the learned counsel for the defendant but nothing has come out from their cross-examination which may go to show that their oral testimony is not reliable and convincing.
(3.) THEREAFTER the trial court proceeded to examine the dispute regarding rate of rent. It was alleged by the plaintiff that a rent receipt was also issued on 11th March 1980 and it was signed by the defendant. The said signatures were, however, denied and the parties led evidence including expert evidence regarding signature on the said rent receipt and ultimately the court believed the case of the plaintiff regarding rate of rent. The evidence of the defendant too was appraised by the trial court and the same was found to be not reliable in regard to both, the rate of rent as well as the date of commencement of the tenancy. Besides this, the trial court has in the impugned judgment also relied upon as a circumstance that in the reply notice the defendant did not allege at all that he had taken the shop in dispute on rent from Baisakha Singh, father of the plaintiff, on 16th September 1977. Absence of the same was, judged in in the light of oral evidence produced by the parties and ultimately the trial court came to the conclusion that oral evidence regarding contract of letting now sought to be adduced by the defendant "after the amendment in the written statement," was an after thought and does not deserve to be accepted. The trial court also found that there was no documentary evidence to support the said version. Therefore, on appraisal of the oral evidence led by the parties and the circumstantial evidence as stated above, the trial court disbelieved the case of the defendant that the tenancy commenced with effect from 15th September, 1977 and believed the case of the plaintiff that it commenced with effect from 1st January 1976. Thus, I find that the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant that no speaking order has been passed by the trial court with regard to the date of commencement of tenancy is devoid of force. The other submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the said finding of fact so arrived by the trial court is not in accordance with law and is liable to be interfered with in revision by this court. This necessitates the examination of the scope of interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. It has been repeatedly held that it is well- settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 25, it is not open to the court to reassess evidence or to discard the testimony of witnessess which may have been found trustworthy by the trial court. It is also not open to the court to interfere with the inference drawn by the trial court. The court has limited jurisdiction to review the judgment and ascertain as to whether any miscarriage of justice has been caused to the parties. In considering that question it is not open to the court to review the findings of fact recorded by the trial court even if two views may be possible on the appreciation of evidence. Admittedly no such situation arises in the present case inasmuch as no error has been committed by the trial court so as to warrant interference by this Court in revision on a finding of fact regarding the date of commencement of tenancy arrived at on appreciation of evidence.;