U.C. Srivastava, J. - (1.) The writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Faizabad Region, Faizabad condoning the delay for evoking his jurisdiction. The erstwhile workman of the petitioner approached him on the ground that his services were illegally terminated with effect from 6.9.80. In response to notice issued by Deputy Labour Commissioner the employers put in appearance and contended that there were no sufficient grounds for condoning delay and explanation given by the workman was not satisfactory as such delay cannot be condoned and that case was not to be cognizable by Conciliation Officer. The workman came forward with the case that after termination of his services, he approached the Deputy Labour Commissioner and filed representation before him and other higher authorities. He also approached the State Government. An enquiry was made by Deputy Labour Commissioner in the year 1982 but result of the same was not communicated to him. He has been making efforts continuously and preferred representation to the State Government and last representation was preferred to State Government by him on 6.11 86 in which prayer was made that the matter may be referred by the State Government to the Labour Tribunal. The Deputy Labour Commissioner vide its letter dated 6.7.81 advised him to approach the Deputy Labour Commissioner cum-Conciliation Officer. The Conciliation officer from the facts of the case found that the opposite party- workman has been continuously approaching authorities in this behalf and he could not get any reply from them. He even approached the employer on 12 9.86 for payment of his dues and on refusal he approached the Conciliation Officer.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the delay could not have been condoned and the Conciliation Officer cannot proceed with the matter at all. In exercise of powers under clause (d) of Section 3 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh with reference to Section 19 of the Act issued the above-mentioned order. Clause (2) of the said order provides for reference of disputes to the Conciliation Board. Said clause (2) reads as under:- "Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Conciliation Officer if it is in respect of a dispute arising more than six months previous to the date of the application, or if the dispute has already been the subject of proceedings before a Conciliation Board, a Labour Court or a Tribunal or an Arbitrator and finally settled therein : Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing proviso, the Conciliation Officer may entertain an application, if he is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making it earlier : Provided also that, notwithstanding any thing hereinbefore contained the Labour Commissioner (Industrial Relations) or the State Government may refer a dispute to any Conciliation Officer for settlement by a Conciliation Board."
(3.) The submission made on behalf of the petitioner was that the dispute so raised was raised after seven years if its accrual and as such there was no occasion for condoning the delay in view of proviso extracted above. The function of the Conciliation Officer or that of Deputy Labour Commissioner (Industrial Relations) performing the functions of Conciliation Officer is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature and he is not vested with power to adjudicate upon an industrial dispute. He can only peruse the parties to come with fair and amicable settlement. After undergoing the process of Conciliation Officer, the question of making reference by State Government to the Labour Commissioner under the Industrial Disputes Act arises. Merely because Conciliation Officer entertains a particular matter in order to bring about conciliation between the parties, normally a writ petition will not issue against Conciliation Officer not to proceed with the conciliation proceedings. It is true that in view of proviso extracted above, no application shall ordinarily be entertained by the Conciliation Officer if it is in respect of a dispute arising more than six months previous to the date of the application. In the instant case the workman has been agitating the matter before various authorities. The proviso referred to above only provides that application shall not ordinarily be entertained after six months meaning thereby the Conciliation Officer generally would not embark upon a move for conciliation by entertaining any dispute even after six months but he can do so even beyond that period if facts warrant it. Ordinarily- means : in large majority of cases but not invariably and the Conciliation Officer is within his jurisdiction to entertain a dispute beyond six months in case he is satisfied that it is a matter of which cognizance should be taken for maintaining industrial harmony and that demand for justice and voice against the action taken against a workman has not been dropped and as a matter of fact was alive and was being agitated before one or the other authority. In Purshottam Lal Dhawan v. Diwan Chaman Lal and another, AIR 1961 SC 1371 limitation for revision under Administration of Evacuee Property Act was provided and regarding Rule 31 it was said that ordinarily the period of sixty days is not a period of limitation but only a rule of guidance for the petitioners as well as for the Custodian General. The Court with reference to use of word ordinarily in the matter of limitation observed:- "The use of the word "Ordinarily" indicates that the period of sixty days is not a period of limitation but only a rule of guidance for the petitioners as well as for the Custodian-General, It is within the discretion of the Custodian-General to entertain revision petitions after sixty days, but the rule indicates to him that the reasonable period for entertaining a revision is sixty days." The same interpretation applies with full force in the interpretation of word ordinarily in the proviso referred to above. Six months period provided therein is a rule of guidance but admits of exception and discretion to entertain any such matter even thereafter by condoning the delay.;