S.K.Mookerji - (1.) -This is a petition by a tenant, Anand Swarup Garg, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the landlords. It appears, landlords filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner from the premises, in question, on the ground of default, in the court of Judge, Small Causes. This suit was decreed and thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision. The revision was dismissed ; hence this writ petition.
(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged only two points : The first point is that notice, under section 20 (2) (a) was necessary before filing the suit for eviction but the same was not either given to or served on the petitioner. It is fairly conceded that this point has not been discussed by the courts below, It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plea of the tenant was that he did not commit default under section 20 (2) (a) and the notice on record was defective and, therefore, the suit for ejectment should fail. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1987 AWC 1149 = AIR 1987 SC 1156, Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh. He has vehemently placed reliance on paragraph 11 and submitted that in absence of a notice, under section 20 (2) (a), the entire suit for ejectment should fail. I have examined the aforesaid case closely and the last few lines in the aforesaid paragraph are as follows : " The quit notice served by the respondent merely asserted that the rent of the disputed premises was due from June 1, 1979. It follows that there being no notice of demand in terms of section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. The suit as framed must fail ". In the present case, counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Along with the affidavit, a copy of the notice has been filed as Annexure '1' to the petition. Paragraph 4 of the notice clearly indicates the period for which the rent was due and paragraph 8 of the aforesaid notice clearly states that the amount of arrears of rent should be paid within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. Thus, in this case there is a specific demand of arrears of rent. It cannot be said that there was no demand at all. This notice (Annexure 1), relied upon by the petitioner, is quite legal and valid. This point was not even argued before the courts below, but I have examined the material on record and heard the learned counsel for the parties. Normally, for the first time such point cannot be raised in a writ petition. No doubt, this notice (Annexure ' 1 ') refers to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act only but that itself will not render the notice invalid. The entire contents of the notice have to be examined. In substance, this is a composite notice of termination of tenancy and demand of arrears of rent. On examination of the notice, I am of the opinion that this is a composite notice, under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The Supreme Court case, cited above, is not applicable to the facts of the case. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of merit and is rejected.
(3.) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant admittedly in the year 1973 when U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 had come into operation. He has relied upon a case reported in 1983 (1) ARC 50. Relying upon this decision, it has been urged that the suit itself is not maintainable for ejectment as the petitioner was inducted as a tenant without any allotment order and in breach of the provisions of Act No. XIII of 1972. Learned counsel for the respondents-landlord has relied upon Sec. 14 of the Act No. XIII of 1972, which came into force some time in 1976. He submitted that even if there was no allotment order at the time of the filing of the suit, still by virtue of Sec. 14, it shall be deemed that the tenancy was regularized and he cannot be penalised for having entered into the premises without an allotment order. THE suit was filed in 1985 only. THEre is great force in this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents and I accept the same. THE decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable on fact. In that case, the suit was filed prior to the incorporation of the section 14 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is also relevant to point out that this point, sought to be raised now, had not been raised before the courts below. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that although it was not taken as a plea in the written statement, but it could be raised being a point of law. I do not agree with him. Thus, this point cannot also be allowed to be raised now. No other point has been urged. 8. In the result, this petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. THE stay order granted by this Court on 18-2-1988 is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed.;