S.K. Dhaon, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal, at the instance of a defendant, is directed against the judgment and decree dated August 9, 1983 passed by the lower appellate court. By the impugned decree, the suit instituted by the Management of the Balika Vidhyalaya Higher Secondary School, Kaimganj, has been decreed and the order dated July 7, 1977 passed by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools (hereinafter referred to as the Inspectress) has been held to be invalid and inoperative with the result that the order dated May 26, 1977 passed by the Management of the aforesaid institution terminating the services of the appellant has been revived. In brief, the relevant facts are one Smt. Asha Gupta who was an Assistant Teacher in the L.T. Grade in Balika Vidhayalaya Higher Secondary School, Kaimganj (hereinafter referred to as the Institution) proceeded on leave some time in the year 1974. On August, 13, 1974 the appellant was appointed in her place by the Management with the express rider that the same subject to the approval of the Inspectress. On October 29, 1974 the Inspectress granted approval to the appointment of the appellant and she also made it clear that the appointment was to enure till June, 30, 1975. In June 1975 Smt. Asha Gupta resigned and a substantive vacancy arose. On September 1, 1975 the appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the substantive vacancy caused by the resignation of Smt. Asha Gupta. This appointment was made under the U.P. Secondary Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1975. Initially the appointment was made for a period of six months. This appointment was extended from time to time under the second, Third and Fourth Removal of Difficulties Orders. On January 15, 1976 the Inspector approved the appointment of the appellant. This is borne out by Ext. 4. On November 28, 1976 (Removal of Difficulties) (Fifth) Order was introduced. The appellant continued in service till May 26, 1977. On that date the management of the Institution terminated the services of the appellant. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant made a representation to the Inspectress which was allowed on July 7, 1977.
(2.) IN the suit, the main ground taken for challenging the validity of the order dated July 7, 1977, of the Inspectress was that the appellant was not duly qualified to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher as she did not possess the necessary qualifications to teach either English or Home Science and, therefore, the order dated July 7, 1977 of the Inspectress was bad and invalid. It appears that the lower appellate court in disagreement with the trial court, has accepted this contention of the Management. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that Smt. Asha Gupta was not a teacher either in English or in Home Science, but was teaching some other subjects and, therefore, it could not be said that the initial appointment of the appellant was bad as she was not able to teach either English or Home Science. Alternatively, he has urged that assuming the appellant was not qualified to teach either English or Home Science, the requirement of educational qualifications had been waived by the Inspectress when she approved her appointment on October 29, 1974. In this connection reliance is placed upon the first proviso to Section 16F(1) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, as the provision then stood. Section 16F(1) laid down that no person shall be appointed as a Principal, Headmaster or teacher in a recognised institution unless he or she possesses the prescribed qualifications or has been exempted under Sub -section (1) of Section 16E. The proviso is relevant and may be extracted: Provided that if the Inspector is satisfied that for any institution no candidate, who possesses all the prescribed qualifications, is available for appointment he may permit the institution to employ as a temporary measure any suitable person for a period not exceeding one year. Such period may be extended with the prior approval of the Inspector. The submission, therefore, is that in any view of the matter it should be deemed that the Inspectress while approving the appointment of the appellant on October 20, 1974, was aware of the fact that appellant was not qualified to be an Assistant Teacher in English or Home Science and it should further be presumed that the Inspectress kept in view the aforementioned proviso when she duly approved the appointment of the appellant. There appears to be force in this submission. The appellant having been appointed in October 1974, it was too late in the day for the management to wake up on the year 1977 and rake up the issue that the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications and, therefore, she should not continue in the institution. The (Removal of Difficulties) (Fifth Order) regularised the appointment of the appellant made in the year 1974. Paragraph 3 of the said order provides that where any person was appointed by the Committee of Management as a teacher on or before June 30, 1975 for any period as a temporary measure with the approval or permission of the Inspector and such person has worked thereafter up to November 1976, he shall be deemed to have been appointed in a substantive capacity. The proviso to paragraph 3 again takes notice of the prescribed qualifications as well as of the exemption from the prescribed qualifications. The Explanation makes it clear that the period during which any such teacher has, between the date of his appointment and November 15, 1976 ceased to work for any reason not arising out of his own request shall not constitute a break into service for purpose of this clause. A combined reading of the provisions of Section 16(1), the proviso thereto and paragraph 3 of the (Removal of Difficulties) (Fifth Order) makes it clear that the appointment of the appellant stood regularised. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the lower appellate took an erroneous view in declaring that the order dated July 7, 1977 passed by the Inspectress was bad and inoperative. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not that of a court of appeal. The Civil Court could entertain the suit and interfere with the order of the Inspectress only if it came to the conclusion that the Inspectress acted beyond her jurisdiction in passing the order dated July 7, 1977. Surely the applicant had a statutory right to make a representation to the Inspectors. Therefore, there was no lack of initial jurisdiction in the Inspectress. Even if two views were possible, namely, the view canvassed on behalf of the appellant before this Court and the view canvassed before the lower appellate court or the Civil Court on behalf of the management, then too it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the Inspectress acted without jurisdiction in accepting one view or the other. At best she acted illegally in taking one particular view. An illegal order cannot be termed to be an order without jurisdiction. Therefore, the Civil Court could not interfere with the order of the Inspectress and the lower appellate court acted without jurisdiction in interfering with it on the ground that the appellant was not duly qualified to teach either English or Home Science. It is implicit in Section 16G(e) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act that a teacher, whose services are terminated by the management of any institution without the approval of the Inspector or the Inspectress, has a statutory right to make a representation to either of the two officers. It is also implicit that if such a representation is made the officer concerned is under a statutory obligation to dispose of the same. Therefore the Inspectress exercised a statutory power under Section 16G(3) when she passed the order dated July 7, 1977 such an order is appealable under Section 16G(3)(C) of the Act. In Sub -section (4) of Section 16G it is provided that an order made or decision given by the competent authority under Sub -section (3) shall not be questioned in any Court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the directions contained in the order or decision within the period that may be specified. Therefore, by virtue of the operation of this provision the suit was not even maintainable in the Civil Court. This is an additional ground for setting aside the decree of the lower appellate court. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree dated August 19, 1983 passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad is set aside and the suit instituted by the plaintiffs -respondents is dismissed with costs. ;