- (1.) B. L. Yadav and D. S. Sinha, JJ. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the order dated 24-3-1985 suspending of licence of the petitioner under Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act, 1959 (for short the Act), is sought to be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari.
(2.) SRI S. K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that a licence of firearm can be suspended under Section 17 (3) (b) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by a law to hold it, or he is of unsound mind, or if the licensing authority deems it necessary for security of public peace or for public safety, or if the licence has been obtained by suppression of material facts or any conditions of licence have been contravened. None of these conditions apply to the petitioner as neither she was prohibited by any law nor she conceded any material facts nor she was of unsound mind. As regards the condition under Section 17 (3) (b), there was no occasion in the case for any necessity for security of public peace or for public safety. The petitioner has not paid the loans she has obtained for a sum of Rs. 3,320 for construction of house and in that connection the Tahsildar submitted a report dated 11-3-85 (Annexure-2 to the petition) that her licence No. 246/2148 for a Double Barrel Gun No. 744 may be suspended that recovery may be effected. But for recovery of loan there are other process including coercive process and suspension of gun was erroneously made which was beyond the statutory provisions of Section 17 of the Act. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged that the impugned order was perfectly correct and within the provisions of Section 17. The counsel for the parties suggested that the petition itself may be decided on merits. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the impugned order is manifestly erroneous. For the suspension of licence of a firearm, the provisions of Section 17 have been enacted under which a licence can be suspended. The petitioner was not prohibited from any provision of the Act or any other law from acquiring the licence, nor she has concealed any fact. The interpretation of Section 11 is very simple. The unequivocal language used by the legislature manifests the intention of the legislature. Section 17 (3) (b) is couched in a language which is capable of only one interpretation. In such matters the duty of court is to ascertain the meaning from the words employed and not from any other notions. Such duty is to expound the law as it stands. There is no necessity to resort to external aid. See D. D. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 420 Shutters v. Briggs, (1922) AC 1 Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Son Lid. , (1963) AC 758. In the present case as under Section 17 (3) (b) the suspension of licence could be on grounds of security of public peace or public safety. In the present case the public peace or safety is not put to peril. For recovery of house loan detailed procedures have been given under different statutes. In majority number of cases the recovery can be made as arrears of land revenue. The procedure is provided under Sections 275 to 292 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Under Section 279 detailed procedure including by arrest and detention of the person in default has been provided. Relevant rules have also been framed. Recovery for arrears of house loan could be made in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the agreement of the loan. The suspension of licence of the gun was not the mode contemplated to facilitate the recovery of the loan. Assuming we read something more under Section 17 (3) (b) of the Act including that in case the holder of licence of a gun is in arrears of some loan that may also be ground for suspension of the licence. In that event, from the point of view of interpretation, it would be as if we are legislating for "causes orisons". But even the case of "causes missus" the defect of the legislature cannot be rectified by the Court. It is for the legislature itself to rectify the same. See Gladstone v. Bower, (1960) 3 All, England Report 353.
(3.) UNDER the circumstances, the recommendation by the Tahsildar and the impugned order was not justified and cannot be sustained. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 24-3-1985 along with the proceedings of suspension are hereby quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. The respondents are directed to handover the gun of the petitioner forthwith, in case it has been deposited. Petition allowed. .;