B.L.Yadav - (1.) -Whether a suit for relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making any construction over the land in suit (a private graveyard and a private Imambara), can be held to be not maintainable and barred by the provisions of Section 64 of U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act, 1960, (for short the Act), is the short question for determination in the present petition filed by the petitioners under Atticle 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) A portrayal of essential facts are these. The petitioners filed a suit (Suit No. 270 of 1985) in the Court of Munsif, Ghazipur, for the aforesaid relief against the defendants, respondent nos. 3 to 14, who were trying to raise construction over the land in dispute, which is in the nature of Wakf Alalaulad, in which dead bodies of the family of petitioners are buried. The said suit was contested by the aforesaid defendants and the suit was alleged to be barred by Section 64 (2) and Section 66 of the Act. It was further alleged that the notice under Section 66 of the Act was necessary. The learned Munsif framed preliminary issues and held by order dated 6-9-85 that the suit was barred by Section 64 (2) of the Act and the notice under Section 66 of the Act was necessary. Against that order the petitioner filed a revision and the same was dismissed by order dated 15-1-88. These are the two orders which have been challenged by this petition, and a prayer has been made to quash them by issuing a writ of Certiorari. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 64 of the Act may be read together. From a bare reading it was manifest that the suit could be barred under sub-section (2) only when any of the reliefs referred to under sub-section (1) were claimed. In case such a suit was sought to be filed, a written consent of the Board was necessary. Ex- abundanti cautela, the statutory provision of Section 64 of the Act are set out below :- " (4. Institution of suits under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 and under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :-(1) A suit to obtain any of the reliefs mentioned under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 or under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to any Wakf may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in those Acts, be instituted by the Board without obtaining the leave or consent referred to in those Acts. (2) No suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in sub-section (1) relating to a wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Board without the consent in writing of the Board and where the Board has given such consent it shall not be necessary further to obtain the leave or consent referred to in the said Acts. " Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that every suit of the civil nature can be filed in the civil court, whereas Section 64 of the Act imposes conditions and in a way excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts to the effect that in case any relief under Section 92 of the Code or Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act was claimed, in that event the suit cannot be filed in respect of a wakf property without the consent in writing of the Board. In the present case, obviously, the suit was not filed with the consent of the Board. The suit has been filed for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from raising any construction or for removal of the construction indicated by letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I, J etc. These reliefs are not the reliefs which could be claimed under Section 92 of the Code. Under that section the reliefs to remove a trustee, to appoint a new trustee, vesting any property in the trustee, directing a trustee to deliver possessions, directing accounts of allocation of the trust property to a particular body of trust, authorising whole or any part of the trust property to be left etc. can be claimed or under Section 92 (1) (h) to grant such further or other relief as the nature of case may require. In the present case a bare reading of the plaint indicates that no such relief as indicated under Section 92 (1) (a) to (g) of the Code was claimed. The only question is as to whether the relief can be said to be covered by Section 92 (l) (h) of the Code to the effect of granting such further or other relief as the nature of case may require and what must be the interpretation of Section 92 (1) (h). Relience was placed on Harendra Nath Bhattacharya v. Kali Ram Das, AIR 1972 SC 246. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand refuted the arguments advanced by the petitioner and urged that the impugned orders were perfectly correct and the suit was barred by Section 64 (2) of the Act.
(3.) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that there are two principal questions, which require determination. The first question is whether the suit can be said to be barred by Section 64 (2) of the Act, and the next is whether granting such other and further relief as the nature of case may require, as indicated under Section 92 (1) (h) of the Code would include relief totally different than provided under Section 92 (1) (a to g) of the Code. Both these questions can be taken together. Under Section 92 (1) (a to g) the nature of relief has been indicated, which was obviously in respect of removal of any trustee, appointing new trustee etc. pertaining particulary to the trustee or any mismanagement of the trust property. The administration of trust property in relation to a trustee was subject of relief which could be obtained under Section 92 (1) (a to g). But certain instances have been given about the reliefs, and Section 92 (1) (h) provides granting such further or other relief as nature of the case may require, and the same has to be interpreted keeping in view certain relevant Latin maxims : (i) Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterios (which obviously connotes the mention of one thing is the exclusion of another) ; and (ii) Ejusdem Generis (i. e. of the same kind) ; and (iii) Noscitur Asociis (i. e. word is known by its companions). These maxims are particularly known as rules of language. As a number of nature of reliefs has been mentioned under Section 92 (1) (a to g), hence Section 92 (1) (h) of the Act has to be interpreted by applying these maxims. The first maxim indicates that mention of one thing is exclusion of another. In case the nature of aforesaid relief has been mentioned under Section 92 (1) (a to g) it means no contradictory or totally opposite relief could be claimed. Similarly the maxim ' ejusdem generis' is an example of broader linguistic rule or in practice to which reference is made by the maxim ' Noscitur Asociis '. It is better to quote an observation in this respect about the nature of words and their interpretation from Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd., (1967) 2 All. ER 576 at 578 as follows ; " English words derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, define separately by reference to the dictionary or decided cases, and then put back into sentences with the meaning which might have assigned to them as separate words. " Applying these principles and rules of language and the interpretation of English words and sentences, it is obvious that Section 92 (1) (h) has to be interpreted quite consistent with the reliefs claimed under Section 92 (1) (a to g) as relief for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the land in dispute, and the relief for demolition of construction was not the relief indicated under Section 92 (1) (a to g). Hence these reliefs claimed by the petitioners in the suit cannot be claimed in a suit under Section 92.;