K. C. Agrawal, J. - (1.) -Allah Rakha (respondent no. 3), who is the owner and landlord of house no. J-27/28, Jaitpura, Varanasi, filed an application for release in respect of the accommodation in dispute under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 on the ground of his personal requirement. The application was resisted by the tenant-petitioner on a number of grounds. One of them, with which we are concerned, being that the landlord having filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, the same was not maintainable in view of the compromise arrived at in Suit No. 123 of 1975 between the parties on September 15, 1975, in a suit brought for the defendant's ejectment and arrears of rent before the Judge, Small Causes Courts Act. The application under Section 21 (1) (a) was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter the appeal, preferred against the same by the tenant-petitioner, was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. Against this order that the present writ petition has been filed.
(2.) WHEN this writ petition came up for admission/hearing the learned single Judge requested the Chief Justice for referring the case to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the following question ; "Whether the agreement between the parties that the landlord will have no right to evict the tenant from the premises in dispute so long as he continues to pay rent provides a complete immunity to the tenant from being evicted from the premises under any condition and precludes the landlord from pressing his application for release of the accommodation under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act even though the need of the landlord may be found to be very pressing, bona fide and genuine ?" The argument before us was confined to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of the compromise arrived at in Suit no. 123 of 1975. The compromise is being reproduced below : "Yah ki agar muddalay kiraya ada karta rahega to muddai ko dookan kiraidari se muddalay ko bedakhal kerne ka haq hasil no hoga." The petitioner's counsel urged that the landlord respondent had given up his right to eject the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 21 and as such, by entering into compromise mentioned above, the present application was not maintainable. For the proposition the petitioner relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhnand Ram Narain, 1979 AWC 637. In Raj Narain Jain's case Raj Narain Jain purchased the property in question in a court auction. By means of a registered deed dated March 20, 1948, the then landlords had leased out the premises to the tenants. One of the terms of the registered lease was that the tenants shall not be liable to ejectment at the instance of the landlords, except on the ground that they were in arrears of rent for a full year.
(3.) INTERPRETING the lease deed of that case the Division Bench held that the lease deed having provided that the tenant was not liable to ejectment except on the ground of arrears of rent for one year, the application for eviction on the ground of landlord's personal need could not succeed. In connection with the controversy that arose for decision in that case the Division Bench referred to various authorities and found that the lease prohibited the landlord from evicting the tenant excepting on ground of default of payment of one year's rent. In the instant case the position is different and so the Raj Narain Jain's case is distinguishable. A compromise had been arrived at in the present case in Suit No 123 of 1975, which simply mentioned that the landlord have no right to get the tenant ejected in case the tenant continued paying rent. In this case the compromise is not absolute and does not take away the right of a landlord to bring the application under Section 21 (1) (a). As Section 21 (1) (a) is a provision entitling a landlord to apply for release on the ground of his or his family members personal need. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 gives another ground to the landlord for release, that is, when the house is in dilapidated condition and is required re-construction after demolition If the right of the petitioner-tenant, as claimed before us, is so absolute that neither Section 21 (1) (a) or (1) (b) would apply that will create a situation which is abhorrent to law. A tenant cannot insist on living in a house although the accommodation is in a dilapidated condition. If that is conceded to, his property would come to ruins and in that event he would just watch standing by and doing nothing. In fact there is a difference between Sections 20 and 21. Section 20 enumerates the verious grounds on which a suit for ejectment can be brought by a landlord against the tenant whereas Section 21 takes care of the two situations mentioned therein for release of the premises on the ground specified therein. Before filing the application under Section 20, the tenancy would have to be terminated whereas such is not required by Section 21 of the Act. In Sheikh Bundu v. State of U. P., 1977 All. Rent Cases 454 a Division Bench of this Court held that both the proceedings are independent of each other being based on separate causes of action. What is debarred by the compromise arrived at in between the parties is that on the basis of the default already committed, which was the subject matter of Suit No. 123 of 1975, the tenant was not liable to be ejected. The compromise does not take away the right of a landlord to either bring a suit for ejectment if other grounds exist or where he files an application for release under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act. By the compromise the parties intended only to settle the subject-matter, which was in dispute, in that case.;