- (1.) THE order dated 1st November, 1988 passed by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur suspending the petitioner from service is being impugned in the present petition.
(2.) THE order recites that a prosecution under Sections 465/467,469/471/420/ I20-B, I. P. C. . road with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act had been launched against the petitioner, who is a clerk in the office of the District Supply Officer, and had been arrested on 28-10-1988. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it is averred that the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. On 29- 11-1988 the Special Judge, Gorakhpur summoned the petitioner in case No. 2 of 1988 with respect to the first set of offence and in case No. 26 of 1988 with respect to the offence under Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act On 30-1-1988 this court in a revision preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid two orders passed the following order : "admit. Issue notice. Further proceeding in Special Case No. 2 of 1988 and in case No. 261 of 1988 shall remain stayed pending disposal of this petition. " Rule 49 (1-A) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rule') provides that a Government servant in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending, may, at the discretion of the appointing autho rity, under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. The argument is that on account of the afore-quoted order passed by this court in the Criminal Revision neither any investigation nor enquiry nor trial relating to a criminal charge is pending in respect of or against the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner nor can it be that the charges against the petitioner are not connected with his position as a Government servant or are likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involve moral turpitude. It is also not in dispute that by issuing sum mons the Special Judge initiated the enquiries against the petitioner. Therefore, the only question is as to whether the proceedings initiated against the petitioner will be deemed to have been terminated on account of the afore-quoted interim orders passed by this court. The answer is clearly in the negative.
(3.) IT is well settled that in a criminal case 'trial" means the whole of the proceedings including the sentence. A trial until concluded is pending. This expression means the entire proceedings before a Tribunal from the date of refe rence to it and to the date of the conclusion of the proceedings. In Asgarali, Nazarali Singapore Walla v. State of Bombay, AIR 195 V Supreme Court 503. the Supreme Court quoted with approval the meaning of the word 'pending - Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Edn. 3, Vol. 3, p. 2141: A legal proceeding is 'pend ing" as soon as commenced and until it is concluded, i. e. , so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order of the matters in issue, or to be dealt with, therein. Again the Supreme Court approved of the meaning of the word 'trial' as defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Edn. 3, of. 4. 3092: A ''trial" is the conclusion, by a competent tribunal. of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal. The Court quoted with approval (R. V. Gram, 1 (1951) 1 KB 500] "the "trial' (Criminal Justice Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6c. 58) Section 23 (1) is not complete until sentence has been passed or the offender has been ordered to be discharged. ' In the precise context, in the rule the word "until termination of all proceedings" have been used. The effect of the stay order passed by this court is that it prohibits the Special Judge from proceeding further. As soon as the Special Judge acquires knowledge of the order it is bound to pay it and if it does not, it acts illegally. The result will be that all proceedings alter the knowledge of the interim order will be a nullity. It cannot be said that an order staying further proceedings is similar to an order allowing an appeal or revision and quashing the proceedings pending before the inferior court. If the proceedings pending before the inferior court are quashed, the order takes effect immediately and there is nothing left to proceed with, but where a stay order is passed, the proceedings before the inferior court still stand. However, during the period of operatic of the stay order the proceedings remain suspended. An order of stay does not undo any thing, which has been done. Its utmost effect is to stop further action. Again, merely by the admission of the revision of the petitioner by this Court the proceedings initiated by the Special Judge have not been effaced. They have been merely put in jeopardy. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the enquiry or trial as against the petitioner is still pending before the Special Judge and has not terminated. Therefore, the impugned order of suspension has been passed within the ambit of the Rule.;