Deoki Nandan, J. - (1.) THIS is a plaintiff's appeal in a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession on a portion marked EFGHIJ on the plaint map, of plot no. 1/1. The parties are co-bhumidhars of the entire land of plot no. 1/1 (which has been renumbered as plot no. 1 in the Consolidation of Holdings Operations) and there is no dispute about their respective shares in the land. The plaintiff's claim is that he had purchased the area in dispute from one of the co-tenure holders and that there were some trees there which the defendants were threatening to remove. The defendants have contended that the area of the land in suit was situated not on the south western corner of plot no. 1/1 as alleged in the plaint but on the north eastern corner thereof. The trial Court held in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. The lower Appellate Court held in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit.
(2.) WITH regard to the situation of the area in dispute, the plaintiffs' case was based on a private partition of the land. It is undisputed that after the date of the alleged private partition there had been proceedings before the Consolidation Authorities in respect of the land comprised in the said plot. Nevertheless, there was no partition of the land among the several co-tenure-holders by the Consolidation Authorities; and the position is that even after the finalisation of the record of rights by the Consolidation Authorities, the entire land is recorded as one holding of the several co-tenureholders; and their respective areas to which several co-tenure holders were held entitled to, by the Consolidation Authorities, have not been demarcated or divided by metes and bounds and the plot has not been sub-divided into sub-plots. The correctnesss of the record of rights prepared by the Consolidation Authorities is made final and conclusive by the Section 27 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Courts to question its correctness is barred. In view of the fact that the alleged private partition was not recognized, or at any rate was not given effect to, by the consolidation Authorities in the record of rights prepared by them, I am of the view that no right based on the alleged private partition could be claimed or adjudicated upon in the present suit. The position would be that the entire area of plot no. 1/1, now plot no. 1, will have to be treated as the joint holding of the co-tenureholders in their respective shares as determined by the Consolidation Authorities, despite the alleged private partition. It may here be stated that it was the common case of the parties that there had been a private partition, and the land was being enjoyed in specific portions by them respectively. However, it is not clear that the partition alleged by the parties was not given effect to by the Consolidation Authorities in the record of rights and the map prepared by them as a result of the consolidation operations. It is further, not disputed before me that there was no proceedings for partition under Section 9-C of the Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Consolidation Authorities. The position which, therefore, emerges is that there was no partition in law of the land by metes and bounds although the parties might have been enjoying different portions thereof by private arrangement among themselves. In the circumstances I am of the view that the dispute should not have been decided by the Civil Court in a suit for injunction in a matter like this. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Chhedilal v. Chhotey Lal, 1951 Allahabad 191; that :- "The question of the right of co-sharers in respect of the joint land should be kept separate and distinct from the question as to what relief should be granted to co-sharers, whose right in respect of joint land has been invaded by the other co-sharer either by exclusive appropriating and cultivating land or by raising constructions thereon." Since the dispute related to the precise situation of the area in question and not to the extent of the area, in my view it could have been best resolved by a suit for partition among the several co-tenure-holders of the land. I may in this context also advert to the Explanation to Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which runs as under :- "If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the revenue Court would have granted." The mandate of the section is that in such a situation "No Court other than a Court, mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II of the said Act will have jurisdiction to decide the suit."
(3.) SINCE it is not disputed in this case that on the alleged invasion of the rights of the plaintiff he could certainly have obtained effective relief by bringing a suit for partition in the Revenue Court, I am of the view that the suit giving rise to the present Second Appeal was not competent and must be dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. In the result, the appeal fails and the decree dismissing the suit is maintained but on grounds different from those which found favour with the lower Appellate Court. The findings recorded by the two Courts below shall not bind the parties and it shall be open to the plaintiff, if so advised, to seek appropriate relief before the Revenue Court. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.;