CHANDRA BHUSHAN KHANNA Vs. BRIJ NANDAN SINGH
LAWS(ALL)-1978-5-40
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on May 25,1978

CHANDRA BHUSBAN KHANNA Appellant
VERSUS
BRIJ NANDAN SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

K. N. Seth, J. - (1.) THIS revision by the defendants is directed against the order of the learned Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiff's claim for ejectment in a suit tried as a small cause court suit. The only question pressed for consideration is that the decree passed by the learned Judge is a nullity as the Small Cause Court Judge lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the suit.
(2.) THE suit was originally filed in the court of Munsif, Moradabad, for ejectment of the defendants from the shop in dispute and for recovery of mesne profits and damages. THE case set up by the plaintiff was that the shop in dispute was let out to Ram Ratan Lal Khanna, father of defendant applicants No. 1 to 4 and husband of defendant applicant No. 5, on 2-6-1946 for a period of two years. During the continuance of the tenancy U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 came into force and Ram Ratan Lal continued to remain in possession as a tenant of the shop. His tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 5-6-1969. Ram Ratan Lal died on 2-12-1969. It was asserted that since Ram Ratan Lal was only a statutory tenant at the time of his death, no tenancy right devolved on the defendants and they were liable to ejectment and damages for wrongful occupation of the shop. After enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972) the suit was transferred to the Judge Small Causes Court. THE trial court decreed the suit for recovery of mesne profits and damages only. On revision by the plaintiff the learned Additional District Judge granted the relief for ejectment also. The question whether the suit was cognizable by the Judge Small Causes Court depends on the nature of the suit as originally brought and has to be determined on the allegations made in the plaint. On the plaint allegations it is evident that the plaintiff treated the defendants as unauthorised occupants of the shop in question and reliefs for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits and damages were claimed only on that basis. The relevant part of Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, provides that a Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the second Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. The Second Schedule enumerates the suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. Article 4 of the Schedule, as it originally stood, excepted a suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. By the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, Article 4 has been substituted by the following Article :- "(4) a suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property, but not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of compensation for the use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease. Explanation-For the purposes of this Article, the expression 'building' means a residential or non-residential roofed structure, and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appurtenant to such building, and also includes any fittings and fixtures affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof." The Article as it originally stood excepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes in respect of a suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property. An exception has, however, now been carved out in respect of a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease i. e. a suit for possession" of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property would be cognizable by a Judge of Small Causes if the suit is not on title but on the basis that a relationship of lessor and lessee existed between the plaintiff and the defendant and that relationship was terminated before the institution of the suit.
(3.) AS noticed earlier, the nature of the suit has to be determined on the allegations made in the court on the allegation that the relationship of lessor and lessee, which existed between the plaintiff and Ram Ratan Lal Khanna, was terminated by a valid notice before the latter's death. On the termination of his tenancy he could claim only the protection provided by U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. On his death, however, his heirs did not inherit any right or interest in the property as the statutory tenancy rights which Sri Khanna had after the termination of his contractual tenancy was not inheritable. There is no assertion in the plaint that the plaintiff and the defendants stood in the relationship of lessor and lessee at any stage. On the plaint allegation it is obvious that the suit was not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes as envisaged in Article 4 of the second Schedule. The suit was rightly instituted in the court of Munsif and its transfer to the Court of Small Causes on the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 was illegal. It is true that both the parties submitted to the illegal transfer of the suit to the Court of Small Causes and no objection to the jurisdiction of the court was raised either in the trial court or in the revisional court but since the Court of Small Causes lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the acquiescence or even consent of the parties could not confer jurisdiction on it. Acquiescence, waiver or consent of the parties may be relevant in objection relating to the pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of the court but these factors have no relevance where the court lacks inherent jurisdiction. The Privy Council in Ledcard v. Bull, (1886) 13 Ind. App. 134 observed as follows :- "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process,......But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit." Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by consent, acquiescence or waiver where there is none nor can it be ousted where is. Lack of inherent jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree and renders the decree a nullity. Since the Judge Small Causes lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the present suit, the decree passed by the courts below must be held to be a nullity.;


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