N.D.Ojha, J. - (1.) BY this writ petition an order passed by the Regional Apprenticeship Advisor and Regional Director, Northern Region, Kanpur, Respondent No. 2, under Section 7(3)(b) of the Apprentices Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby a contract of apprenticeship has been terminated and a direction has been made that a sum of Rs. 500/ -may be recovered as the cost of training from the guardian of the Petitioner for having failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the contract, is sought to be quashed. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed and the question involved in the writ petition being a short one we are of opinion that it is a fit case which may be finally disposed off at this very stage as contemplated by the second proviso to Rule 2(1) of Chapter 22 of the Rules of the Court. We accordingly proceed to dispose off the writ petition finally.
(2.) ONE of the grievances raised in the writ petition is that even though an appeal was filed against the order of Respondent No. 2 by the Petitioner before Respondent No. 1, the same has not been disposed off. In regard to this submission it has been asserted by Shri J.N. Tewari, appearing for Respondents 1, 2 and 4, that no appeal was maintainable against the order passed by Respondent No. 2. Reliance for the submission that an appeal was maintainable was placed by counsel for the Petitioner on Sub -section (2) of Section 20 of the Act Section 20 of the Act reads as follows: 20. Settlement of disputes. -(1) Any disagreement or dispute between an employer and an apprentice arising out of the contract of apprenticeship shall be referred to the Apprenticeship Advisor for decision. (2) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Apprenticeship Advisor under Sub -section (1) may, within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such decision, prefer an appeal against the decision to the Apprenticeship Council and such appeal shall be heard and determined by a Committee of that Council appointed for the purpose. (3) The decision of the Committee under Sub -section (2) and subject only to such decision the decision of the Apprenticeship Advisor under Sub -section (1) shall be final. A bare perusal of Sub -section (2) of Section 20 makes it clear that an appeal is maintainable under the said Sub -section only against the decision of the Apprenticeship Advisor made under Sub -section (1) thereof. In the instant case the impugned order itself clearly indicates that it had been passed under Section 7(3)(b) of the Act and not under Section 20(1) of the Act. Annexure I to the writ petition is an application which was made by the Principal of the Training School on the basis of which the impugned order was passed. This application was an application as contemplated by Sub -section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. On this application the Petitioner was required to show cause and it was after considering the application made by the Principal and the objection of the Petitioner that the impugned order was passed. The recital in the impugned order that it was being passed under Section 7(3)(b) of the Act is borne out from the aforementioned facts and we have no doubt that the said order was passed not under Section 20(1) of the Act but under Section 7(3)(b) of the Act. This being so Sub -section (2) of Section 20 was apparently not applicable and the stand taken by the Petitioner that Respondent No. 1 should have decided the appeal filed by the Petitioner is accordingly not substantiated. The plea raised in this connection by counsel for Respondent No. 1 that since the appeal itself was not maintainable no question of deciding it arose cannot therefore, be said to be unjustified. Coming to the merits of the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 2 it would be seen that an order under Section 7(3) of the Act is contemplated on an application being made by either party of a contract to apprenticeship for the termination of the contract. On such an application being made it is incumbent on the Apprenticeship Advisor to give an opportunity to the other party to have its say in the matter and it is only after considering the contents of the application and the objection, if any, that the order under Sub -section (3) is to be passed. Further, before passing any order under Sub -section (3) the Apprenticeship Advisor has to be satisfied that the parties to the contract, or any one of them has or, have failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the contract and as such it is desirable in the interests of the parties or any of them to terminate the same. All this indicates that the proceedings for termination of contract under Sub -section (3) of Section 7 are quasi -judicial proceedings. Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub -section (3) of Section 7 of the Act confers power on the Apprenticeship Advisor to direct the employer to pay to the apprentice such compensation as may be prescribed whereas Clause (b) of the said proviso empowers him to direct the apprentice or Sis guardian to refund to the employer as cost of training such amount as may be determined by him. If a direction is issued under either of the Clauses (a) or (b), it would be to the prejudice to the party against whom the order is passed. A perusal of the impugned order makes it clear that except for making a bald statement in the last line of the order that the Petitioner was guilty of having failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the said contract, Respondent No. 2 has not assigned any reason why the detailed explanation given by the Petitioner, a true copy whereof has been filed as Annexure IV to the Writ Petition, has been found to be unsatisfactory. In State of U.P. v. Managing Committee, 1973 ALJ 282 a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with an order passed under Section 16 -D of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act held: The impugned order of the State Government only states that maladministration was rampant in the institution and that the explanation furnished by management was not satisfactory. No reasons have been disclosed in support of these conclusions. The matter was highly controversial. The Director had indicated 19 heads of irregularities. The institution had furnished an elaborate and detailed reply. Its case was that the charges were misconceived. Under the circumstances, the institution was entitled to know why its case has failed, which particular irregularities have, in the opinion of the State Government, remained unrectified. For lack of reasons, this Court is also disabled from satisfactorily exercising its supervisory powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. On this ground, the impugned order was liable to be quashed. It will, however, be open to the State Government to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
(3.) IN Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India : AIR 1976 SC 1785 it was held that it is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi -judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi -judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The impugned order, as already seen above, does not give any reason as to why the detailed explanation submitted by the Petitioner was not acceptable. It has to be borne in mind that there is difference between a finding and the reasons on which the said finding is based. In the instant case at best what can be said is that the Respondent No. 2 had recorded a finding that the Petitioner had failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the contract but no reasons for the said findings have been recorded by Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained.;