V.K. Mehrotra, J. - (1.) IN this revision under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure filed by the Plaintiff, who is the landlord of the suit premises, it has been urged that the approach of the courts below in the matter of determining the question of default was manifestly erroneous in law and that they had committed material irregularity in the proceedings.
(2.) THE Plaintiff brought a suit for ejectment of the Defendant -opposite party on the ground of default. One of the items upon which the plea of default was founded was that the Defendant had not paid the amount of water tax and house tax due from him. The trial court, as also the revisional court, took the view that the Plaintiff -applicant had failed to establish any contract between him and the Defendant opposite party for payment of such taxes by the latter. This is clearly erroneous. The liability for payment of proportionate amount of these taxes has been fastened upon a tenant by Section 7 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 "in addition to and as part of the rent". The decision of the courts below, therefore, suffers from a manifest error. The question which is yet to be examined is as to whether the Defendant would still be a defaulter within the meaning of that term under Section 20 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 if the amounts claimed as arrears of water tax and house tax from the Defendant remained unpaid. The courts below naturally did not go into this aspect. As far as the revisional court below is concerned, it also did not consider and record a finding on the plea of material alteration raised by the Plaintiff -applicant on account of the construction of the Nali in regard to which the trial judge had recorded a finding.
(3.) THE necessary factual finding as regards the default, if any, in payment of the amount of rent by the Defendant -opposite party will have to be recorded afresh by the trial judge having regard to the correct legal position, namely, that the tenant was liable for payment of taxes as provided for by Section 7 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. For this purpose it is necessary in the interest of justice to send the case back to the trial court.;