N.D.Ojha, J. - (1.) SWAMI Devanand Snatak Mahavidyalay Society, which is registered under the Societies Registration Act, runs a college named SWAMI Devanand Snatak Mahavidyalaya in the district of Deoria. This college imparts higher education in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. State Univer sities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is affiliated to the University of Gorakhpur. It appears that the State Government received certain information in respect of this college as contemplated by section 57 of the Act and issued notice to show cause why an order under section 58 of the Act appointing an Authorised Controller may not be issued. The State Government being further of the opinion that immediate action was necessary in the interest of the college suspended the Managing Committee of the college in exercise of the power conferred on it by sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act and entrusted the interim management of the college to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Salempur, district Deoria, by order dated 8th August, 1978. It is this order which sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. A prayer has been made in the writ petition for quashing the notice to show cause issued under section 57 also but at the time of arguments this plea was not pressed before us and in our opinion rightly because the question whether the charges mentioned in the show cause notice have been made out or not is one which can appropriately be decided by the State Government after the petitioners have submitted their reply to the said notice. That on receipt of the informa tion as contemplated by Section 57 of the Act a show cause notice can be issued by the State Government admits of no doubts. As such no question of lack of jurisdiction in issuing such a notice arises. The only question which will arise is whether those charges have been substantiated and as already pointed out above, the said question will have to be decided by the State Government after the explanation has been submitted by the petitioners. In regard to the interim order passed by the State Government on 8th August, 1978, suspending the management of the college and entrusting it to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Salempur, under section 58 (2) of the Act, it was urged by counsel for the petitioners that the said order was vitiated on two grounds (1) that it had been passed without giving the petitioners any oppor tunity of hearing and was thus violative of the principles of natural justice; and (2) that the said order did not record reasons as contemplated by Section 58 (2) of the Act. Coming to the first ground it may be pointed out that the rules of natural justice vary with the varying situations of the statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function. The question whether or not any rules of natural justice have been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notion but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. See Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398. and Suresh Koshi v. University of Kerala A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198 and Shadi Lal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1124. Further rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of the fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law but supplement it. It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implica tion excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred the pur pose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power. See Union of India v. J.N. Singh A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40. It is in the light of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court as aforesaid in regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice that we have to consider the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners made in this behalf. For this purpose we have to turn to the relevant statutory provisions contained in this behalf in Sections 57 and 58 of the Act. It would be useful to reproduce these sections at this place. They read:- 57. Power of the State Government to issue notice :- If the State Government receives information in respect of any affiliated or associated college (other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government or a local authority)'- (i) That its management has persistently committed wilful default in paying the salary of the teachers or other employees of the college by the twentieth day, of the month next following the month in respect of which it is payable, (ii) That its Management has failed to appoint teaching staff possessing such qualification as are necessary for the purpose of ensuring the main tenance of academic standards in relation to the college or has appointed or retained in the service any teacher in contravention of the statutes or ordinances, or (iii) That any dispute with respect to the right claimed by different persons to be lawful office bearers of its Management has affected the smooth and orderly administration of the college, or (iv) That its Management has persistently failed to provide the college with such adequate and proper accommodation, library, furniture, stationery, laboratory, equipment, and other facilities, as are necessary for the efficient administration of the college, or (v) That its Management has substantially diverted, misapplied or misappropriated the property of the college to the detriment of the college, it may call upon the Management to show cause why an order under Sec tion 58 should not be made: Provided that where it is in dispute as to who are the office-bearers of the Management, such notice shall be issued to all persons claiming to be so. 58. Authorised Controller-(1) If the State Government after consi dering the explanation, if any, submitted by the Management under Section 57 is satisfied that any ground mentioned in that section exists, it may by order, authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as 'the Authorised Controller) to take over for such period not exceeding two years as may be specified, the Management of the College and its pro perty to the exclusion of the Management, and whenever the Authorised Controller so takes over the Management, he shall subject only to such restrictions as State Government may impose, have inlrelation to the Management of the college and its property all such powers and authority as the Management would have if the college and its property were not taken over under this sub-section : Provided that if the State Government is of opinion that it is expedient so to do in order to continue to secure the proper management of the college and its property, it may, from time to time, extend the operation of the order, for such period, not exceeding one year at a time as it may specify, so however, that the total period of operation of the order including the period specified in the initial order under this sub-section does not exceed four years: Provided further that the State Government may at any time revoke an order made under this sub section.
(2.) WHERE the State Government while issuing a notice under Sec tion 57 is of opinion, for reasons to be - recorded, that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college, it may suspend the Management, which shall thereupon cease to function and make such arrangement as it thinks proper for managing the affairs of the college and its property till further proceedings are completed : Provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than six months from the date of actual taking over the Management in pursuance of such order: Provided further that in computation of the said period of six months, the time during which the operation of the order as suspended any order of the High Court passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or any period during which the Management failed to show cause in pursuance of the notice under Section 57 shall be excluded. Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed to confer on the Authorised Controller the power to transfer any immovable property belonging to college (except by way of letting from month to month) in the ordinary course of management or to create any charge thereupon (except as a condition of receipt of any grant-in-aid of the college) from the State Government or the Government of India. Any order made under this section shall have affected notwith standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other enact ment or in any instrument relating to the management and control of the college or its property : Provided that the property of the college and any income there from shall continue to be applied for the purposes of the college as provided in any such instrument.
(3.) THE Director of Education (Higher Education) may give to the Authorised Controller such directions as he may deem necessary for the proper management of the college or its property, and the Authorised Controller shall carry out those directions." A perusal of these sections makes it clear that on the receipt of informa tion as contemplated by section 57 of the Act a notice is to be issued under the said Section 57 calling the management to show cause why an order under section 58 should not be made. THE words "while issuing a notice under section 57 is of opinion", occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 58 under which the impugned order suspending the management has been passed are relevant. THEy pinpoint the stage at which an order under sub-section (2) of Section 58 can be passed and that stage is the point of time of issuing notice under section 57 of the Act. In the other words, Section 58 (2) contemplates passing an order suspending the management, if the State Government is of opinion for reasons to be recorded that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college......simultaneously with the issue of the notice under section 57. Apparently, therefore, an order under section 58(2) is contemplated to be passed on the ex parte material contained in the information contemplated by section 57 of the Act. Reply to the show cause notice issued under section 57 can be expected from the Management only after such notice has been served on it. And when Section 58 (2) contemplates the passing of an order suspending the management at the stage of the issuing of the notice itself there seems to be no doubt that an opportunity of hearing being given prior to the passing of an order suspending the management was ruled out by the provisions contained in Section 58, if not expressly then by necessary implication. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in J.N. Sinha's case (supra) it is not possible for the Court to ignore the mandate of the legislature on this point. THE nature of the power conferred the purpose for which it is conferred, and the effect of the exercise of that power which also have to be kept in mind while considering an argument in regard to the violation of the principles of natural justice as contemplated by J.N. Sinha's case (supra) also lead to the same conclusion. THE nature of the power conferred on the State Govern ment under Section 58 (2) is as already pointed out above, a power to be exercised while issuing a notice under Section 57, i.e. simultaneously with the issue of such notice, and giving of an opportunity of hearing at this stage is ruled out. THE purpose for which the power has been conferred is to take immediate action in the interest of the college. THE effect of the exercise of that power is also not such which is likely to cause any permanent injury to the management, the outer limit of an order of suspension passed under Section 58 (2) of the Act remaining in force being six months from the date of the actual taking over of the management as contemplated by the first proviso to the said sub-section. This, of course, is subject to the provision contained in the second proviso to the said sub-rule. THE legislature while fixing this outer limit clearly intended that the proceedings under Section 58 (1) in pursuance of the show-cause notice issued under Section 57 should be completed within these six months. And in any view of the matter even if those proceedings could not be completed for some reason or the other the management is not to suffer inasmuch as no power has been given to extend the period of suspension of the management ordered under Section 58 (2) of the Act. THEre is another aspect which, in our opinion, deserves consideration. As seen above sub-section (2) of Section 58 provides for the suspension of the management. THE interim arrangement for the college under Section 58 (2) is to be made for the period till further proceedings are completed or for a period of six months computed in accordance with the second proviso to the said sub-section whichever is earlier. It is open to the management on being served with the notice under Section 57 and the order under Section 58 (2) to show cause forthwith and place the necessary material before the State Government and satisfy it if is able to do so that the information conveyed to it under section 57 was baseless and no credence could be given to it and obtain an order dropping the proceedings which will have automatic effect of revoking the interim order suspending the management even before the expiry of the period of six months contemplated by the first proviso aforesaid. In Pearlbergs v. Varty (1972) 1 W.L.R. 534. Lord Pearso observed:- "A tribunal to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is held to be required to apply those principles in performing these func tions unless there is a provision to the contrary. But where some person or body is entrusted by Parliament with administrative or executive functions there is no presumption that compliance with the principles of natural justice is required, although as Parliament, is not to be presumed to act unfairly the courts may be able in suitable oases (Perhaps always to imply an obligation to act with fairness). Fairness, however, does not necessarily require a plurality of hearings or representations and counter-representations if there were too much elaboration of procedural safe guards, nothing could be done simply and quickly and cheaply. Adminis trative or executive efficiency and economy should not be too readily sacrificed. THE disadvantage of a plurality of hearings even in the judicial sphere was cogently pointed out in the majority judgments in Cozens North Devon Hospital Management Committee (1966) 2 Q.B. 330, 343, 346, 347." Reference to Pearlbergs case as decided by the Court of Appeals (1971) 1 W.L.R. 728 as also by the House of Lords (1972) 1 W.L.R. 534 was made by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851 and in paragraph 71 of the Reports it was observed :- "What the Election Commissioner does is not to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists or an ex parte order, subject to modification by him is to be made. If that were so Pearlberg, (1971) 1 W.L.R. 728 would have been an effective answer.'' In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the impugned order cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice. In order to consider the second submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order was bad for it did not record reasons as contemplated by Section 58 (2) of the Act it would be necessary to quote the order. Translated into English it reads thus:- "Whereas action is being taken against the Committee of Management of Swami Devanand Degree College Math Lar, Deoria, on the grounds contained in clauses (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of Section 57 of State Univer sities Act; And whereas on account of the property of the said college having been substantially diverted, misapplied and misappropriated by its Com mittee of Management, some teachers, having been appointed in contraven tion of the Statutes and Ordinance and no adequate arrangements of furniture etc. having been made the proper and regular management of the degree College is being adversely affected and taking of immediate action to protect it is very necessary; And whereas for this reason also that the Committee of Management may not be able to further injure the cause of the Degree College and its students by committing any other kind of illegality it is necessary to take immediate action in the interest of the Degree College. THE Gover nor, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by sub-section (2) of section 58 of the State Universities Act, makes an order that the Committee of Management of the said Degree College may immediately be suspended and that the said Degree College and its property may, during the period of such suspension, be carried on by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Salempur, Deoria." THE question which falls for consideration is whether the aforesaid order fulfils the requirements of reason to be recorded as contemplated by Section 58(2) of the Act. Counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission on this point has placed reliance on various authorities reference to which will shortly be made but in our opinion they are clearly distinguishable. Before dealing with those oases it is necessary to be kept in mind that an order contemplated by Section 58 (2) as already pointed out above is of necessity to be passed ex parte and on the basis of the information which may have been received under Section 57 of the Act. At the stage when this order is passed the explanation of the management is not before the State Government and the reasons which are to be recorded by it can naturally not be expected to be such reasons which may show as to why and how the explanation given to the charges has been considered. THE cases cited by counsel for the petitioners in which observations have been made that the reasons should be such which may indicate why and how the explanation submitted by the party accused has been repelled will, therefore, not apply to the facts of the instant case. In the very nature of things the opinion which the State Government is to form on the question as to whether immediate action is necessary in the interest of the College will be a prima facie opinion based on ex parte material and not a final opinion given after considering the cases of both the parties. This is a circumstance which cannot be lost sight of while considering the arguments made by counsel for the petitioners. Now we refer to the cases relied on by counsel for the petitioners on this point. For the proposition that there is a difference between the conclusions reached or the findings given and the reasons for such conclusions and findings and that if no reasons are given for the conclusions or the findings arrived at the order would be bad reliance was placed on I.P. Kapoor v. State of U. P. 1967 A.L.J. 808 and State of U. P. v. Managing Committee 1973 A.L.J. 282. Both these were Cases where final orders had been passed after considering the explanation given in pur suance of the show-cause notices issued under the relevant provisions and it was emphasised that since no reasons had been recorded as to why the explanation given by the party concerned was not acceptable the order was bad. That there is difference between the conclusions and findings on the one hand and the reasons, therefore, admits of no doubt. Whether the im pugned order contains reasons or not will be considered a little later. In regard to the aforesaid two cases we may, however, point out that they' are distinguishable inasmuch as in the instant case the impugned order is not a final order passed after considering the explanation of the petitioners also but is an interim ex parte order passed on prima facie opinion of the State Govern ment. THE other case cited by counsel for the petitioners is Collector of Monghyr v. Kesho Prasad A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1694. That was a case in which Sections 3 to 5-A of the Bihar Private Irrigation Works Act fell for consideration. - Sections 3 to 5 laid down elaborate procedure for passing an order in regard to proposed work of repair, extension or alteration or irrigation work. Section 5-A, however, constituted a departure from the normal procedure indicated in sections 3 to 5. This section 5-A reads as follows:- "5-A (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, whenever, the Collector for reasons to be recorded by him, is of opinion that the delay in the repair of any existing irrigation work which may be occasioned by proceedings commenced by a notice under section 3 adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely lands which are depen dent on such irrigation work for a supply of water, he may forthwith cause the repair of such irrigation work to be begun by any one or more of the persons mentioned in clause (ii) of section 3 or by such agency as he thinks proper : Provided that the Collector shall cause public notice to be given at convenient places in every village in which the irrigation work is situated stating that the work mentioned therein has already been begun. (2) When any such work has been completed, the Collector shall cause notice to be given in the manner aforesaid stating that the work men tioned therein has been completed." Recourse in the aforesaid case was taken by the Collector to Section 5-A of the Act. One of the requirements of the said section as seen above is for reasons to be recorded by him is of opinion. THE relevant parts of the order which were challenged in the aforesaid case are quoted in paragraph 5 of the reports. Its perusal indicates that the Collector had almost repeated the requirements of section 5-A in his order without giving any reasons for his opinion and in this context it was held:- "THEre are two matters, which though somewhat interim related are nevertheless distinct and separate. One is the conclusion or finding of the Collector that the state of circumstances set out in S. 5-A (1) exists, and the other the reasons why and the grounds upon which the Collector reaches that conclusion that in the circumstances existing in a particular case it cannot brook the delay which the resort to the normal procedure of notice and enquiry for which provision is made by Ss. 2 to 5 should be departed from. To suggest that by a recital of the nature of the repairs required to be carried out and employing the language of S. 5-A (1) the officer has recorded his reasons for invoking S. 5-A is to confuse the recording of the conclusion of the officer with the reasons for which he arrived at the conclusion............what the section requires is that on the basis of materials which exist this might include the reports of officers as well as information gathered by the Collector himself by personal inspection or after enquiry he should reach the conclusion that irrigation works for the purposes set out in S. 5-A should be immediately taken on hand and completed and that there is such an emergency in having the work com pleted which will not brook that amount of delay which the notice and proceedings under Ss. 3 to 5 would entail. It is not, therefore, the pre sence of the material that is of sole relevance or the only criterion but the Collector's opinion as to the urgency coupled with his recording his reasons why he considers that the procedure under Ss. 3 to 5 should not be gone through.'' Section 5-A aforesaid makes it clear that before an order could be passed under the said section the following findings had to be recorded by the Collector:- "That the delay in repair of any existing work which may be occa sioned by proceedings commenced by a notice under section 3 adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely lands which are dependent on such irrigation work for a supply of water...............". THE impugned order simply contained these findings without giving reasons, there for, and was thus obviously bad in law. Coming to the facts of the instant case it would be seen that the only finding which has to be given or the conclusion which has to be reached by the State Government before passing an order under sub-section (2) of Section 58 is that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management. It is true that since order under section 58 (2) is to be passed while issuing a notice under section 57 the State Government would be deemed to have been satisfied that it was a fit case for issuing a notice under section 57. But this satisfaction too would be a prima facie satisfaction on the basis of an ex parte material. THE requirement of issuing a notice under section 57 is receipt of information as contemplated by the said section. No findings or reasons are expected to be recorded by the State Government in the document issuing notice. To except that a finding should be recorded by the State Government that the information conveyed to it under Section 57 is correct would not be proper inas much as at this stage there is nothing to discredit the information received. What has to be seen by the State Government is whether, if the facts stated in the information are correct on their face value a case has been made out for appointing an authorised controller under section 58 (1). At this stage no better reasons can be expected to be recorded except that the State Govern ment is prima facie satisfied that the information conveyed to it makes out a case for taking action under section 58. It is in this back ground that the words for reasons to be recorded in section 58 (2) have to be construed. As already seen above the only finding or the conclusion which would justify an order under section 58 (2) is that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management. If the impugned order, with out saying anything further, had just stated that immediate action was necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management, viz., only the finding necessary to pass the order would have been given without any reasons, therefor, as was done in the case of Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad (supra) the submission made by counsel for the petitioners may have been accepted. In the instant case, however, that is not the position. In our opinion the impugned order contains reasons in support of the finding that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management. THE order as seen above inter alia states that the property of the college had been substantially diverted, misapplied and misappropriated by the committee of management, that the management of the Degree College was being adversely affected and that it was also necessary to put a check on the activities of the committee of management so that it may not be able to further injure the cause of the degree college and its students by committing any other kind of illegality. Keeping in view the stage at which and the material on the basis of which an order under Section 58 (2) is to be passed we are of opinion that it cannot be said that the impugned order does not record any reasons for the requisite finding that immediate action is necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management. THE fact that the words "Substantially diverted, misapplied or misappropriated the property of the college" appear in Section 57 (v) in our opinion not of much importance in the circumstances of the present case because at the stage when the im pugned order was passed it was not expected of the State Government to record a categorical finding on this point on the basis of the material placed by both the parties. THE order clearly indicate that on the basis, of the ex parte material the State Government was satisfied that a case of substantial diversion, misapplication and misappropriation of the property of the college was made out on account of which immediate action was necessary in the interest of the college to suspend the management. THE original record of the case was paced before us by the Standing Counsel. It appears that certain complaints were received in respect of the management of the college. THEy were brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University, who consti tuted a committee for enquiry. THE Committee required the management of the college to assist it and to furnish necessary material in respect of the com plaints made against it and thereafter submitted a report to the Vice-Chancel lor which was forwarded by the Vice-Chancellor to the State Government along with his opinion that a case for the management being suspended forth with has been made out. Opinion was thereafter obtained from the legal Remembrancer and it was only then that the impugned order was passed. THE report which was submitted by the inquiry committee inter alia indicated that the income of the endowed property of the college was about Rs.19,000/-per year and this income for three years, has not been accounted for. It also indicated that even though expenses on a hostel were incurred from the college funds the income received from the hostel was not accounted for. If these facts are correct it cannot be said that the tentative opinion of the State Government that the property of the college had substantially been diverted misapplied or misappropriated is based on no material. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that the inquiry committee constituted by the Vice- Chancellor did not give adequate opportunity to the management of the college to explaln the matter. This assertion has been disputed by the Standing Counsel and on the basis of the original record it has been asserted that in spite of adequate opportunity being given the manage ment itself did not avail of the opportunity. Since the matter is still to be decided by the State Government after the management has submitted its expla nation we are of opinion that it is not the stage for entering into this controversy. Counsel for the petitioners on the basis of Mohinder Singh's case (supra) also urged that the respondents were not entitled to place the original record before this Court to supply fresh reasons for the order. We have looked into the record in order to ascertain whether ground no. (a) taken in the writ petition that there was no material before the State Government pass the impugned order was founded on facts or not. In our opinion in view of the facts stated above it is not a case of supplying fresh reasons for the impugned order. As seen above the 'impugned order itself contained reasons and the original record was placed before us only for the purpose to satisfy us as to whether there was any material even for the prima facie satisfaction of the Government, that the property of the college was being diverted, misapplied or misappropriated as stated in the impugned order. In our opinion, therefore the submission that the impugned order does not contain reasons is also unsustainable. Before parting with the case we may point out that a ground being ground No. 2 was also taken in the writ petition that the order of the State Government was inter alia, mala fide and politically motivated. It was, however, not seriously pressed before us by counsel for the petitioners when it was pointed out to him that no person to whom mala fide or political motivation could be imputed has been made a party to the writ petition to enable him to have his say in the matter, that the allegations about the impugned order being mala fide or politic ally motivated were vague and of a general character, that those allegations had been controverted in the counter-affidavit and had not been substantiated by any convincing evidence. Further, as has been asserted in the counter-affidavit the impugned order was passed on the basis of the recommendation made by the Vice-chancellor of the Gorakhpur University which in its turn was based on the report of the enquiry committee as seen above. No allegation of mala fide or political motivation has been made against either the Vice-Chancellor or any of the members of the enquiry committee. Another circumstances was brought to our notice during the course of arguments, even though no specific ground was taken in this behalf in the writ, petition, that on an earlier occasion also some complaint had been made against the management of the college, it was enquired into by the Director of Education, and was found not to be substantiated. Firstly, all the necessary material on this point is not on the record of the writ petition. Secondly, the question whether a case has been made out for the appointment of an authorised controller under section 58(1) of the Act or not is still pending before the State Government and it is open to the petitioners to raise in their explana tion the plea about the effect of the earlier enquiry on the present proceedings. We do not find it expedient to go into this question at this stage. In view of the foregoing discussion we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.;