K. C. Agarwal, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Bareilly dated 1-4-77 allowing an appeal filed under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 by Shrimati Una J. Massey, respondent 2. Shrimati Una J. Massey, respondent 2 filed an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 for release of House No. 171/2 Civil Lines, Bareilly on the ground that she was the owner and landlord of the said house. She alleged that she was in service out of Bareilly which had been terminated with effect from 28-9-1974, as she wanted to live in this house, hence she filed the application for the release. She also alleged that as the petitioner had been transferred to Moradabad and lived there he was not in need of the disputed house.
(2.) THE petitioner contested the application and denied that he was a tenant and was in occupation of the house in that capacity. He denied that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the petitioner. He claimed that the house in dispute previously belonged to one H. M. Angelo and that he had been paying rent to him. In 1968 H. M. Angelo wanted to sell the house. THErefore an agreement was executed between Angelo and the petitioner on February 14, 1968 whereby the former agreed to sell the house to the latter for a consideration of Rs. 14,000/-. Out of Rs. 14,000/- Rs. 7,000/- was paid immediately and the balance Rs. 7,000/- was to be paid in instalments in six years. It was further agreed that the petitioner would continue to remain in possession of the house and no rent would be payable by him from the date he completed the payment of Rs. 10.000/-. THE petitioner claimed that the balance amount of Rs. 7,000/- was also paid by him to Angelo. THE case of the petitioner further was that he could not get a sale-deed executed from H. M. Angelo because of the restrictions imposed by the Uttar Pradesh Government on transfer of urban land. Respondent 2 disputed the claim of ownership of the petitioner. She asserted that the aforesaid property along with some other properties belonged to her father late Shri S. J. Angelo who died leaving behind respondent 2 and her brothers and sisters as his heirs and legal representatives. By a registered partnership deed dated 11th March, 1971 entered into between the heirs of late S. J. Angelo i. e. respondent 2 and her brothers and sisters the building in dispute fell in the share of respondent 2. As the respondent 2 was employed with British Consults General Lahore, she had entrusted the management of the property to one H. B. Luke and thereafter on his death since 1968 H. N. Angelo was collecting rent on her behalf. The denial of relationship of landlord and tenant made by the petitioner raised a serious controversy about title. The petitioner did not only refute the claim of respondent No. 2 being the owner of the property but also set up title in himself ; both the parties filed a number of documents in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority held that respondent No. 2 was not the owner of the property and that she had no right to get the house vacated from the petitioner. In appeal the District Judge took a different view.
(3.) THE sole question that arose for consideration before the court below and still arises for decision before me is whether a question of title of ownership of a property could be gone into in the proceedings under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. THEre is nothing in the Act which deprives a court, dealing with an application under Section 21 to decide a question of title when raised. However, it appears to me that a court dealing with an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 being a court of limited jurisdiction did not have the jurisdiction or authority to decide a complicated and intricate question of title if the same arises for decision before him. If a question of title is decided incidentally for the purposes of deciding the chief point involved, there can be no objection to such a decision but where as here, the substantial object of the respondent 2 was to get a decision of her title through the application filed under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the same has to be objected to and cannot be permitted. Admittedly the respondent 2 never realised any rent from the petitioner. She could not file any document which could establish a direct relationship of landlord and tenant between herself and the petitioner. Apart from the direct evidence, no other evidence could be brought on the record showing the admission of the petitioner of her title. To the contrary the evidence brought showed that the petitioner had been paying rent to Angelo. THE petitioner also filed an agreement executed by Angelo to sell the property to him. THE genuineness of the partition deed filed by respondent 2 under which she claimed title had also been disputed by the petitioner. In the background of all these facts, it was not a case where a court dealing with an application under Section 21 could decide the question of title. A Prescribed Authority appointed for the purpose of deciding an application under Section 21 as well as an appellate court to which an appeal is filed against such a decision are not in a position to make a thorough and full inquiry of the disputed question of title. As I may not be understood as saying that in no case the question of title can be decided by an authority dealing with an application under Section 21, I wish to make it clear that this is a question the decision of which has to differ from case to case. It is not possible to lay down any criterion exhaustively which has to be taken into consideration, while deciding this question It may, however, be mentioned that where an authority finds that the question of title of the landlord has been disputed by a tenant with an ulterior motive for the purpose of delaying the disposal, the Prescribed Authority would certainly be entitled to investigate into title and decide it. In such a case the question of title could be said to have incidentally arisen for decision. Similarly, where a dispute of title raised by a tenant appears to be frivolous, the Prescribed Authority would be fully competent to decide the same. A plea is said to be frivolous, where it appears from bare inspection to be lacking in legal sufficiency, and where in view of the facts pleaded it does not present a plausible defence. A plea is also said to be frivolous where it is interposed for mere purpose of delay or to embarrass the opponent. In such a case, it is so clearly and pulpably bad as to require any argument. Similarly, a dispute of title which is sham can also be investigated. A sham plea is good on its face ; but false infact. It may by all appearances constitute a direct defence but is a pretence because false and because not pleaded in good faith. All these things have been said by me only by way of illustrations.;