K.N.Singh, J. - (1.) SURYA Nath Tewari petitioner was employed as Central Nazir in the District Judgeship of Azamgarh. His date of birth as mentioned in the service book and his High School Examination certificate was 1-3-1918 which had been attested by him. He made an application to the District Judge for the correction of his date of birth. He asserted that he was born in 1925 and his date of birth as mentioned in the High School Examination certificate was incorrect. The District Judge by his order dated 23rd January, 1973, accepted the petitioner's contention and directed that entry be made in the service book showing his date of birth as 1-1-1925 instead of 1-3-1918. Ram Palat Singh and Surendra Nath Lal, respondents, two senior clerks in the Judgeship of Azamgarh, had opposed the petitioner's claim for correction of his age before the District Judge but their representations were rejected. Thereafter they filed a representation before the High Court. The High Court by its order dated 3rd February, 1976 set aside the order of the District Judge correcting the petitioner's age. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the High Court, The District Judge purported to exercise his powers in correcting the petitioner's date of birth in his service book under rule 127-A as contained in Chapter VII of the Financial Handbook, Vol. V, Part I. Rule 127-A including the note appended thereto are as under:- "127-A. The date of birth by Christian era should be clearly entered in the appropriate column of the annual establishment return to be submitted to the Accountant General. In the case of a person who first entered military employ and was subsequently employed in a civil department, his date of birth for the purpose of his civil employment should be the date stated by him at the time of attestation. In such cases, however, where the document referring to the previous military service do not give the exact date of birth but only the age stated at the time of attestation, the government servant concerned should be assumed to have completed the stated age on the date of attestation. For instance, if an ex-soldier was enrolled on January 1, 1910, and if on that date his age was stated to be 18, his date of birth should be taken as January 1, 1892...............Cases, however, in which the date of birth has already been determined by a different method are not to be re-opened and should not be treated in the above manner. Note-The date of birth once determined may be altered, except in the case of a clerical error under the orders of the Government. Heads of Departments, Secretaries to Government and District and Sessions Judge are authorised to direct the alteration in the date of birth of non-gazetted government servants provided that the correct date is clearly proved in every case. They should, however, not exercise this power in the case of non-gazetted government servants who have at any time officiated as gazetted officers." The above rule, in the first instance, requires that the date of birth of a Government servant should clearly be entered in the annual establishment return submitted to the Accountant General; secondly, it lays down the manner for the determination of the date of birth of a Government servant who may have joined civil department after rendering service in Military; thirdly, the rule lays down that the method of determining the date of birth should also be followed in cases where a person enters civil employment without having entered into military service if he is unable to give his date of birth but gives only his age. If a person entering Government service is unable to give his date of birth and if he only gives his age, the method for determining the date of birth as prescribed in the rule may be followed. Fourthly, the rule requires that in case where the date of birth has already been determined by a different method it should not be re-opened. The rule does not contemplate alteration of date of birth of a Government servant where the exact date of birth is given by the Government servant and accepted by the authority concerned. The note appended to the said rule however permits correction of date of birth under certain conditions. A clerical error pertaining to the date of birth once determined is permitted to be corrected under the orders of the Government. The note lays down that so far as non-gazetted government servants are concerned, the power to alter the date of birth of a Government servant is to be exercised by the Head of Departments, Secretaries to Government and District and Sessions Judge, provided the correct date of birth of a Government servant is clearly proved and it is shown that the date of birth as determined earlier was incorrect. A careful reading of the rule and the note appended thereto thus makes it amply clear that the date of birth of a Government servant once determined is ordinarily not open to correction except in cases mentioned in the rule. In the instant case, the petitioner's date of birth as entered in his service book was 1-3-1918 in accordance with his High School Examination certificate. This date of birth had been declared by the petitioner at the time he joined his service and that had been accepted by the District Judge which was recorded in his service book. The petitioner in his application before the District Judge stated that this date of birth had wrongly been recorded in the High School Examination certificate and he produced evidence in support of his contention that he was born in 1925. The petitioner, however, failed to give any specific date of his birth. The District Judge after considering the material produced before him held that the petitioner was born somewhere in 1925 and it was on that basis that he held that the petitioner's date of birth should be taken as January 1, 1925, in accordance with the formula laid down in rule 127-A even though none of the contingencies as prescribed in the main clause of rule 127-A existed. At the time the petitioner joined Government service he gave out 1-3-1918 as his date of birth and in support of his statement he produced his High School Examination certificate. The appointing authority determined the petitioner's date of birth accordingly. The petitioner attested the same. Thereafter, it was not open to the District and Sessions Judge to re-open the question. None of the conditions precedent as prescribed by rule 127-A were available for altering the petitioner's date of birth. The District Judge committed error in correcting the petitioner's date of birth in the service book. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the note to rule 127-A and contended that the District and Sessions Judge was competent to direct the alteration in the petitioner's date of birth as the petitioner had proved by cogent evidence that the date of birth mentioned in the service book was incorrect. We find no merit in this contention. The note, in the first instance, permits correction of clerical error after obtaining the orders of the Government. Secondly, the note permits alteration in the date of birth in the circumstances mentioned in the main clause of the rule and the note designates authorities empowered to order alteration. As discussed earlier, rule 127-A lays down that if a person while joining civil service is not able to give his date of birth, instead he gives his age only, in that case his date of birth may be altered provided he proves his date of birth to the satisfaction of the authority designated under the note. There is a basic difference between the date of birth and age. Many a time, a person entering civil employment is not able to give his date of birth, instead he gives out his age. In such cases, if later on his date of birth is ascertained then alteration may be made. But in a case, where exact date of birth as mentioned in the High School Examination certificate is furnished and attested in the service book it is not open to alter the same on the basis of age. In the instant case, the petitioner while entering service had given exact date of birth on the basis of the High School Examination certificate and that date was attested by him and accepted by the appointing authority. The District Judge, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct alteration in the date of birth entered in the service book of the petitioner, Moreover, the petitioner was not able to give exact date of his birth in the application filed by him, instead he merely gave his age and on that basis the District Judge corrected the date of birth. The District Judge, in our opinion, exceeded his jurisdiction in permitting the alteration in the petitioner's date of birth as mentioned in the service book. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the District Judge while correcting the petitioner's date of birth exercised a statutory power as conferred on him by rule 127-A and his order was final and as no appeal or representation is prescribed by the rule, the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the District Judge on the representation of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. We find no merit in this submission also. The petitioner has failed to place any material to show that rule 127-A or the note appended thereto has got statutory character. As noted earlier, the rule in question is contained in Financial Handbook, Vol. V, Part I, which contains instructions to Government servants generally in dealing with Treasuries. Part I contains account rules. Chapter VII as contained in Part I, deals with establishment and rule 127-A is under the sub-heading "annual returns". The instructions as contained in Part I of the said book do not show that they have been framed in exercise of any statutory power or that each one of the instructions have statutory force. It is therefore difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that rule 127-A is statutory in nature. But even assuming that the note appended to rule 127-A is statutory and it conferred power on the District Judge to alter the date of birth of a non-gazetted Government servant, the High Court being superior authority vested with the control of subordinate courts and persons employed thereunder, has authority to hear representations against the order of the District Judge. Paragraph 376(5) (viii) of the Manual of Government Orders lays down that whenever in any matter connected with his service rights or conditions, a Government servant wishes to press a claim or to seek redress of a grievance the proper course for him is to address his immediate officer superior of the Head of his office or such other authority at the lowest level as is competent to deal with the matter. Paragraph 376(8)(b) further lays down that an appeal or representation to a higher authority must not be made unless the appropriate lower authority has already rejected his claim or refused the relief or ignored or unduly delayed the disposal of the case. These provisions clearly show that the grievance of a Government servant must be raised before the lowest authority at the lowest level and in case of further grievance the Government servant concerned may make representation before the immediate superior authority or the head of office. In the instant case, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were affected by the correction of petitioner's date of birth as their chances of promotion were postponed for a period of six years on account of the correction. They had raised grievance before the District Judge against the correction of the petitioner's date of birth. Their representation was rejected by the District Judge, thereupon they made representation to the High Court which is superior authority and the District Judge and the staff employed in the subordinate courts is under the control of the High Court. The High Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's representation. The petitioner was given opportunity to contest the representation of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the respondents representation and also placed his case before the High Court by means of a detailed representation. The petitioner was thus afforded full opportunity before the High Court to defend the District Judge's order. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner at no stage questioned the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the representation of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 against the order of the District Judge. Since the petitioner took a change to get a decision in his favour from the High Court, it is now not open to him to turn round and challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court. We have already held that the order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and if that order has been set aside by the High Court in its administrative side, it would not be proper or desirable to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground that the High Court acted without jurisdiction. It is well settled that no relief would be granted to a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce or revive an order passed illegally or without jurisdiction. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief on this ground also. Learned counsel then urged that the impugned order of the High Court is vitiated as it is not a speaking order and does not contain reasons for setting aside the order of the District Judge. The impugned order of the High Court setting aside the order of the District Judge is administrative in nature and it is not vitiated on account of absence of reasons as each and every administrative order need not contain reasons. On the petitioner's request we sent for the relevant file from the Administrative Department of the High Court and on a perusal of the same we found that the matter was examined by the High Court at considerable length. Detailed reasons have been recorded in the file for setting aside the order of the District Judge. The matter was examined by the Administrative Judge as well as by the Chief Justice and only thereafter final decision was taken. It is true that the order which was communicated to the District Judge does not contain reasons but on that account the order is not vitiated. There is no statutory requirement that the order of the High Court in such matters must contain reasons. No doubt it would be desirable to indicate reasons in the order but absence of those reasons does not vitiate the order of the High Court. Lastly, the learned counsel urged that the order in question imposed punishment as the petitioner's period of service has been reduced under the orders of the High Court as he was not given a reasonable opportunity the order of the High Court is violative of Article 311. In our opinion the argument is wholly misconceived. The District Judge had corrected the petitioner's date of birth illegally. The High Court merely set aside that order. There is no question of imposing punishment against the petitioner or curtailing his period of service. The petitioner is therefore not entitled to the protection of Article 311. In view of the above discussion, we find no valid ground to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.;