SATISH CHANDRA,C.J. - (1.) THIS Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that it is belated; that the impugned order of reversion did not amount to reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution and that the impugned order of reversion did not violate Art. 16 of the Constitution. When this appeal came up for hearing, learned counsel for the appellant informed us that the appellant has an alternative remedy by way of approaching the Services Tribunal constituted under the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act (U.P. Act no. 17 of 1976) and, therefore, the appeal as well as the writ petition are liable to be abated under Section 58 of the Forty-Second Constitution Amendment Act. Section 58 aforesaid is headed as under: 58. "Special provision as to pending petitions under Article 226.,'
(2.) IN substance, it provides that pending petitions under Article 226 of the constitution shall abate in case an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party. By the Forty-Second Constitution Amendment Act, Article 226 was amended. One of the statutory limits imposed on Article 226 was that jurisdiction under Article 226 would not be exercised in cases where there is an alternative remedy. The well settled principle that Article 226 conferred a discretionary jurisdiction and was not liable to be exercised in cases where an alternative remedy is available has been made by the Forty-Second Constitution Amendment Act as a statutory restriction or limit on the jurisdiction itself. In order to further the legislative intent behind this limitation, Section 58 of the Forty-Second Constitution Amendment Act specifically provided for abatement of such petitions pending under Article 226. The question is whether the provisions of Section 58 are applicable to Special Appeals also which are pending under the letters patent read with the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order 1948, against decisions rendered in petitions under Article 226 of Constitution.
(3.) FOR the appellant, reliance was placed on certain decisions which say that Article 226 confers jurisdiction on the High Courts. It does not ordain whether the jurisdiction shall be exercised by the Judges sitting alone or in Division Benches. If according to the Rules of the Court the jurisdiction under Article 226 is exercised by a Judge sitting alone and if under the law and Rules of the Court an appeal from the j judgment of a learned Single Judge lies, the High Court exercises the same jurisdiction as is conferred under Article 226 while hearing and disposing of an appeal. See Chairman Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia and others (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 433). It was further emphasized that as recognised by the Supreme Court in Carikapati Veerava v. N. Subbiat Choudhary and others (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540), the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal pro­ceeding. This suggests that the proceedings, whether pending in the court of first instance or of appeal are some in nature and character. In other words, the petition under Article 226 remains pending in the High Court, either before a Single Judge or a Division Bench.;