JUDGEMENT
Deoki Nandan, J. -
(1.) THIS is a defendant's second appeal arising from a suit for declaration that the charge-sheet dated 28.12.1966 and the proceedings thereafter resulting in the passing of the resolution of the Managing Committee of the defendant-institution dated 1.10.1967 and the notice issued thereafter dated 2.12.1967 are illegal, ineffective, ultra vires and not binding on the plaintiff. The trial court decreed the suit in part declaring the notice dated 2.12.1967 requiring the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service to be illegal, ineffective and ultra vires. Rest of the claim made by the plaintiff was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, the suit was decreed into to with costs throughout. The grounds on which the plaintiff had claimed the relief have been summarised by the trial court thus: "(1) The plaintiff was appointed by the Managing Committee of 1952 which was properly constituted and as such alleged disciplinary action against the plaintiff can only be taken by 'a properly constituted com mittee but as the present committee was not a proper and valid com mittee. The disciplinary action against the plaintiff was unfounded. (2) The next contention is that no charge-sheet was issued by a com petent authority, and therefore, the notice of penalty is illegal, premature and ultra vires. (3) Thirdly it has been urged that the Enquiry Officer was not appointed by a competent authority and therefore was not an enquiry officer in the eye of law and is not entitled to proceed against the plaintiff, it has been urged in this connection that the charge-sheet issued by the Enquiry Officer is not a charge- sheet in the eye of law. (4) The alleged charge-sheet has not been signed by disciplinary autho rity and the same is not charge- sheet and no action can be taken on this basis. (5) The defendant no. 5 being a party to the alleged dispute between the plaintiff and him, the enquiry should have been conducted according to Education Act by a committee. The present Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to try. (6) It has been urged that the Management Committee is not competent to issue the impugned notices. (7) Lastly the notice of the proposed penalty being based on an improper report and malicious report the proposed penalty cannot be imposed." And the following were the issues on which the parties went to trial: 1. Whether the present Management Committee is not competent to take action against the plaintiff for the reasons contained in paras 6 and 7 of plaint ?
(2.) WHETHER the present management committee has regularised its status as alleged in para 34 of additional pleas of written statement ?
Whether the notice of proposed penalty is illegal and ultra vires for the reasons contained in paragraph 14 of the plaint ?
To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?
(3.) HAS this court no jurisdiction to the suit for the reasons contained in para 30 of W. S. ?
Has the plaintiff no cause of action ? On issue no. 1 the trial court found that the present committee and the Scheme of Administration under which it was functioning were approved by the Director of Education under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act; that thus the present committee is the only competent authority to take the place of appointing authority in relation to the plaintiff and to inflict punishment and proceed with disciplinary action against him. On issue no. 2, the trial court held that the plaintiff's services are governed by the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the present Committee of Management, after the approval of the Scheme of Administration by the Director of Education under the provisions of that Act is a valid committee empowered to take action against the plaintiff. On issue no. 3, the trial court' held that the two charge-sheets served on the plaintiff were not illegal and could not, therefore, be cancelled but the notice dated 2nd December, 1967 issued to the plaintiff to show cause against his dismissal was ineffective and ultra vires and it would be open to the Committee of Management to start enquiry de novo on the charges dated 28.12.1966 and 1.10.1967 if it still deems necessary to do so by appointing another independent person as the Enquiry Officer and to proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act. On issue no. 5, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit; on issue no. 6, that the plaintiff had a cause of action and in the result the suit was decreed as aforesaid declaring the s how cause notice dated 2nd December, 1967 to be illegal, ineffective and ultra vires. The ground on which the said show cause notice was held to be illegal was that Shri D. P. Singh to whom the enquiry had been entrusted as the Enquiry Officer, was not an impartial person. The lower appellate court has, however, held that the defendants could not establish before him the validity and competency of the Managing Committee, by any means or circumstance whatsoever, and held that the Managing Committee and also the Scheme of Administration framed by the registered society are illegal, unauthorised and incompetent insofar as they relate to the institution or the trust, for want of Government's sanction and orders under section 5 of the Charitable Endowments Act. It was basically, on this finding that the lower appellate court proceeded to hold that all the actions taken by the Managing Committee against the plaintiff, including the passing of the suspension order after the judgment of the trial court, were illegal and ultra vires. However, by way of an epilogue, the learned District Judge also added that the beginning of the controversy was trifling and that the enquiry was started on account of the displeasure of the principal against the plaintiff, that Shri D. P. Singh was biased against the appellant and was related to the principal. On this ground also, it was held by the learned District Judge that all the actions and disciplinary proceedings, including the charge-sheets and the enquiries held against the plaintiff were illegal and not binding upon him. This appeal had earlier been heard by Hon'ble K. B. Asthana, J. as he then was and by a detailed order the following issue was remitted to the trial court, namely, "Whether the Committee of Management appointed under the Govern ment Notification dated 27.7.1960 published in the Government of Uttar Pradesh Gazette, Education (C) Department in 6.8.1960 at any time before July 17, 1964 framed or deemed to have framed any Rules or Regulations in exercise of its power under rule 16 of the said Scheme." The Trial Court has returned the following finding on this issue: "From the evidence, adduced by the parties, I hold that the Committee of Management, appointed under the Government Notification, dated 27.7.60 published in the Government of Uttar Pradesh Gazette, Educa tion (C) Department on 6.8.1960, before July 17, 1964, framed the rules in exercise of its power under rule 16 of the said scheme." When the matter was again placed before Hon'ble K. B. Asthana, the Chief Justice as he then was on 7th May, 1977, he felt that the order dated 16th February, 1971 remitting the issue was uncalled for, as it was based on the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that he will not rely upon the registration of the Society. Under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which could not have been permitted as no such plea was raised in the written statement. Certain other pleas were thereafter raised before the 'Hon'ble Chief Justice but as he was relinquishing his office that very day he could not decide the case and released it; and that is how it has come up before me for hearing to-day. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, I am of the opinion that this appeal deserves to be allowed on a very short ground. It is undisputed that Udai Pratap College, Varanasi, in which the plaintiff-respondent has been a teacher in the Intermediate Section, is a recognised institu tion within the meaning of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The Management of all recognised institutions and the service conditions of all the teachers employed therein are governed, since the passing of the Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958, by the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act as amended thereby and the regulations framed there under. It is undisputed that in compliance with the provisions of that Act and the regulations framed there under a Scheme of Administration was submitted and approved by the Director of Education, and the impugned action was taken by and under the directions of the Committee of Manage ment functioning under and in accordance with the scheme of administration so framed, under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. These provisions are statutory and vest the powers of management, including the right to take disciplinary action or to remove or dismiss a teacher employed in a recognised institution, in the Committee of Management in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the regulations framed there under and the Scheme of Administration approved by the Director of Education, in respect of the institution. The trial court did record a finding to that effect. The lower appellate court has, however, brushed aside that finding simply by saying that the approval of the Director of Education given to the scheme of administration under the Intermediate Education Act could confer no authority on the Committee of Management to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff. The learned Judge has not given any particular reason for thus displacing the effect of the statutory provisions of the Intermediate Education Act. I agree with the finding of the trial court on this point. As to the other ground added by way of epilogue by the learned District Judge, for holding that all actions and disciplinary proceedings taken by the Committee of Management were illegal, it was, in my opinion, clearly in excess of his jurisdiction to do so. He was not sitting on appeal over the actions of the Committee of Management. No allegations of mala fides was established against the Committee of Management as such, and all the actions taken being within its competence and authority to take, the civil court has had no jurisdiction to interfere with the same. The re suit is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court of the District Judge, Varanasi, in Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1969 are set aside and those of the trial court in suit No. 152 of 1967 are restored. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal as no one has appeared for the plaintiff-respondent. All the stay orders in this case shall stand vacated.;