M.P.MEHROTRA, J. - (1.) THIS petition raised out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
(2.) THE facts in brief, are these: The petitioner was issued notice under section 10(2, and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority, Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was dismissed by the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gonda. A certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court has been annexed to the petition and marked as annexure 6. A true copy of the order of the Prescribed Authority has been annexed to the petition and marked as annexure 2. Now, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof L have heard Shri H. S. Sahai learned counsel for the petitioner. The controversy is about certain sale deeds which were ignored by the Prescribed Authority and also by the appellate court. Admittedly, "the sale deeds were executed after 24th January, 1971, and, therefore, the authorities below were bound, in view of the language of section 5(6), to ignore the said documents. However, if clause (b) of the proviso was held to be applicable then the docu­ments could be accepted. It should be seen that the language used in clause (b) of the proviso to section 5(6) speaks of the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority. The Division Bench in Ram Agyan Singh's case (1969 A.LJ, 1060), laid down as under; "..................it is well settled that where it is the satisfaction of a statutory authority which affects the determination of a question it is not open to the court on a petition for oertiorari to interfere with that deter­mination unless the satisfaction of the statutory authority can be shown to be perverse or vitiated by mala fide."
(3.) THIS Division Bench pronouncement was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murlidhar v. State of U. P. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924). It is, therefore, important that it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority which has been made the crux of the matter. It is true that such satisfaction cannot merely be subjective. Still, it has to be emphasised that in view of the aforesaid Division Benoh pronouncement, it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority which is important and which has been made a pre-requisite before the benefit of clause (b) of the proviso can be extended to any transfer deed. The Division Bench clearly laid down that if certain results follow from the satisfaction of an authority then unless such satisfaction is shown to be perverse or mala fide, the court in its writ jurisdiction cannot interfere.;